זבחים דף י

השוחט את הבהמה על מנת לזרוק דמה לעבודה זרה, ולהקטיר חלבה לעבודה זרה – רבי יוחנן אמר: אסורה; מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה, וילפינן חוץ מבפנים.

With regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or in order to burn its forbidden fat for idol worship, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, as it is considered an offering to idol worship, even if ultimately its blood was not sprinkled or its fat burned to that effect. This is because one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite; idolatrous intent while slaughtering the animal renders it forbidden, even if the intention pertains not to the slaughter itself but to the sprinkling of the blood or the burning of the forbidden fat. And this halakha is derived from the halakhot of piggul, as we derive halakhot of idol worship, which are applicable even outside the Temple, from halakhot concerning intent that apply inside the Temple.

ריש לקיש אמר: מותרת; אין מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה, ולא ילפינן חוץ מפנים.

Reish Lakish says: Deriving benefit from the animal is permitted. One cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite, and we do not derive halakhot applicable outside the Temple from halakhot that apply inside the Temple.

ואי אשמעינן בהא – בהא אמר ריש לקיש, אבל פנים מפנים אימא מודי ליה לרבי יוחנן;

Although both disputes are essentially the same, each is necessary. And if the Sages had taught us the dispute only with regard to that issue, namely, an animal slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would have reasoned that Reish Lakish says his opinion only with regard to that issue, as he maintains that halakhot applicable outside the Temple are not derived from halakhot applicable only inside the Temple. But with regard to an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that it is disqualified, as halakhot applicable inside the Temple can be derived from other halakhot applicable inside the Temple.

ואי אשמעינן הא – בהא קאמר רבי יוחנן, אבל בההיא אימא מודי ליה לריש לקיש; צריכי.

And if the Sages had taught us the dispute only with regard to this issue, namely, an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might claim that Rabbi Yoḥanan says his opinion only with regard to this issue, which concerns halakhot applicable inside the Temple. But with regard to that issue, an animal that was slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would say that he concedes to the opinion of Reish Lakish that halakhot applicable outside the Temple are not derived from halakhot applicable only inside the Temple. Therefore, both statements are necessary.

כי אתא רב דימי, אמר: מתיב רב ירמיה לסיועיה לרבי יוחנן, ורבי אילא לסיועיה לריש לקיש.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: Rav Yirmeya responds to this dispute by eliciting evidence to support the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan; and Rabbi Ila elicits evidence to support the opinion of Reish Lakish.

רב ירמיה לסיועיה לרבי יוחנן: ומה במקום שאם אמר ״הריני שוחט חוץ לזמנו״ שהוא כשר, שחטו על מנת לזרוק דמו חוץ לזמנו

Rav Dimi elaborated: Rav Yirmeya elicits evidence to support the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan by an a fortiori inference: Just as in the case of improper intent with regard to the offering’s time, where if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it beyond its designated time, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?

– פסול; מקום שאם אמר ״הריני שוחט שלא לשמו״ – פסול, שחטו על מנת לזרוק דמו שלא לשמו – אינו דין שיהא פסול?!

מתקיף לה רבא בר אהילאי: מה לחוץ לזמנו, שכן כרת!

Rava bar Ahilai objects to this inference: One cannot claim that deviation from the type of offering is a more severe transgression than intent to consume it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, since the latter has its own element of stringency. What is notable about intent beyond its designated time? It is notable in that one who eats the meat of such an offering is liable to be punished with karet, whereas one who eats the meat of an offering disqualified due to deviation from the type of offering is not.

אלא אמר רבא בר אהילאי, הכי קאמר: ומה מקום שאם אמר ״הריני שוחט חוץ למקומו״ שהוא כשר, שחטו על מנת לזרוק דמו חוץ למקומו

Rather, Rava bar Ahilai says: Rav Yirmeya was actually referring to improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, since consumption of an offering thereby disqualified is not punishable by karet. And this is what he is saying: Just as in the case of improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, where if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it outside its designated area, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood outside its designated area, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?

– פסול; מקום שאם אמר ״הריני שוחט שלא לשמו״ שהוא פסול, [שחטו על מנת] לזרוק דמו שלא לשמו – אינו דין שיהא פסול?!

מתקיף לה רב אשי: מה לחוץ למקומו – שכן נוהג בכל הזבחים; תאמר בשלא לשמו – שאינו נוהג אלא בפסח וחטאת?!

Rav Ashi objects to this inference: What is notable about intent to sprinkle the blood outside its designated area? It is notable in that the disqualification applies to all slaughtered offerings. Can you say that the same halakhot govern the disqualification of an offering sacrificed not for its sake, which applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering?

אלא אמר רב אשי, הכי קאמר: ומה במקום שאם אמר ״הריני שוחט לשם פלוני״ שהוא כשר, לזרוק דמו (שלא לשמו) לשם פלוני –

Rather, Rav Ashi says: This is what Rav Yirmeya is saying: Just as in the case of deviation with regard to the owner, where, if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it for the sake of so-and-so, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood for the sake of so-and-so, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit? The opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is supported by this logical line of reasoning.

פסול; מקום שאם אמר ״הריני שוחט שלא לשמן״ שהוא פסול, [שחטו על מנת] לזרוק דמן שלא לשמן – אינו דין שיהא פסול?!

רבי אילא לסיועיה לריש לקיש: לא תאמר בזריקה, ותיתי מקל וחומר מבינייא משחיטה וקבלה! למאי הלכתא כתב רחמנא? לומר דאין מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה.

Rabbi Ila elicits evidence to support the opinion of Reish Lakish, that performance of one rite with improper intent with regard to another rite is of no consequence: The Torah should not have stated the requirement of sacrificing an offering for its own sake with regard to sprinkling of the blood, and rather should have let one derive it by an a fortiori inference from the common element of two other rites, from slaughter and collection of the blood. If so, for what halakha does the Merciful One write this redundant requirement? It is in order to say that one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite.

מתקיף לה רב פפא: ודלמא דמחשבין מעבודה לעבודה!

Rav Pappa objects to this derivation: But perhaps the requirement is written to teach the opposite, that one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite. A redundant requirement should expand, not reduce, the scope of actions that can disqualify the offering.

אם כן, לשתוק קרא מיניה, ותיתי מקל וחומר דרב אשי.

The Gemara answers: If that were so, let the verse remain silent with regard to sprinkling the blood for the sake of the offering, and one could derive that one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite from Rav Ashi’s aforementioned a fortiori inference. The verse must be meant to counteract that inference and teach that one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite.

ואידך פריך הכי: מה להנך – שכן טעונות צפון, וישנן בחטאות הפנימיות!

And the other amora, Rabbi Yoḥanan, would refute Rabbi Ila’s proof like this: It is necessary for the Torah to state the requirement with regard to sprinkling. It cannot be derived from the cases of slaughter and collection of the blood, since these two share an element of stringency that sprinkling lacks. What is notable about these? They are notable in that in offerings of the most sacred order they must be performed in the north of the Temple courtyard. And furthermore, they are performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings as well as external sin offerings, unlike the sprinkling of the blood on the external altar.

ואידך – השתא מיהא בשלמים קיימין.

And the other amora, Reish Lakish, would respond that now, in any event, we stand in a discussion with regard to peace offerings, since the requirement of sacrifice for the offering’s sake is derived from the verses concerning peace offerings. Peace offerings are neither offerings of the most sacred order nor inner sin offerings, and therefore the elements of stringency mentioned above are irrelevant.

איתמר: שחטה לשמה, לזרוק דמה שלא לשמה – רב נחמן אמר: פסולה, רבה אמר: כשרה. והדר ביה רבה לגבי רב נחמן, מקל וחומר דרב אשי.

A parallel dispute was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its sake but with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, Rav Naḥman says that the offering is unfit, and Rabba says that it is fit. And Rabba retracted his opinion, and conceded to Rav Naḥman, due to Rav Ashi’s a fortiori inference.

רבי אליעזר אומר: אף (את) האשם. תניא, אמר רבי אליעזר: חטאת באה על חטא, ואשם בא על חטא; מה חטאת שלא לשמה – פסולה,

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering, too, is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. With regard to this it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer said: A sin offering is brought for committing a transgression and a guilt offering is brought for committing a transgression. Just as a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit, so too, a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit.

אף אשם שלא לשמו – פסול.

אמר לו רבי יהושע: לא; אם אמרת בחטאת – שכן דמה למעלה!

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: The inference is not valid. If you say this with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line that encircles the altar, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line, like most animal offerings?

אמר לו רבי אליעזר: פסח יוכיח – שדמו למטה, ושחטו שלא לשמו פסול.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A Paschal offering can prove the point, as its blood is sprinkled below the red line, and nevertheless, if one slaughtered it not for its sake it is unfit.

אמר לו רבי יהושע: מה לפסח – שכן זמנו קבוע!

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: A Paschal offering cannot serve as the source either, since it possesses a unique element of stringency. What is notable about a Paschal offering? It is notable in that its designated time is fixed. A guilt offering does not have a fixed time.

אמר לו רבי אליעזר: חטאת תוכיח.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A sin offering can prove the point, as it does not have a fixed time, and nevertheless, it is disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.

אמר לו רבי יהושע:

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:

חוזרני חלילה.

I return to my previous claim that a sin offering is unique since its blood is sprinkled above the red line. The discussion is going around [ḥalila] in circles.

חזר רבי אליעזר ודנו דין אחר: חטאת נאמר בה ״היא״ בשחיטה – היא לשמה כשירה, שלא לשמה פסולה; ופסח נאמר בו ״הוא״ בזביחה – הוא לשמו כשר,

Rabbi Eliezer then presented a different logical inference: With regard to a sin offering, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter, in the verse: “And slaughter it in the place where they kill the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit. And similarly, with regard to a Paschal offering, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter [zeviḥa], in the verse: “It is the sacrifice [zevaḥ] of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27). Here, the word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit.

שלא לשמו פסול;

אף אשם נאמר בו ״הוא״ – הוא לשמו כשר, שלא לשמו פסול.

And the word “it” is stated with regard to a guilt offering as well, in the verse: “It is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5). Here too, say that the word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit.

אמר לו רבי יהושע: חטאת נאמר בה ״היא״ בשחיטה – היא לשמה כשרה, שלא לשמה פסולה. פסח נאמר בו ״הוא״ בזביחה – הוא לשמו כשר,

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: With regard to a sin offering, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter, teaching that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit, but if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit. With regard to a Paschal offering too, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter, likewise teaching that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit, but if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit. But with regard to a guilt offering, the word “it” is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And since the offering itself is fit even if the sacrificial portions were not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.

שלא לשמו פסול. אבל אשם, לא נאמר בו ״הוא״ – אלא לאחר הקטרת אימורין, והוא עצמו שלא הוקטרו אימורין – כשר!

אמר לו רבי אליעזר, הרי [הוא] אומר: ״כחטאת כאשם״ – מה חטאת שלא לשמו פסול, אף אשם שלא לשמו פסול.

The baraita concludes: Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A sin offering and a guilt offering are juxtaposed in the verse that states: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7). The verse teaches that just as a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit, so too, a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit.

אמר מר: אמר לו רבי יהושע: חוזרני חלילה. ולמיהדר דינא, ולייתי ב״מה הצד״!

§ The Gemara discusses the baraita. The Master said: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: I return to my previous claim, that a sin offering is unique since its blood is sprinkled above the red line. The discussion is going around in circles. The Gemara asks: And let the derivation revert to its starting point, and let Rabbi Eliezer derive the point by analogy from the common element of the two sources, a sin offering and a Paschal offering. Together they can prove that a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is also unfit, since they share no element of stringency that the latter lacks.

משום דאיכא למיפרך: מה להצד השוה שבהן – שכן יש בהן צד כרת.

The Gemara answers: Even such a derivation is not valid, as it can be refuted: What is notable about their common element? A sin offering and a Paschal offering are notable in that they both have an element of karet. A sin offering is brought for a transgression punishable by karet when committed intentionally, and one who refrains intentionally from bringing a Paschal offering is liable to be punished with karet. A guilt offering, by contrast, has no element of karet.

אמר לו רבי יהושע: לא; אם אמרת בחטאת – שכן דמה למעלה! ולימא ליה: לא; אם אמרת בחטאת – שכן נכנס דמה לפני ולפנים!

§ The baraita states: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Your comparison of a guilt offering to a sin offering is not valid. If you say a halakha with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line? The Gemara challenges: And let Rabbi Yehoshua say to him another refutation: Your comparison is not valid, as if you say the halakha with regard to a sin offering, whose blood enters the innermost sanctum, i.e., the Holy of Holies, on Yom Kippur, must the same be said for a guilt offering, whose blood never enters the innermost sanctum?

בחטאות החיצונות קאמרינן.

The Gemara answers: We are stating a comparison of a guilt offering to a sin offering specifically with regard to the external sin offerings, whose blood does not enter the innermost sanctum.

שאם נכנס דמה [לפני] ולפנים – פסולה!

The Gemara counters: If so, Rabbi Yehoshua could have refuted the comparison by pointing out another difference between a sin offering and a guilt offering, as, if the blood of an external sin offering enters the innermost sanctum, it is disqualified. This is not so in the case of the blood of a guilt offering.

אית ליה לרבי אליעזר ״אף האשם״.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer holds that a guilt offering whose blood enters the innermost sanctum is also disqualified.

שכן מכפרת על חייבי כריתות!

The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, as a sin offering atones for transgressions for which one is liable to receive karet if he committed them intentionally.

מחטאת דשמיעת הקול.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer derives the halakha specifically from a sin offering brought for hearing the voice, i.e., for falsely taking an oath that one is unable to testify in another’s case. This transgression is not punishable by karet.

שכן טעונה ארבע מתנות!

The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, that the blood of a sin offering requires four placements on the altar, whereas the blood of a guilt offering requires only two.

כרבי ישמעאל, דאמר: כל הדמים (טעונה) [טעונין] ארבע מתנות.

The Gemara answers: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that the blood of almost all offerings requires four placements.

שכן טעונה על ארבע קרנות!

The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, that a sin offering’s blood requires placement on all four corners of the altar, whereas the blood of a guilt offering, even according to Rabbi Yishmael, is sprinkled on only two corners.

וליטעמיך, האיכא אצבע! האיכא קרן! האיכא חודה! אלא חד מתרי תלת טעמי נקט.

The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, why didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua mention other distinctions between a sin offering and a guilt offering? Isn’t there the requirement that a priest place a sin offering’s blood on the altar with his finger? Isn’t there the requirement to place a sin offering’s blood on the corner of the altar? And even according to the opinion that it is not placed on the corner itself, isn’t there the requirement to place it on the edge of the corner? None of these requirements pertain to any offering other than a sin offering. Rather, Rabbi Yehoshua mentioned one of two or three valid claims at his disposal.

אמר מר, אמר לו רבי יהושע: לא, אם אמרת. לימא ליה רבי אליעזר: אשם נמי דמו למעלה!

§ The Master says: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Your comparison is not valid. If you say this with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line? The Gemara challenges: Let Rabbi Eliezer say to him: The blood of a guilt offering is also sprinkled above the red line, since Rabbi Eliezer holds that the halakhot of a guilt offering and a sin offering are parallel.

אמר אביי: אשם דמו למעלה לא מצית אמרת, קל וחומר מעולה; ומה עולה שהיא כליל – דמה למטה, אשם שאינו כליל – לא כל שכן?!

Abaye said: You cannot say that the blood of a guilt offering is presented above the red line, due to an a fortiori inference from the case of a burnt offering: Just as in the case of a burnt offering, which is treated stringently in that it is totally consumed on the altar, its blood is presented below the red line, all the more so is it not clear that in the case of a guilt offering, which is not totally consumed on the altar, its blood is presented below the red line?

מה לעולה, שכן אינה מכפרת!

The Gemara rejects the inference: What is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that it does not atone for a sin, unlike a guilt offering. Perhaps this is why its blood is presented below the red line.

חטאת העוף תוכיח.

The Gemara answers: A bird sin offering can prove the point, as it atones for a sin, and still its blood is presented below the red line.

מה לחטאת העוף, שכן אינה מין זבח!

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is notable about a bird sin offering? It is notable in that it is not a type of offering that is slaughtered; it is killed by pinching the nape of its neck. Perhaps this is why its blood is presented below the red line.

עולה תוכיח. לא ראי זה כראי זה, ולא ראי זה כראי זה. הצד השוה שבהן – שהן קדשי קדשים, ודמן למטה; אף אני אביא אשם –

The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since it is slaughtered, and its blood is still presented below the red line. Therefore, the halakha is derived from a combination of the halakhot of a burnt offering and a bird sin offering: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings of the most sacred order, and their blood is presented below the red line. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering of the most sacred order, and therefore its blood is presented below the red line.

שהוא קודש קדשים, ודמו למטה.

אמר ליה רבא מפרזקיא לרב אשי: ולפרוך, מה להצד השוה שבהן – שכן אין להן קצבה; תאמר באשם – שיש לו קצבה?!

Rava of Parzakya said to Rav Ashi: Let Rabbi Eliezer refute this inference: What is notable about the common element of the two cases? It is notable in that neither a burnt offering nor a bird sin offering has a fixed value. Need you say that the same halakhot apply to a guilt offering, which has a fixed value of two silver shekels (see Leviticus 5:15)?

אלא היינו טעמא דרבי אליעזר, דאמר קרא: ״הכהן המחטא אותה״ – אותה דמה למעלה, ואין דמו של אחר למעלה.

Rather, this is Rabbi Eliezer’s reason for not claiming that the blood of a guilt offering is presented below the red line: As the verse states with regard to the presenting of the blood of a sin offering: “The priest who offers it” (Leviticus 6:19). The word “it” indicates that its blood is presented above the red line, but the blood of another slaughtered offering is not presented above the red line.

אי הכי, חטאת נמי נימא: אותה – לשמה כשרה, שלא לשמה פסולה; הא שאר זבחים – בין לשמן בין שלא לשמן כשרין!

The Gemara asks: If so, if Rabbi Eliezer accepts that the word “it” indicates exclusivity, let him also say that the verse: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), teaches that only a sin offering is fit if slaughtered for its sake, and unfit if slaughtered not for its sake. Consequently, other slaughtered offerings, whether slaughtered for their sake or not for their sake, are fit. Why then does Rabbi Eliezer deem a guilt offering unfit if slaughtered not for its sake?

ההוא ״אותה״ לאו דוקא, דהא שייר פסח.

The Gemara answers: That instance of the word “it” does not indicate that the halakha applies specifically to a sin offering and to no other offerings, as the Torah excludes the Paschal offering from such a generalization. A Paschal offering is certainly disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.

הכא נמי לאו דוקא, דהא שייר עולת העוף!

The Gemara counters: If so, here too, with regard to the presenting of the blood above the red line, one must say the word “it” does not indicate that this halakha applies specifically to a sin offering and no other offerings, as the Torah excludes a bird burnt offering from such a generalization. The blood of a bird burnt offering is presented above the red line.

בזביחה מיהא לא שייר מידי.

The Gemara answers: With regard to offerings that require slaughter, in any event, the Torah excluded nothing from the generalization. Bird offerings are irrelevant, as they are killed by the pinching of the nape.

ואי בעית אימא: הא מני – רבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון היא, דאמר: האי מקום לחוד, והאי מקום לחוד.

And if you wish, say instead that even the blood of a bird burnt offering is presented in a manner different from that of a sin offering. In accordance with whose opinion is this suggestion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: This place where the blood of a sin offering is presented is discrete, and that place where the blood of a bird burnt offering is presented is discrete.

דתניא: דמים התחתונים ניתנין מחוט הסיקרא ולמטה, והעליונים מחוט הסיקרא ולמעלה. אמר רבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון: במה דברים אמורין – בעולת העוף; אבל

As it is taught in a baraita: The blood that must be placed on the lower half of the altar is placed anywhere from the red [hasikra] line and below, and the blood that must be placed on the upper half is placed anywhere from the red line and above. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to a bird burnt offering. But the placement of the blood of an animal sin offering is itself performed only on the actual corner of the altar.

בחטאת בהמה – היא עצמה אין נעשה אלא על גופה של קרן.

תנן התם, שהיה רבי עקיבא אומר: כל דמים שנכנסו להיכל לכפר – פסולים. וחכמים אומרים: חטאת בלבד. רבי אליעזר אומר: אף האשם, שנאמר: ״כחטאת כאשם״.

§ We learned in a mishna elsewhere (81b): As Rabbi Akiva would say: Any blood that should have been sprinkled on the external altar but instead entered to atone in the Sanctuary is unfit. And the Rabbis say: That is the halakha only with regard to the blood of a sin offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: The halakhic status of a guilt offering is also like that of a sin offering, as it is stated: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7).

בשלמא רבי אליעזר – כדקאמר טעמא, אלא רבנן מאי טעמא?

The Gemara asks: Granted, the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is understandable, as he states the reason for his opinion. But what is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis?

אמר רבא: אשם נכנס דמו לפנים פסול – לא מצית אמרת, קל וחומר מעולה; מה

Rava said: You cannot say that the blood of a guilt offering that entered into the Sanctuary is disqualified, due to an a fortiori inference from the case of a burnt offering: Just as