זבחים דף יג

צד כרת לא פריך.

does not refute the inference by citing a common element of karet, as the elements of karet in a sin offering and in a Paschal offering are not parallel.

אשם נמי לייתי!

The Gemara asks: If so, let it be derived from this inference that a guilt offering is also disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.

אשם – פריך: מה להצד השוה שבהן, שכן ישנן בצבור כביחיד.

The Gemara answers: With regard to a guilt offering, ben Azzai refutes the inference as follows: What is notable about the common element of a sin offering and a Paschal offering? It is notable in that there are communal offerings as well as individual offerings of these types, as well as communal burnt offerings, whereas there is no communal guilt offering.

ואיבעית אימא: צד כרת נמי פריך, ובן עזאי גמרא גמיר לה. והא דקאמר רב הונא קל וחומר – לא אמרה אלא לחדד בה תלמידיו.

And if you wish, say instead that actually, ben Azzai also refutes the entire inference, because a sin offering and a Paschal offering uniquely share an element of karet. And the reason ben Azzai maintains that a burnt offering sacrificed not for its sake is disqualified is that he learned it as a tradition. And as for the fact that Rav Huna cites an a fortiori inference, he does not believe it to be the true source for ben Azzai’s halakha; he said it only to sharpen the minds of his students with it, challenging them to refute it.

מתני׳ הפסח והחטאת ששחטן שלא לשמן, קבל והלך וזרק שלא לשמן; או לשמן ושלא לשמן, או שלא לשמן ולשמן – פסולים.

MISHNA: With regard to the Paschal offering and the sin offering, where one slaughtered them not for their sake, or where he collected their blood in a vessel, conveyed this blood to the altar, or sprinkled this blood on the altar not for their sake, or where he performed one of these sacrificial rites for their sake and not for their sake, or not for their sake and for their sake, in all these cases the offerings are unfit.

כיצד לשמן ושלא לשמן? לשם פסח ולשם שלמים. שלא לשמן ולשמן? לשם שלמים ולשם פסח.

How are these rites performed for their sake and not for their sake? In a case where one slaughtered the Paschal offering for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a peace offering. How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? In a case where one slaughtered the Paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering and for the sake of a Paschal offering.

שהזבח נפסל בארבעה דברים: בשחיטה, ובקבול, ובהילוך, ובזריקה.

The offering is unfit because a slaughtered offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent in four matters: In the performance of the sacrificial rites of slaughtering the animal, in collecting the blood, in conveying the blood, and in sprinkling the blood.

רבי שמעון מכשיר בהילוך, שהיה אומר: אי אפשר שלא בשחיטה ושלא בקבלה ושלא בזריקה, אבל אפשר בלא הילוך – שוחט בצד המזבח וזורק.

Rabbi Shimon deems the offering fit if the prohibited intent was during the rite of conveying the blood, as he would say: It is impossible to sacrifice an offering without slaughtering the animal, or without collection of the blood, or without sprinkling the blood, but it is possible to sacrifice an offering without conveying the blood to the altar. How so? If one slaughters the animal alongside the altar and sprinkles the blood, the blood does not need to be conveyed. Therefore, the rite of conveying the blood is not significant enough to cause the offering to be disqualified due to prohibited intent while performing it.

רבי אליעזר אומר: המהלך במקום שהוא צריך להלך – מחשבה פוסלת; במקום שאינו צריך להלך – אין מחשבה פוסלת.

Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to one who conveys the blood in a situation where he is required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it disqualifies the offering. If he conveys the blood in a situation where he is not required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it does not disqualify the offering.

גמ׳ וקבלה מי פסלה?!

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a slaughtered offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent while performing four rites, including collection of the blood. The Gemara asks: And does collection of the blood with prohibited intent disqualify the offering?

והתניא: ״והקריבו״ – זו קבלת הדם. אתה אומר קבלת הדם, או אינו אלא זריקה? כשהוא אומר ״וזרקו״ – הרי זריקה אמור; הא מה אני מקיים ״והקריבו״?

But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall present the blood” (Leviticus 1:5); this is referring to collection of the blood. Do you say it is referring to collection of the blood, or is it referring to only sprinkling the blood? When it states immediately afterward: “And sprinkle the blood roundabout against the altar,” sprinkling the blood is thereby stated. If so, how do I realize the meaning of: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall present”? This is referring to collection of the blood. And the phrase “the sons of Aaron, the priests” teaches that collection of the blood must be performed by a fit priest, i.e., one who has no blemish and who was not disqualified due to flawed lineage, and that he must do so while he is wearing priestly service vestments.

זו קבלת הדם. ״בני אהרן הכהנים״ – שתהא בכהן כשר ובכלי שרת.

אמר רבי עקיבא: מנין לקבלה שלא תהא אלא בכהן כשר ובכלי שרת? נאמר כאן: ״בני אהרן״, ונאמר להלן: ״אלה שמות בני אהרן הכהנים המשחים״; מה

The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva said: From where is it derived that collection of the blood may be performed only by a fit priest and while he is wearing service vestments? The expression “the sons of Aaron” is stated here in the verse in Leviticus, and it is stated there: “These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the priests that were anointed, whom he consecrated to minister in the priest’s office” (Numbers 3:3). Just as there, in the verse in Numbers, it mentions the word “priests” with regard to fit priests, i.e., Aaron’s sons, and with regard to priests who were consecrated to serve by being dressed with service vestments (see Exodus 29:30), so too here, the reference is to a fit priest and with regard to one who is wearing service vestments.

להלן – בכהן כשר ובכלי שרת, אף כאן – בכהן כשר ובכלי שרת.

אמר רבי טרפון: אקפח את בניי, אם לא שמעתי להבחין הפרש בין קבלה לזריקה. ואין לי לפרש.

Rabbi Tarfon said: I will bury my sons if I did not hear a halakha from my teachers discerning a distinction between collection of and sprinkling the blood, but I cannot explicate the distinction, as I do not remember what it was.

אמר רבי עקיבא, אני אפרש: קבלה – לא עשה בה מחשבה כמעשה, זריקה – עשה בה מחשבה כמעשה. קבלו בחוץ – אינו חייב כרת,

The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva said: I will explicate: With regard to collection, the Torah does not render intent like action. Collecting the blood with prohibited intent does not disqualify the offering. But with regard to sprinkling, the Torah does render intent like action. Furthermore, if one collected the blood outside the Temple, he is not liable to be punished with karet. But if one sprinkled the blood outside the Temple, he is punished with karet. Moreover, if those who are unfit for the Temple service collected the blood, they are not liable for that action. But if those who are unfit for the Temple service sprinkled the blood, they are liable to receive the penalty of death at the hand of Heaven for that action.

זרקו בחוץ – ענוש כרת. קבלוהו פסולין – אין חייבין עליו, זרקוהו פסולין – חייבין עליו.

אמר לו רבי טרפון: העבודה אם הטית ימין ושמאל! אני שמעתי ואין לי לפרש, אתה דורש ומסכים לשמועה! בלשון הזה אמר לו: עקיבא, כל הפורש ממך כפורש מחייו.

Rabbi Tarfon said to him excitedly: I take an oath by the Temple service that you have not deviated left or right from what I heard from my teachers. I myself heard them and I cannot explicate what they taught, whereas you teach this halakha on your own in concurrence with the halakha I heard. He said to Rabbi Akiva, using this language: Akiva, anyone who leaves you is like one who leaves his life. In any event, Rabbi Akiva’s statement in the baraita apparently contradicts the mishna with regard to the matter of whether the collection of the blood with prohibited intent disqualifies the offering.

אמר רבא: לא קשיא; כאן במחשבת פיגול, כאן במחשבת שלא לשמה.

Rava said: It is not difficult. The baraita here is referring to intent of piggul, i.e., intent to consume or burn the offering after its appointed time. The mishna there is referring to intent not for the sake of the offering.

דיקא נמי, דקתני ״שהזבח נפסל״, ולא קתני ״מתפגל״; שמע מינה.

The Gemara adds: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches that a slaughtered offering is disqualified in this manner, and it does not teach that an offering is rendered piggul in this manner. Apparently, the mishna is referring to intent that merely disqualifies the offering without rendering it piggul, one who partakes of which is liable to receive karet. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from the mishna’s language that this interpretation is correct.

ומחשבת פיגול לא פסלה בקבלה?!

The Gemara asks: And does intent of piggul during the collection of the blood not disqualify the offering?

והתניא: יכול לא תהא מחשבה מועלת אלא בזריקה בלבד; מנין לרבות שחיטה וקבלה? תלמוד לומר: ״ואם האכל יאכל מבשר זבח שלמיו (פיגול

But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One might have thought that intent to consume an offering after its designated time is effective to render the offering piggul only when one has that intent during sprinkling. From where is it derived to include slaughter and collection of the blood in this halakha? The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be an abhorred thing [piggul ]” (Leviticus 7:18). As derived on 29a, the verse is referring to performance of the sacrificial rites with intent to consume the offering after its designated time. The phrase “is at all eaten” teaches that the verse speaks of matters that lead to consumption, i.e., those sacrificial rites that enable consumption of the offering, including slaughter of the animal and collecting the blood.

הוא) ביום השלישי לא ירצה״ – בדברים המביאין לידי אכילה הכתוב מדבר.

יכול שאני מרבה אף שפיכת שיריים והקטרת אימורין?

The baraita continues: One might have thought that I should include even the pouring of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar, after its sprinkling, and the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar.

תלמוד לומר: ״ביום השלישי לא ירצה, המקריב אותו לא יחשב״ – זריקה בכלל היתה, ולמה יצתה? להקיש אליה. לומר לך: מה זריקה מיוחדת – שהיא עבודה (ומכפרת),

Therefore, the verse states: “On the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it” (Leviticus 7:18). The phrase “the one who offers it” indicates the sprinkling of the blood. Sprinkling was included in the general category of rites that enable consumption. And for what purpose was it singled out? To compare other halakhot to it, i.e., to say to you: Just as sprinkling is unique, as it is a rite and if not performed it prevents atonement, so too, any rite that prevents atonement if not performed is included in the halakha of piggul. Pouring the remainder of the blood and burning the sacrificial portions are therefore excluded, as they do not prevent atonement if not performed. Evidently, intent of piggul applies to the collection of the blood, contrary to Rava’s resolution of the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita.

ומעכבת כפרה; אף כל – עבודה, ומעכבת כפרה. יצאו שפיכת שיריים והקטרת אימורין – שאין מעכבין את הכפרה.

אלא לא קשיא; הא דאמר: ״הריני שוחט על מנת לקבל דמה למחר״, הא דאמר: ״הריני מקבל דמה על מנת לשפוך שירים למחר״.

The Gemara answers: Rather, it is not difficult. This statement of Rava, that intent of piggul does not apply to collection, is referring to a case where the one slaughtering the offering says: I am hereby slaughtering this offering in order to collect its blood tomorrow. Because the collection of the blood is not considered consumption, such intent does not render the offering piggul. That statement of the baraita is referring to a case where the one collecting the blood says: I am hereby collecting its blood in order to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar tomorrow. Since pouring the remains is considered consumption of the blood on the altar, such intent renders the offering piggul.

אמר ליה ההוא מרבנן לרבא: ושפיכת שירים והקטרת אימורין – לא פסלה בהו מחשבה?!

One of the Sages said to Rava: And does prohibited intent with regard to the pouring of the remainder of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions not disqualify the offering, as this explanation of the baraita seems to indicate?

והתנן: יכול לא תהא מחשבה מועלת אלא באכילת בשר, מנין לרבות שפיכת שירים והקטרת אימורים? תלמוד לומר: ״ואם האכל יאכל״ – בשתי אכילות הכתוב מדבר: אחת אכילת אדם,

But didn’t we learn in a baraita: One might have thought that only prohibited intent with regard to consumption of the meat is effective to render the offering piggul. From where is it derived to include the pouring of the remainder of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions? The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten [he’akhol ye’akhel ] on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18). It is derived from the repeated verb that the verse speaks of two types of consumption: One is consumption of the meat by man, i.e., by the priests or the owner of the offering, and the other one is consumption of the blood and the sacrificial portions on the altar.

ואחת אכילת מזבח.

לא קשיא; הא דאמר: ״הריני זורק על מנת לשפוך שירים למחר״, הא דאמר: ״הריני שופך שירים על מנת להקטיר אימורין למחר״.

The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. This case, where intent renders the offering piggul, is where the one sprinkling the blood says: I am hereby sprinkling the blood in order to pour the remainder tomorrow. Since sprinkling the blood is necessary for atonement, if it is performed with the intent that consumption occur beyond its designated time, the offering is rendered piggul. That case, where intent does not render the offering piggul, is where he says: I am hereby pouring the remainder in order to burn the sacrificial portions tomorrow. Although burning the portions is considered consumption, pouring the remainder of the blood is not indispensable for atonement, and therefore the offering is not rendered piggul.

אמר רבי יהודה בריה דרבי חייא: שמעתי שטבילת אצבע מפגלת בחטאת פנימית.

§ Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: I heard that with regard to an inner sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled on the curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, dipping one’s finger in the blood in order to sprinkle it, if he does so with the intent of burning the offering on the altar the following day, renders the offering piggul.

שמעה אילפא, אמרה קמיה דרב פדא. אמר: כלום למדנו פיגול – אלא משלמים; מה שלמים – אין טבילת אצבע מפגלת בהן,

Ilfa heard this statement and said it before Rav Padda. Rav Padda said in response: Did we derive the halakha of piggul with regard to all offerings from anything but a peace offering? The source for the halakha of piggul is the verse stated with regard to peace offerings (Leviticus 7:18). Therefore, just as with regard to a peace offering, prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood to sprinkle it on the altar does not render it piggul, as there is no requirement to sprinkle the blood of a peace offering with one’s finger rather than the containing vessel, so too, with regard to a sin offering, prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood does not render it piggul.

אף חטאת – אין טבילת אצבע מפגלת (בהן) [בה].

וכי הכל משלמים למדו?! אי, מה שלמים – שלא לשמן אין מוציא מידי פיגול, אף חטאת – שלא לשמה אין מוציא מידי פיגול!

The Gemara challenges: But are all of the halakhot of piggul derived from the halakha of a peace offering? If that is so, then just as sacrifice of a peace offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered piggul, as it is still fit, so too, the halakha should be that sacrifice of a sin offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered piggul. In fact, the halakha is that a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake cannot become piggul.

אלא מאי אית לך למימר – מרבויא דקראי קאתיא; הכא נמי, מרבויא דקרא קאתי.

Rather, what have you to say to explain this halakha? You must say that it is derived from an amplification of the verse. Here too, the halakha that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering renders it piggul is derived from an amplification of the verse.

אמר רבי יהושע בן לוי: בעליה זו שמעתי, שטבילת אצבע מפגלת. תהי בה רבי שמעון בן לקיש: כלום למדו פיגול – אלא משלמים; מה

Similarly, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: I heard in this upper story that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering renders it piggul. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish wondered [tahei] at this halakha: Did the Sages derive the halakha of piggul from anything but a peace offering? Just as with regard to a peace offering, prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood does not render it piggul, so too, with regard to a sin offering, the halakha should be that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood does not render it piggul.

שלמים – אין טבילת אצבע מפגלת בהן, אף חטאת – אין טבילת אצבע מפגלת (בהן) [בה]!

וכי הכל משלמים למדו?! אי, מה שלמים – שלא לשמן אין מוציא מידי פיגול, אף חטאת – שלא לשמה אין מוציא מידי פיגול!

The Gemara responds: But are all of the halakhot of piggul derived from those of a peace offering? If so, just as sacrifice of a peace offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered piggul, so too, the halakha should be that sacrifice of a sin offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered piggul.

אמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא: אין, הכל משלמים למדו. הואיל וחוץ למקומו פוסל בשלמים, ושלא לשמו פוסל בחטאת; מה חוץ למקומו הפוסל בשלמים – מוציא מידי פיגול,

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: Indeed, all of the halakhot of piggul, even this one, are derived from a peace offering. Since in the case of a peace offering, intent to consume it outside its designated area disqualifies it, and in the case of a sin offering, sacrifice not for its sake disqualifies it, one can infer that just as intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, which disqualifies a peace offering, precludes its being rendered piggul, so too, sacrifice not for its sake, which disqualifies a sin offering, precludes its being rendered piggul. By contrast, dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering with intent to consume it after its designated time does not render it piggul, as there is no parallel halakha with regard to a peace offering.

אף שלא לשמו הפוסל בחטאת – מוציאה מידי פיגול.

אמר רבי ירמיה: מצדה תברא! מה לחוץ למקומו הפוסל בשלמים – שכן נוהג בכל הזבחים; תאמר בשלא לשמו – שאינו נוהג אלא בפסח וחטאת בלבד?!

Rabbi Yirmeya says: This inference is inherently disjointed: What is notable about intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, which disqualifies a peace offering? It is notable in that its disqualification applies to all slaughtered offerings. This is why it precludes the offering from becoming piggul. Need you say the same with regard to disqualification by sacrifice not for its sake, which applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering?

אלא מאי אית לך למימר – דבר הפוסל בהן מוציאם מידי פיגול, דבר המעכב בהן מביאן לידי פיגול;

Rather, what have you to say to explain this derivation? One must say that it is not based on a case-to-case comparison, but on a principle that is derived from a peace offering, namely: Any matter that disqualifies a peace offering, e.g., intent to consume it outside its designated area, precludes its being rendered piggul, and any matter that prevents atonement if not performed renders the offering piggul if performed with intent to consume it beyond its designated time.

הכא נמי – דבר הפוסל בה מוציא מידי פיגול, דבר המעכב בה מביאה לידי פיגול.

One infers therefore that here too, with regard to an inner sin offering, any matter that disqualifies it, e.g., sacrifice not for its sake, precludes its being rendered piggul, and any matter that prevents atonement if not performed renders it piggul if it is performed with intent to consume it beyond its designated time. Accordingly, dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time renders it piggul, as this rite is indispensable.

אמר רב מרי: אף אנן נמי תנינא – זה הכלל: כל הקומץ, ונותן בכלי, והמוליך, והמקטיר.

Rav Mari says: We learn in a mishna as well that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering with intent to consume it beyond its designated time renders the offering piggul (Menaḥot 12a): This is the principle: With regard to anyone who removes a handful from a meal offering, or who places the handful in a vessel, or who conveys the handful to the altar, or who burns it on the altar, if he does so with intent that the offering will be consumed after its designated time the offering is piggul.

בשלמא קומץ – היינו שוחט; מוליך – היינו מוליך; מקטיר נמי – היינו זורק; אלא נותן בכלי מאי ניהו?

Since the halakhot of piggul are derived from those of a peace offering, one can ask: Granted, the one who removes a handful of a meal offering can render the offering piggul, as he is considered equivalent to the one who slaughters a peace offering. Just as the blood is the essential part of an animal offering, and it is removed by slaughter, so too, the handful of a meal offering is its essential part. Likewise, the one who conveys the handful is equivalent to the one who conveys the blood of a peace offering, and the one who burns the handful is equivalent to the one who sprinkles the blood too. But to what is the one who places the handful in a vessel equivalent? From where is it derived that he, too, can render the offering piggul?

אילימא דדמי לקבלה – מי דמי?! התם ממילא, הכא איהו קא שקיל ורמי!

If we say that placing the handful in a vessel is comparable to collection of the blood, as both rites involve placing the essential part of the offering in a vessel, one may respond: Are these rites actually comparable? There, in the case of a peace offering, the collection of the blood is performed passively. The blood spills into the vessel by itself. Here, in the case of a meal offering, the priest takes the handful himself and places it in a vessel. Clearly, placing the handful in a vessel is not equivalent to any specific rite in the sacrifice of a peace offering.

אלא כיון דלא סגי דלא יהיב – על כרחיה עבודה חשובה היא; הכא נמי, כיון דלא סגי דלא עביד לה – על כרחיה היינו הולכה.

Rather, since it is not sufficient for the handful to be sacrificed without first placing it in a service vessel, it is, perforce, an important rite. One who performs it can therefore render the offering piggul like those who perform other essential rites. Here too, with regard to dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering, although it has no equivalent in the sacrifice of a peace offering, since it is not sufficient if the priest does not perform it, it is perforce considered part of the conveying of the blood, and the priest can render the offering piggul while performing it.

לא, לעולם דדמי לקבלה; ודקאמרת: הכא ממילא, התם איהו קא שקיל ויהיב – כיון דאידי ואידי מתן כלי הוא, מה לי ממילא מה לי קא שקיל ויהיב.

The Gemara responds: No, actually, placing the handful in a vessel is comparable to the collection of the blood. And despite the distinction that you say, namely, that here, in the case of a peace offering, the blood spills by itself, while there, in the case of a meal offering, the priest takes the handful himself and places it in the vessel, nevertheless, since both this rite and that rite involve placement of the essential part of the offering in a vessel, they are equivalent. What difference is it to me if the blood spills into the vessel by itself, and what difference is it to me if the priest takes the handful himself and places it in the vessel? By contrast, dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering has no equivalent in a peace offering. Therefore, piggul does not apply to it.

לימא כתנאי – דתני חדא: טבילת אצבע מפגלת בחטאת, ותניא אידך: לא מפגלת ולא מתפגלת; מאי, לאו תנאי היא?

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the principle that dipping one’s finger in the blood is considered part of conveying it to the curtain is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in one baraita: With regard to an inner sin offering, dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent that it be consumed beyond its designated time renders it piggul. And it is taught in another baraita: Dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent that it be consumed beyond its designated time does not render it piggul, and neither does slaughtering the animal with the intent to dip his finger in the blood the next day render it piggul. What, is it not that this matter is a dispute between tanna’im?

לא; הא רבנן, הא רבי שמעון.

The Gemara responds: No, both tanna’im agree that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering is part of conveying it to the curtain. Rather, this baraita, which states that a priest can render the offering piggul while dipping his finger in its blood, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in the mishna (13a), who hold that one can render the offering piggul while conveying the blood to the altar. That baraita, which states the opposite, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna, who holds that one cannot render the offering piggul while conveying the blood.

אי רבי שמעון, מאי איריא טבילת אצבע? האמר:

The Gemara asks: If the latter baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, why is it referring specifically to dipping one’s finger? Doesn’t he say