יבמות דף קטו
Yevamos 115דף יומי שיעור אויף אידיש · יבמות דף קטו
Daf Yomi shiur on Maseches Yevamos daf 115 (מסכת יבמות דף קטו), in Yiddish, by HaRav Avrohom Karp ZT"L. The Gemara page, Rashi and Tosafos follow along as you listen, with the English translation alongside.
דאי בעיא אמרה: ״שלום בעולם״. או דלמא: כיון דאיחזקה — אמרה בדדמי, ולא אתי ״מה לי לשקר״ ומרע חזקתיה. תא שמע: ״עישינו עלינו בית״, ״עישינו עלינו מערה״, ״הוא מת, ואני…
The same discussion elsewhere in Shas
Yevamos 115: the daf with times in the shiur
Tap a time to hear Rabbi Karp's explanation of that passage.
יבמות קטו · עמוד א
דאי בעיא אמרה: ״שלום בעולם״. או דלמא: כיון דאיחזקה — אמרה בדדמי, ולא אתי ״מה לי לשקר״ ומרע חזקתיה.
Because if she wanted to lie she would have said: There was peace in the world, and the court would have accepted her testimony. Or perhaps it can be argued: Since she has maintained that there was a war and this claim of hers has already been accepted, with regard to her report concerning her husband, she will say what she imagines to be the case, and the argument of: Why would I lie, does not come and undermine the established presumption that there was a war.
תא שמע: ״עישינו עלינו בית״, ״עישינו עלינו מערה״, ״הוא מת, ואני נצלתי״ — אינה נאמנת. שאני התם, דאמר לה: כי היכי דלדידך איתרחיש ניסא, לדידיה נמי איתרחיש ניסא.
The Gemara cites a baraita in an attempt to resolve this dilemma. Come and hear: It was taught that if a woman comes and says: They set our house on fire and the house became filled with smoke, or: They set our cave on fire to smoke us out, and she adds: My husband died and I was saved, she is not deemed credible. In this case, she herself related the entire story, and even so her version of events is not accepted. The Gemara answers that this is no proof. There, in the case of the fire, it is different, as one says to her: Just as a miracle occurred for you and you were saved, likewise a miracle might have occurred for your husband and he too survived.
תא שמע: ״נפלו עלינו גוים״, ״נפלו עלינו ליסטים״, ״הוא מת, ונצלתי״ — נאמנת. התם, כדרב אידי. דאמר רב אידי: אשה כלי זיינה עליה.
Come and hear a proof from another baraita. If a woman comes and says: A group of gentiles attacked us, or: A group of bandits attacked us, and she adds: My husband died and I was saved, she is deemed credible. This indicates that her testimony is accepted due to the argument of: Why should she lie? The Gemara rejects this proof. There, in that baraita, her testimony is accepted because it stands to reason that she is speaking the truth, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Idi. As Rav Idi said: With regard to a woman, her weapons are upon her. In other words, a woman is generally not killed by thieves, because the very fact of her being a woman protects her. They would most likely rape her and not kill her. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that she is speaking the truth.
ההוא גברא דבשילהי הלוליה איתלי נורא בי (גנני) [גנניה]. אמרה להו דביתהו: ״חזו גבראי! חזו גבראי!״ אתו, חזו גברא חרוכא דשדי, ופסתא דידא דשדיא.
§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who got married. At the end of his wedding a fire broke out in the bridal chamber, where the bride and groom were standing, during the ceremony. His wife screamed and said to them: Look at my husband, look at my husband! They went and saw an unrecognizable burnt man fallen down, and a palm of a hand lying there.
סבר רב חייא בר אבין למימר: היינו ״עישינו עלינו בית, עישינו עלינו מערה״. אמר רבא: מי דמי? התם לא קאמרה ״חזו גבראי, חזו גבראי״. ועוד, גברא חרוכא דשדי,
Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin thought to say: This is the same as the case of: They set our house on fire and the house became filled with smoke, or: They set our cave on fire to smoke us out, i.e., we cannot rely on her claim that her husband died. Rava said: Is this case comparable to those? There she did not say: Look at my husband, look at my husband. And furthermore, there is another difference: Here, there is a burnt man who has fallen down and a palm that is lying there. In other words, her statement is substantiated by facts.
ופסתא דידא דשדיא.
ורב חייא בר אבין — גברא חרוכא דשדי, אימא איניש אחרינא אתא לאצולי, ואכילתיה נורא. ופסתא דידא דשדיא — נורא איתליא ואתיליד ביה מומא,
And why didn’t Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin accept her testimony? In his opinion, a burnt man who has fallen down is not conclusive proof, as one might still say: Perhaps another person came to the rescue and the fire burned him. And as for the palm lying there, perhaps the fire burned him and caused a deformity through which he lost his hand, and due to his embarrassment he went and ran away to somewhere else in the world, but he is still alive. Consequently, Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin did not want to rely upon the testimony of the wife.
ומחמת כיסופא אזל וערק לעלמא.
איבעיא להו: עד אחד במלחמה מהו? טעמא דעד אחד מהימן — משום דמילתא דעבידא לאיגלויי הוא לא משקר, הכא נמי לא משקר. או דלמא:
§ A dilemma was raised before them: In the case of one witness who testifies to the death of someone during a war, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: The reason that one witness is deemed credible when he provides testimony concerning the death of a husband is because the husband being alive is a matter that is likely to be revealed, and one would not lie in a case of this kind. Here, too, one witness would not lie. Or perhaps the reason that one witness is trusted is because his account is supported by the fact that she herself is exacting in her investigation before she marries again. And here, since sometimes she hates him, and war is a situation that requires especially careful investigation and it is tempting for her to rely on the witness, she is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again, and therefore the testimony of one witness is not accepted.
טעמא דעד אחד משום דהיא גופא דייקא ומינסבא, והכא [כיון דזימנין דסניא ליה], לא דייקא ומינסבא.
אמר רמי בר חמא: תא שמע, אמר רבי עקיבא: כשירדתי לנהרדעא לעבר השנה, מצאני נחמיה איש בית דלי, ואמר לי: שמעתי שאין משיאין את האשה בארץ ישראל
Rami bar Ḥama said: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma. Rabbi Akiva said: When I descended to Neharde’a in Babylonia to intercalate the year, I found there the Sage Neḥemya of Beit D’li, and he said to me: I heard that the Sages do not allow a woman to marry in Eretz Yisrael based on the testimony of one witness, apart from Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, as the other Sages are reluctant to rely on his opinion. And I said [namti] to him: This is so. He said to me: Say to them in my name: Do you know that this country is riddled with troops? This is the tradition that I received from Rabban Gamliel the Elder, that the Sages do allow a woman to marry based on one witness.
על פי עד אחד, אלא רבי יהודה בן בבא. ונמתי לו: כן הדברים. אמר לי, אמור להם משמי: אתם יודעים המדינה הזו משובשת בגייסות?
כך מקובלני מרבן גמליאל הזקן, שמשיאין האשה על פי עד אחד.
מאי מדינה משובשת בגייסות? לאו, אף על גב דמדינה זו משובשת, כך מקובלני שמשיאין על פי עד אחד. אלמא עד אחד מהימן.
The Gemara analyzes this baraita in relation to the issue at hand. What is the significance of his comment that this country is riddled with troops? Isn’t he saying: Even though this country is riddled with troops, this is the tradition that I received, that the Sages do allow a woman to marry based on one witness, notwithstanding the war. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible in the case of a missing husband during a time of war.
אמר רבא: אי הכי, מאי שנא ״מדינה זו״? ״כל מקום שיש גייסות״ מיבעי ליה! אלא אמר רבא, הכי קאמר: אתם יודעים שמדינה זו משובשת בגייסות,
Rava said: If this is how you interpret the matter, in what way is this country different from any other? In other words, why did Neḥemya of Beit D’li mention a particular place? He should have said: Any place where there are troops. Rather, Rava said: This is what he said: You know that this country is riddled with troops, and I cannot leave the members of my household and come before the Sages, due to the danger. Therefore, I cannot testify in person that this is the tradition that I received from Rabban Gamliel the Elder, that the Sages allow a woman to marry based on one witness. According to this interpretation, his statement has no bearing on the matter at hand.
ולא אפשר לי למשבק אינשי ביתי ומייתי קמי רבנן. כך מקובלני מרבן גמליאל שמשיאין האשה על פי עד אחד.
תא שמע: מעשה בשני תלמידי חכמים שהיו באין עם אבא יוסי בן סימאי בספינה, וטבעה, והשיא רבי נשותיהן על פי נשים. והא מים כמלחמה דמו. ונשים,
The Gemara continues. Come and hear a baraita that relates an incident involving two Torah scholars who were coming with Abba Yosei ben Simai by boat, and that boat sank. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi allowed their wives to marry based on the testimony given by women that these men were dead. But consider: Water, i.e., the sea, is like war with respect to this halakha, as there is room in both cases for conjecture and error. And women, even one hundred of them, are considered as one witness with regard to their testimony about a husband’s death. And yet the baraita taught: He allowed them to marry, which indicates that one may rely on one witness even during a war.
אפילו מאה — כעד אחד דמו, וקתני: השיא!
ותסברא? מים שאין להם סוף נינהו, ומים שאין להם סוף — אשתו אסורה. אלא היכי דמי, דאמרי: אסקינהו קמן
The Gemara rejects this proof. And how can you understand it that way? Apparently, the women testified only that the boat sank, and this is a case of an endless body of water, as the boat sank at sea in a spot from which it is impossible to see the shore. And the halakha is that if a man was on a boat that sank in an endless body of water his wife is prohibited to marry, as there is no proof that he actually drowned and didn’t emerge from the water on a different shore. Rather, one must say: What are the circumstances? That those women said: Those drowned men were brought up before us
יבמות קטו · עמוד ב
וחזינהו לאלתר, וקאמרי סימנין. דלאו עלייהו סמכינן, אלא אסימנים.
and we saw them immediately when they came out of the water, and the women stated distinguishing marks that identified these people. As, in this case we do not rely upon the women, but upon the distinguishing marks.
ההוא גברא דאפקיד שומשמי גבי חבריה, אמר ליה: הב לי שומשמי. אמר ליה: שקילתינהו: והא כן וכן הויין, ובחביתא רמיין. אמר ליה: דידך שקלתינהו, והני — אחריני נינהו.
§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who deposited sesame plants with his friend. Sometime later he said to him: Give me the sesame plants. The friend said to him: You already took them. The owner replied: But they were of such-and-such an amount, and placed in a barrel; go and check that barrel and you will see that I am right. The bailee said to him: You took your sesame plants, and these in the barrel at my house are other ones.
סבר רב חסדא למימר: היינו שני תלמידי חכמים, ולא אמרינן: הנך אזלו לעלמא, והני אחריני נינהו.
The case came before the Sages for a ruling. Rav Ḥisda thought to say: This situation is the same as the situation involving the two Torah scholars who drowned, when they used distinguishing marks to identify them. And we do not say in that case: Those men went elsewhere in the world, and these men who floated up are different people. Here too one may rely upon the distinguishing marks of the sesame plants given by the owner, and there is no reason to think that these sesame plants are different ones.
אמר ליה רבא: מי דמי? התם, קאמרי סימנים. הכא, שומשמי מאי סימנא אית להו? ודקאמר ״כן וכן הויין״ — אימר חושבנא איתרמי.
Rava said to Rav Ḥisda: Is it comparable? There they said distinguishing marks that identified the victims. Here, in the case of sesame plants, what distinguishing marks might they have, by which they could be identified? And as for that which he said: They were of such-and-such an amount, one can say it happened by chance that this second time it was the same amount, and there is no proof that these are the same sesame plants.
אמר ליה מר קשישא בר רב חסדא לרב אשי: ומי חיישינן שמא פינן? והתנן: מצא כלי וכתוב עליו קוף — קרבן, מם — מעשר, דלת — דמוע,
With regard to the same issue, Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: And are we concerned that perhaps the one guarding the plants moved them from their place? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 4:11): If one found a vessel on which the letter kuf was written, all objects inside the vessel are designated for a korban, an offering; if the letter mem was written on it, it is ma’aser, tithes; if it was the letter dalet, it is dimua, a mixture of teruma and non-sacred produce; if tet, it signifies tevel, untithed produce; and finally, if it is a tav, it indicates teruma. As during a time of danger, i.e., religious persecution against Jews, they would write, for example, tav instead of teruma. In this case, no concern is expressed that someone might have moved the teruma from that vessel to somewhere else.
טית — טבל, תיו — תרומה. שבשעת הסכנה היו כותבין תיו תחת תרומה!
אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי: ולא חיישינן שמא פינן? אימא סיפא, רבי יוסי אומר: אפילו מצא חבית וכתוב עליה תרומה — הרי אלו חולין, שאני אומר:
In response to this claim, Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And aren’t we concerned that perhaps someone moved the teruma from their place? Say the latter clause of that same mishna Rabbi Yosei says: Even if one found a barrel on which the full word teruma was written, these contents are non-sacred. As I say: Last year it was full of teruma, and someone removed the contents and replaced them with non-sacred produce. This proves that the possibility that someone moved the original contents is taken into consideration.
אשתקד הוה מלא תרומה, ופינה!
אלא: דכולי עלמא חיישינן שמא פינן, והכא בהא קמיפלגי. מר סבר: אם איתא דפינהו — מיכפר הוה כפר. ואידך: אימר אישתלויי אישתלי. אי נמי, לפנחיא שבקיה.
Rather, say as follows: Everyone agrees that we are concerned that perhaps someone moved the contents of a container from their place, and here, with regard to the marked vessels, they disagree about this issue: The Sage who claims that one may rely on the inscription holds that if it is so, that he moved the teruma, he would have erased the inscription. And the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, responds that one can say he forgot to do so. Alternatively, he left the label to preserve [panaḥya] the contents, so that people would mistakenly think that it contained teruma and would refrain from taking the produce.
יצחק ריש גלותא, בר אחתיה דרב ביבי, הוה קאזיל מקורטבא לאספמיא, ושכיב. שלחו מהתם: יצחק ריש גלותא, בר אחתיה דרב ביבי, הוה קאזיל מקורטבא לאספמיא, ושכיב.
§ The Gemara relates a story that deals with the permission of a woman to remarry. Yitzḥak the Exilarch, son of the sister of Rav Beivai, was walking from Cortva to Spain and died along the way. They sent this message from Spain: Yitzḥak the Exilarch, son of the sister of Rav Beivai, was walking from Cortva to Spain and died. The Gemara asks: Are we concerned about the possibility of two men named Yitzḥak or not? Perhaps there is someone else with the same name, and therefore the mention of his name is not a sufficiently distinguishing mark. Abaye said: We are concerned about this possibility. Rava said: We are not concerned.
מי חיישינן לתרי יצחק, או לא? אביי אמר: חיישינן. רבא אמר: לא חיישינן.
אמר אביי: מנא אמינא לה, דההוא גיטא דאשתכח בנהרדעא וכתיב: בצד קלוניא מתא אנא אנדרולינאי נהרדעא פטרית ותרכית ית פלונית אנתתי.
Abaye said: From where do I say my reasoning that there might be another man with the same name? As a certain bill of divorce was found in the city of Neharde’a, and this passage was written on it: On the colonial [kelonya] side of the city, I, Androlinai of Neharde’a, excused, sent away, and divorced my wife so-and-so. Androlinai’s wife requested permission to remarry based on this bill of divorce, but they did not know if he was the man who gave the divorce or if it was given by another man of the same name. And the father of Shmuel sent this question before Rabbi Yehuda Nesia in Eretz Yisrael. And Rabbi Yehuda Nesia sent a message to him: All of Neharde’a must be examined, to see whether there is another man by that name. This shows that one must be concerned that there might be two people with the same name.
ושלחה אבוה דשמואל לקמיה דרבי יהודה נשיאה. ושלח ליה: תיבדק נהרדעא כולה.
ורבא אמר: אם איתא — ״יבדק כל העולם״ מיבעי ליה?! אלא משום כבודו דאבוה דשמואל הוא דשלח הכי.
And Rava said: This story provides no proof. If it is so, that there were grounds to suspect that someone else of the same name wrote the bill of divorce, Rabbi Yehuda Nesia should have said: The entire world must be examined, in case there is someone else with the same name somewhere. Since he did not say this, evidently there was no legitimate reason for this suspicion at all. Why, then, did Rabbi Yehuda Nesia send instructions to examine all of Neharde’a? Rather, Rava added, it was due to respect for the father of Shmuel that he sent this message. He did not want to write explicitly that Shmuel’s father had inquired unnecessarily, and therefore he wrote his reply in a manner which indicated his partial agreement with the concern.
אמר רבא: מנא אמינא לה — דהנהו תרי שטרי דנפקי במחוזא וכתיב בהו: חבי בר ננאי וננאי בר חבי, ואגבי בהו רבא בר אבוה זוזי.
Rava said: From where do I say my reasoning that we are not concerned about two people with identical names? As there were two promissory notes produced in Meḥoza, and these names of the creditors were written on them: Ḥavai bar Nanai and Nanai bar Ḥavai, and Rava bar Avuh collected dinars for them with these promissory notes, without concerning himself with the possibility that they might be referring to other people. And the names Ḥavai bar Nanai and Nanai bar Ḥavai are very common in Meḥoza, i.e., there are certainly other people with these names, and yet he was not worried about this matter. The Gemara asks: And Abaye, how does he answer this proof?
והא חבי בר ננאי וננאי בר חבי במחוזא שכיחי טובא. ואביי?