יבמות דף יד

מי סברת עשו בית שמאי כדבריהם? לא עשו בית שמאי כדבריהם. ורבי יוחנן אמר: עשו ועשו. ובפלוגתא [דרב ושמואל]. דרב אומר:

Reish Lakish said to him: Do you hold that Beit Shammai actually acted in accordance with their own statement? Beit Shammai did not in fact act in accordance with their own statement, as the dispute was merely theoretical. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Beit Shammai certainly did act in accordance with their opinion. The Gemara comments: And this is also reflected in the dispute between Rav and Shmuel, as Rav says: Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own statement, and Shmuel said: They certainly did act in that manner.

לא עשו בית שמאי כדבריהם, ושמואל אמר: עשו ועשו.

אימת? אילימא קודם בת קול — מאי טעמא דמאן דאמר לא עשו? ואלא לאחר בת קול — מאי טעמא דמאן דאמר עשו?

The Gemara inquires: When does this question apply? If we say that it is referring to the period prior to the Divine Voice that declared that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, then what is the rationale of the one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion? But rather, if one would say it is referring to after the Divine Voice, what is the reason for the one who said that they did act in accordance with their opinion? After all, the Divine Voice established that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

אי בעית אימא קודם בת קול, ואי בעית אימא לאחר בת קול. אי בעית אימא קודם בת קול, וכגון דבית הלל רובא,

The Gemara answers: Neither of these options poses a difficulty. If you wish, say that it is referring to the period prior to the Divine Voice, and if you wish, say instead that it is after the Divine Voice. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say it is prior to the Divine Voice, and it is referring to the period when Beit Hillel formed the majority of the Sages. Therefore, according to the one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion, the reason is that Beit Hillel was the majority, and the halakha is in accordance with the majority.

למאן דאמר לא עשו — דהא בית הלל רובא.

ומאן דאמר עשו, כי אזלינן בתר רובא — היכא דכי הדדי נינהו. הכא, בית שמאי מחדדי טפי.

And the one who said that they did act in accordance with their opinion maintains that when do we follow the majority? It is in a case where the disputing parties are equal in wisdom to one another. Here, however, Beit Shammai are sharper than Beit Hillel, and therefore they acted in accordance with their own opinion despite the fact that they were in the minority.

ואי בעית אימא לאחר בת קול, מאן דאמר לא עשו — דהא נפקא בת קול, ומאן דאמר עשו — רבי יהושע היא, דאמר: אין משגיחין בבת קול.

And if you wish, say instead that it was after the Divine Voice. The one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion would say that this was due to the pronouncement of the Divine Voice. And the one who said that they did do so, this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said, with regard to the Divine Voice that emerged and proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of the oven of akhnai (Bava Metzia 59b), that one disregards a Heavenly Voice. Just as he disregarded the Divine Voice in his dispute with Rabbi Eliezer, so too, one disregards the Divine Voice that proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

ומאן דאמר עשו, קרינן כאן ״לא תתגודדו״ — לא תעשו אגודות אגודות! אמר אביי: כי אמרינן ״לא תתגודדו״ — כגון שתי בתי דינים בעיר אחת,

And yet the question remains: According to the one who said that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion, we should read here: “You shall not cut yourselves” (Deuteronomy 14:1), which is interpreted to mean: Do not become numerous factions. Abaye said: When we say that the prohibition: “You shall not cut yourselves” applies, we are referring to a case where two courts are located in one city, and these rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and those rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel. However, with regard to two courts located in two different cities, we have no problem with it.

הללו מורים כדברי בית שמאי, והללו מורים כדברי בית הלל. אבל שתי בתי דינים בשתי עיירות — לית לן בה.

אמר ליה רבא: והא בית שמאי ובית הלל כשתי בתי דינים בעיר אחת דמי! אלא אמר רבא: כי אמרינן ״לא תתגודדו״ — כגון בית דין בעיר אחת,

Rava said to him: But the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is considered like a case of two courts in one city, as these two schools of thought were found everywhere, not in any specific place. Rather, Rava said: When we say that the prohibition: “You shall not cut yourselves” applies, we are referring to a case where there is a court in one city, a section of which rules in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and another section rules in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel. However, with regard to two courts located in one city, we have no problem with it.

פלג מורין כדברי בית שמאי, ופלג מורין כדברי בית הלל. אבל שתי בתי דינין בעיר אחת — לית לן בה.

תא שמע: במקומו של רבי אליעזר היו כורתים עצים לעשות פחמים בשבת לעשות ברזל. במקומו של רבי יוסי הגלילי היו אוכלים בשר עוף בחלב.

§ The Gemara cites other relevant sources. Come and hear: In the locale of Rabbi Eliezer, where his ruling was followed, they would cut down trees on Shabbat to prepare charcoal from them to fashion iron tools with which to circumcise a child on Shabbat. In Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, not only does the mitzva of circumcision override Shabbat, but also any action required for the preparation of the tools necessary for the circumcision likewise overrides Shabbat. The baraita adds: In the locale of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they would eat poultry meat in milk, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili held that the prohibition of meat in milk does not include poultry.

במקומו של רבי אליעזר — אין, במקומו של רבי עקיבא — לא. דתניא, כלל אמר רבי עקיבא: כל מלאכה שאפשר לעשותה מערב שבת — אין דוחה את השבת.

The Gemara infers: In the locale of Rabbi Eliezer, yes, they would act in this manner, whereas in the locale of Rabbi Akiva, for instance, no, they would not do so, as it is taught in a baraita that a principle was stated by Rabbi Akiva: Any prohibited labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat even if it involves a mitzva. A mitzva whose proper time is on Shabbat overrides Shabbat only if its performance was impossible earlier, e.g., the act of circumcision itself, which cannot be performed earlier.

והאי מאי תיובתא? מקומות מקומות שאני! ודקארי לה — מאי קארי לה?!

The Gemara asks: And what is this refutation? As stated above, it is different when dealing with numerous places, and the baraita explicitly states that this practice was followed in Rabbi Eliezer’s locale. Consequently, there is no violation of the prohibition against splitting into factions. The Gemara asks: He who asked it, why did he ask it, i.e., what is the basis for the question in the first place? It is obvious that the baraita is referring to a specific place.

סלקא דעתך אמינא משום חומרא דשבת — כמקום אחד דמי, קא משמע לן.

The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that due to the severity of Shabbat, it, i.e., the world, is considered like a single locale. In other words, one might have thought that the permission to tolerate diverse customs in different places applies only to other prohibitions, whereas the prohibition of Shabbat is so severe that it is unacceptable to allow different customs, as this might lead people to disrespect Shabbat. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that even in the case of Shabbat there can be different customs in various locales.

תא שמע, דרבי אבהו כי איקלע לאתריה דרבי יהושע בן לוי הוה מטלטל שרגא. וכי איקלע לאתריה דרבי יוחנן, לא הוה מטלטל שרגא.

§ The Gemara cites another relevant case involving Shabbat: Come and hear that Rabbi Abbahu, when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, would move an oil lamp [sheraga] after the flame that had been lit for that Shabbat had burned out, as Rabbi Yehoshua accepted the ruling that it is permitted to carry items of this sort that had been set aside. But when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who prohibited carrying items of this kind that had been set aside on Shabbat, he would not move an oil lamp. This indicates that divergent customs are followed in different places.

והאי מאי קושיא? ולא אמרינן מקומות שאני? אנן הכי קאמרינן: רבי אבהו, היכי עביד הכא הכי, והיכי עביד הכא הכי?

Again, the Gemara asks: And what is this difficulty? Didn’t we say that it is different when dealing with numerous places? The Gemara explains that this is what we are saying: With regard to Rabbi Abbahu himself, how could he act in this manner here and how could he act in that manner there?

רבי אבהו כרבי יהושע בן לוי סבירא ליה, וכי מקלע לאתריה דרבי יוחנן לא הוה מטלטל משום כבודו דרבי יוחנן. והאיכא שמעא! דמודע ליה לשמעא.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Abbahu holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that it is permitted to carry this item. And when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yoḥanan he would not carry it, in deference to Rabbi Yoḥanan, so as not to act contrary to his ruling in the place where he was the authority. The Gemara asks: But there was a servant accompanying Rabbi Abbahu who would see him carrying these types of articles that had been set aside. Wasn’t Rabbi Abbahu concerned that the servant might carry them in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s locale? The Gemara explains that he would inform the servant and explain to him the reason for his change in behavior.

תא שמע: אף על פי שאלו אוסרים ואלו מתירים — לא נמנעו בית שמאי מלישא נשים מבית הלל, ולא בית הלל מבית שמאי. אי אמרת בשלמא לא עשו,

§ The Gemara continues to discuss the question of whether Beit Shammai followed their own rulings. Come and hear that which is taught in the mishna: Although Beit Hillel prohibit and Beit Shammai permit, and these disqualify the women and those deem them fit, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion, it is due to that reason that they did not have to refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel. However, if you say that they did act in accordance with their opinion, why didn’t they refrain from marrying one another?

משום הכי לא נמנעו. אלא אי אמרת עשו, אמאי לא נמנעו?

בשלמא בית שמאי מבית הלל לא נמנעו, דבני חייבי לאוין נינהו.

The Gemara elaborates: Granted, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying into Beit Hillel, as even if Beit Shammai maintain in a certain case that a rival wife required levirate marriage or ḥalitza, if she went ahead and married another man their children are born to a union whose partners are liable by a regular prohibition: “The wife of the dead man shall not be married outside” (Deuteronomy 25:5). Since this transgression does not entail karet, the children of this relationship are not mamzerim.

אלא בית הלל מבית שמאי אמאי לא נמנעו? בני חייבי כריתות — ממזרים נינהו?

However, why did Beit Hillel not refrain from marrying into Beit Shammai? In the opinion of Beit Hillel the children of these rival wives who entered into levirate marriage are born of a union whose partners are liable to receive karet, as the prohibition of a brother’s wife was never nullified in this case, which means that the children are mamzerim. If so, how could Beit Hillel allow these marriages?

וכי תימא קסברי בית הלל דאין ממזר מחייבי כריתות — והאמר רבי אלעזר: אף על פי שנחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל בצרות,

And if you would say that Beit Hillel maintain that the child of a union whose partners are liable to receive karet is not a mamzer, as a mamzer is only one whose parents violated a prohibition that entails the death penalty, didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to rival wives, they concede that a mamzer is only from a union whose prohibition is a prohibition of forbidden relations punishable by karet? Consequently, the children of rival wives are mamzerim according to Beit Hillel. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from here that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own opinion?

מודים שאין ממזר אלא ממי שאיסורו איסור ערוה וענוש כרת! אלא לאו שמע מינה, לא עשו!

לא, לעולם עשו, דמודעי להו ופרשי.

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: No; actually, Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion. As for the problem with these marriages, the answer is that they would inform Beit Hillel and Beit Hillel would withdraw from the match. When those who acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel would come to marry women from those who followed the rulings of Beit Shammai, they would be notified that certain children were born of rival wives and that those people were considered mamzerim in the opinion of Beit Hillel, who therefore declared them forbidden in marriage.

והכי נמי מסתברא, דקתני סיפא: כל הטהרות וכל הטמאות שהיו אלו מטהרין ואלו מטמאין — לא נמנעו עושים טהרות אלו על גבי אלו.

The Gemara comments: And so too, it is reasonable that this is the case, as the mishna teaches in the latter clause: With regard to all of the disputes concerning the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity, where those, Beit Hillel, rule an article ritually pure and these, Beit Shammai, rule it ritually impure, they did not refrain from handling ritually pure objects each with the other.

אי אמרת בשלמא דמודעי להו — משום הכי לא נמנעו, אלא אי אמרת דלא מודעי להו, בשלמא בית שמאי מבית הלל לא נמנעו — דטמאות דבית הלל,

Granted, if you say that they notified them, it is due to that reason that they did not need to refrain from using their objects. However, if you say that they did not notify them, granted, it is logical that Beit Shammai did not refrain from handling items belonging to Beit Hillel, as ritually impure objects for Beit Hillel are ritually pure for Beit Shammai, and therefore no special care is necessary.

לבית שמאי טהרות נינהו.

אלא בית הלל מבית שמאי למה לא נמנעו? טהרות דבית שמאי, לבית הלל טמאות נינהו! אלא לאו דמודעי להו, שמע מינה.

However, why didn’t Beit Hillel refrain from touching articles that belonged to Beit Shammai? After all, ritually pure objects for Beit Shammai are ritually impure for Beit Hillel. Rather, is it not the case that Beit Shammai notified Beit Hillel that these items were ritually pure only in their own opinion, and Beit Hillel separated themselves from them? The Gemara summarizes the discussion: Conclude from here that this is the correct interpretation.

ומאי אולמיה דהך מהך? מהו דתימא צרה קלא אית לה, קא משמע לן.

The Gemara asks: In what way is this case stronger than that case? In other words, why is the statement with regard to ritual purity and impurity more conclusive than the one that deals with marriage? Since the practice of notification was not explicitly stated in the case of ritual purity but was merely inferred logically, the same reasoning applies equally to the case of marriage. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since it is so unusual, a marriage to a rival wife generates publicity and is so widely known that no special notification is required, therefore, the Gemara teaches us that even in this case notification is required.

גופא, אמר רבי אלעזר: אף על פי שנחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל בצרות, מודים שאין ממזר אלא ממי שאיסורו איסור ערוה וענוש כרת. מאן מודים?

§ Since the statement of Rabbi Elazar was mentioned, the Gemara turns to discuss the matter itself. Rabbi Elazar said: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to rival wives, they concede that a mamzer is only from a union whose prohibition is a prohibition of forbidden relations punishable by karet. The Gemara asks: Who concedes to whom? If we say that Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel, this is obvious, since if they acted in accordance with their own opinion that rival wives who married others without ḥalitza are liable only for violating a regular prohibition, their children are therefore fit and are not mamzerim at all.

אילימא בית שמאי לבית הלל — פשיטא! בני חייבי לאוין, כשרים נינהו!

אלא בית הלל לבית שמאי — היא גופה חייבי כריתות היא!

Rather, one could say that Beit Hillel concede to Beit Shammai. But in that case she herself, the rival wife of a forbidden relative who married one of the yevamin, is liable to receive karet in the opinion of Beit Hillel, and the child is a mamzer, whereas Rabbi Elazar’s statement indicates that they concede with regard to a different case.

לעולם בית שמאי לבית הלל, ולאפוקי מדרבי עקיבא, דאמר: יש ממזר מחייבי לאוין, קא משמע לן דאין ממזר מחייבי לאוין.

The Gemara explains: Actually, Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel, and this is not a novelty with regard to their basic dispute. Instead, the statement comes to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said: The offspring from forbidden relations for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is a mamzer. Rabbi Elazar teaches us that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that the offspring from forbidden relations for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is not a mamzer; rather, one is a mamzer only if he is born of a union punishable by karet.

תא שמע: אף על פי שנחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל בצרות ובאחיות,

§ The Gemara returns to the initial question of whether or not Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their own opinion. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to several cases, nevertheless, they did not refrain from marrying women from each other’s communities. The cases with regard to which they disagreed include rival wives, and sisters, i.e., if two sisters had been married to two brothers and simultaneously became obligated in levirate marriage, Beit Hillel prohibit both in levirate marriage, and if they violated the prohibition and married regardless, they require a divorce. By contrast, Beit Shammai permit them to remain married.

בגט ישן, ובספק אשת איש, ובמגרש את אשתו ולנה עמו בפונדק,

Furthermore, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to an outdated bill of divorce that had been written but not delivered. Beit Shammai maintain that if the husband and wife continued to live together after the writing of the bill of divorce, the same bill of divorce can still be used later, whereas Beit Hillel dispute this. And they likewise disagreed with regard to an uncertain married woman, i.e., whether a minor who was actually married, and not merely betrothed, may perform refusal. And they also disagreed with regard to one who divorces his wife and later she lodged together with him at an inn, as to whether or not this is sufficient grounds for assuming that they remarried.

בכסף ובשוה כסף, בפרוטה ובשוה פרוטה —

Additionally, they disagreed with regard to the issue of betrothal by money and with the equivalent value of money, and by a peruta or with the equivalent value of a peruta. According to Beit Shammai, the minimal amount of money effective for betrothal is a dinar or the equivalent of a dinar, whereas Beit Hillel maintain that even the less valuable peruta or its equivalent is sufficient.

לא נמנעו בית שמאי מלישא נשים מבית הלל, ולא בית הלל מבית שמאי. ללמדך שחיבה וריעות נוהגים זה בזה, לקיים מה שנאמר: ״האמת והשלום אהבו״. רבי שמעון אומר:

Despite the fact that these halakhot entail important ramifications depending on whether or not these women were married or fit for marriage, or whether their offspring are fit for marriage, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. This serves to teach you that they practiced affection and camaraderie between them, to fulfill that which is stated: “Love truth and peace” (Zechariah 8:19). Rabbi Shimon says: They did refrain in the certain cases, but they did not refrain in the uncertain cases. In other words, Beit Hillel were not worried that any ordinary woman from Beit Shammai might be one of those of uncertain status.

נמנעו הן מן הודאי, ולא נמנעו מן הספק.

אי אמרת בשלמא עשו — משום הכי נמנעו. אלא אי אמרת לא עשו, אמאי נמנעו? ותסברא? נהי נמי דעשו, בשלמא בית הלל — נמנעו מבית שמאי,

The Gemara infers from the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion, it is due to that reason that they refrained in the certain cases. However, if you say that they did not act in accordance with their opinion, why did they refrain from marriage? The Gemara replies: And how can you understand it that way, that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion? Even if they acted in accordance with their opinion, granted that Beit Hillel refrained from marrying into Beit Shammai, as those rival wives who entered into levirate marriage are liable to receive karet and their children are mamzerim according to the opinion of Beit Hillel.

דחייבי כריתות נינהו, וממזרים הם לבית הלל.

אלא בית שמאי — אמאי נמנעו מבית הלל? בני חייבי לאוין נינהו, וכשרים נינהו! כדאמר רב נחמן בר יצחק: לא נצרכה אלא לצרה עצמה, הכא נמי:

However, why did Beit Shammai refrain from marrying the offspring of rival wives of Beit Hillel? The parents are liable for violating a regular prohibition, and therefore their children are fit. The Gemara answers as Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said with regard to a different matter: This halakha was necessary not for the children of the rival wife, but only for the rival wife herself. Here too, it was necessary only for the rival wife herself. The halakha was not taught with regard to the children of the rival wives; rather, it is referring only to the rival wives.

לא נצרכה אלא לצרה עצמה.

ומאי שנא מן הודאי — דאיסורא הוא, ספק נמי איסורא הוא!

The Gemara asks further: And in what way are uncertain cases different from the certain cases, such as forbidden rival wives? If you say that certain cases are undoubtedly prohibited in the opinion of Beit Hillel, the cases involving uncertain circumstances, e.g., one who divorced his wife and then stayed with her in the same inn, are also prohibited. Even if Beit Hillel render these cases prohibited only due to some uncertainty, the ruling is the same.

לא תימא: מן הספק, אלא אימא: מן הסתם, דמודעי להו ופרשי.

The Gemara answers: Do not say: In the uncertain cases, i.e., that the halakha involved doubtful circumstances. Rather, say: From the unspecified case. In other words, barring clear knowledge of an uncertain betrothal within a specific family, they would take women from that family in marriage. The reason is that Beit Shammai would notify Beit Hillel of the prohibition according to their opinion, and they would refrain from the marriage. If there was no notification, this was a clear sign that no doubt was involved in this case at all.

ומאי קא משמע לן, דאהבה וריעות נוהגים זה בזה? היינו רישא! הא קא משמע לן דכולה רבי שמעון היא.

The Gemara asks: But if so, what does this come to teach us? Is it that they had relations of affection and camaraderie between them, i.e., that each trusted that the other side would never cause them to err with regard to something they held to be prohibited? This is the same as the first clause of the baraita. What is Rabbi Shimon adding by his statement? The Gemara answers: This comes to teach us that the entire baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. This is not a dispute between two Sages. Rather, Rabbi Shimon’s opinion elucidates the earlier statement.

תא שמע דאמר רבי יוחנן בן נורי: היאך הלכה זו רווחת בישראל? נעשה כדברי בית שמאי — הולד ממזר לדברי בית הלל,

§ The Gemara offers an alternative resolution: Come and hear, as Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: How should one act with regard to this halakha of rival wives? In what form should it become widespread among the Jewish people? If we act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and permit a rival wife in levirate marriage, the offspring will be a mamzer according to the statement of Beit Hillel. If we act in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel and grant full exemption to the rival wives, the offspring will be of flawed lineage according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, as he is the child of a woman prohibited in marriage by a regular prohibition. Although he is not a mamzer, his lineage is nevertheless defective. Instead, let us enact a general decree for rival wives

נעשה כדברי בית הלל — הולד פגום לדברי בית שמאי. בואו ונתקן להן לצרות,