נדרים דף ז

״מעמך״, זה לקט שכחה ופאה.

The verse states with regard to offerings: “When you shall take a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay to pay it; for the Lord your God will surely require it of you” (Deuteronomy 23:22). With regard to the term “of you” the baraita states: This is a reference to gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a.

יש יד לצדקה, או אין יד לצדקה? היכי דמי? אילימא דאמר: ״הדין זוזא לצדקה, והדין נמי״ — ההוא צדקה עצמה היא!

§ The Gemara asks: Is there intimation for charity or is there no intimation for charity? The Gemara clarifies the question: What are the circumstances of such a case? If we say that it is a case where one said: This dinar is for charity and this also, that itself is an explicit statement of donating to charity. Rather, it is a case where he said: This, and did not say: Also. What is his intention? Is he understood to be saying: This is also charity, or perhaps what is the meaning of: And this? He is saying that this coin is merely for general use, and he did not complete his statement.

אלא כגון דאמר ״הדין״ ולא אמר ״נמי״, מאי? ״הדין נמי צדקה״ קאמר, או דלמא [מאי] ״והדין״ (נמי) — לנפקותא בעלמא קאמר, ודבורא הוא דלא אסקיה.

מי אמרינן: כיון דאיתקש לקרבנות, דכתיב: ״בפיך״ — זו צדקה. מה קרבנות יש להן יד, אף צדקה יש לה יד. או דלמא ל״בל תאחר״ הוא דאיתקש?

The Gemara explains the two sides of this dilemma: Do we say that since charity is juxtaposed to offerings, as it is written in a verse following the prohibition against delaying an offering: “That you have spoken with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24) and the Sages expounded that this is a reference to charity, therefore, just as there is intimation, i.e., intimation is effective, with regard to offerings, so too, there is intimation with regard to charity? Or perhaps it is only with regard to the prohibition: You shall not delay, that it is juxtaposed, but not with regard to other halakhot?

יש יד להפקר, או דלמא אין יד להפקר? היינו צדקה!

The Gemara asks further: Is there intimation for rendering one’s property ownerless, or perhaps there is no intimation for rendering one’s property ownerless. Does an incomplete expression employed by an owner to relinquish property take effect or not? The Gemara notes: This is the same as the previous question with regard to charity, which is comparable to rendering one’s property ownerless for the benefit of the poor.

אם תמצא לומר קאמר. אם תמצא לומר יש יד לצדקה, דאין היקש למחצה. הפקר מי אמרינן היינו צדקה, או דלמא שאני צדקה, דצדקה לא חזיא אלא לעניים,

The Gemara responds: This question is stated in the style of: If you say, as follows: If you say there is intimation for charity, as there is no partial analogy based on juxtaposition, do we say that rendering one’s property ownerless is the same as charity; or perhaps charity is different, as charity is suitable only for the poor, but ownerless property is suitable for both the poor and the wealthy, and therefore it cannot be derived from the halakha with regard to charity.

אבל הפקר בין לעניים בין לעשירים?

בעי רבינא: יש יד לבית הכסא, או לא? היכי דמי? אילימא דאמר ״הדין ביתא ליהוי בית הכסא, והדין נמי״, ההוא בית הכסא נמי הוה!

Ravina raised another dilemma: Is there intimation for designating a location as a bathroom or not? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case? If we say that it is a case where one said: Let this structure be a bathroom and this one also, that second structure is certainly also a bathroom. Rather, it is a case where he said: And this, and he did not say: Also. What is his intention? Is the expression: And this, that he said, understood to mean: And this shall also be a bathroom? Or perhaps what is the meaning of: And this? He is saying that it is designated for general use rather than as a bathroom.

אלא כגון דאמר ״והדין״ ולא אמר ״נמי״. מאי ״הדין״ דאמר — ״והדין נמי בית הכסא״, או דלמא מאי ״והדין״ — לתשמישא בעלמא קאמר.

מכלל דפשיטא ליה לרבינא דיש זימון לבית הכסא? והא מיבעיא ליה לרבינא: הזמינו לבית הכסא מהו? הזמינו לבית המרחץ מהו? זימון מועיל, או אין זימון מועיל?

The Gemara comments: Can it be derived by inference that it is obvious to Ravina that there is designation for a bathroom, i.e., that if one explicitly designates a location as a bathroom, it attains that status even before it is used for that purpose, so that one may not bring sacred items to that location? Didn’t Ravina raise this as a dilemma? He asked: If one designated a particular location as a bathroom, what is the halakha? If one designated it as a bathhouse, what is the halakha? In other words, is designation effective to grant the location a particular status, or is designation not effective?

רבינא חדא מגו חדא קמיבעיא ליה: זימון מועיל או אין זימון מועיל. אם תמצא לומר יש זימון: יש יד או אין יד תיבעי ליה.

The Gemara answers: Ravina raised one dilemma within another dilemma: Is designation effective or is designation not effective? And if you say there is designation, i.e., designation is effective, is there intimation or is there not intimation, i.e., is designation via intimation effective? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma remains unresolved.

מנודה אני לך וכו׳. אמר אביי: מודה רבי עקיבא לענין מלקות שאינו לוקה. דאם כן, ניתני ״רבי עקיבא מחמיר״.

§ It was taught in the mishna that if one said: I am ostracized from you, Rabbi Akiva was uncertain about the halakha but was inclined to rule stringently about this. Abaye said: Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to flogging that one is not flogged if he violates a vow that was expressed in this way. As, if so, if Rabbi Akiva held that one is liable to be flogged, let the mishna teach: Rabbi Akiva is stringent. The fact that it states: Rabbi Akiva was uncertain but was inclined to rule stringently, indicates that although Rabbi Akiva holds that one may not violate this vow, he concedes that one is not liable to be flogged if he does violate the vow.

אמר רב פפא: ב״נדינא מינך״ — דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דאסור. ״משמתנא מינך״ — לכולי עלמא שרי. במאי פליגי —

Rav Pappa said: With regard to a vow that one expressed with the phrase: I am distanced [nadeina] from you, everyone agrees that he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the other individual, as this is an intimation of a vow. If he employs the expression: I am excommunicated [meshamattena] from you everyone agrees that he is permitted to derive benefit from the other person, even though he meant to distance himself from the other individual, because this is not the terminology of a vow. With regard to what do they disagree?

ב״מנודה אני לך״, דרבי עקיבא סבר: לישנא דנידויא הוא, ורבנן סברי: לישנא דמשמתנא הוא.

They disagree with regard to a case when the language one uses is: I am ostracized from you, as Rabbi Akiva holds that it is a language of distancing and therefore expresses a vow, and the Rabbis hold that it is a language of excommunication, and not the terminology with which people express vows.

ופליגא דרב חסדא. דההוא גברא דאמר ״משמתנא בנכסיה דבריה דרב ירמיה בר אבא״ אתא לקמיה דרב חסדא. אמר ליה: לית דחש לה להא דרבי עקיבא. קסבר: ב״משמתנא״ פליגי.

The Gemara comments: And Rav Pappa disagrees with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as demonstrated in the following incident: There was a certain man who said: I am excommunicated from the property of the son of Rav Yirmeya bar Abba. He came before Rav Ḥisda to ask whether this statement was effective in generating a prohibition or not. Rav Ḥisda said to him: There is no one who, in practice, is concerned for that opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Apparently, Rav Ḥisda holds that they also disagree with regard to the phrase: I am excommunicated from you. This indicates that the dispute between the tanna’im is not with regard to specific terms but with regard to the more general question of whether terms of ostracism or excommunication are terms that can also express vows.

אמר רבי אילא אמר רב: נדהו בפניו — אין מתירין לו אלא בפניו. נדהו שלא בפניו — מתירין לו בין בפניו בין שלא בפניו.

§ Rabbi Ila said that Rav said: If one ostracized another individual in his presence, one may dissolve it for him only in his presence. If one ostracized him not in his presence, one may dissolve it for him in his presence or not in his presence.

אמר רב חנין אמר רב: השומע הזכרת השם מפי חבירו צריך לנדותו, ואם לא נידהו — הוא עצמו יהא בנידוי. שכל מקום שהזכרת השם מצויה, שם עניות מצויה.

Rav Ḥanin said that Rav said: One who hears mention of the name of God in vain by another individual must ostracize him for doing so. And if he did not ostracize him, he himself, the listener, shall be ostracized, as wherever mention of God’s name in vain is common, poverty is also common there.

ועניות, כמיתה, שנאמר: ״כי מתו כל האנשים״, ותניא: כל מקום ש״נתנו חכמים עיניהם״, או מיתה או עוני.

And poverty is so harsh that it is considered like death, as it is stated: “For all the men are dead who sought your life” (Exodus 4:19). The Sages had a tradition that Dathan and Abiram had sought to have Moses killed in Egypt and that they were the men referred to in the quoted verse (see 64b). They were still alive at that time but had become impoverished. And additionally, it is taught in a baraita: Wherever it says that the Sages set their eyes on a particular individual, the result was either death or poverty. This also indicates that death and poverty are equivalent.

אמר רבי אבא: הוה קאימנא קמיה דרב הונא, שמעה להך איתתא דאפקה הזכרת השם לבטלה, שמתה ושרא לה לאלתר באפה. שמע מינה תלת:

Rabbi Abba said: I was standing before Rav Huna, and he heard a certain woman utter a mention of the name of God in vain. He excommunicated her and immediately dissolved the excommunication for her in her presence. The Gemara comments: Learn three things from this. Learn from this that one who hears mention of the name of God in vain by another individual must ostracize him; and learn from this that if one ostracized another in his presence, one may dissolve it for him only in his presence; and learn from this that there is nothing, i.e., no minimum time that must pass, between ostracism and nullification of the ostracism.

שמע מינה השומע הזכרת השם מפי חבירו צריך לנדותו, ושמע מינה: נידהו בפניו, אין מתירין לו אלא בפניו, ושמע מינה: אין בין נידוי להפרה ולא כלום.

אמר רב גידל אמר רב: תלמיד חכם מנדה לעצמו, ומיפר לעצמו. פשיטא? מהו דתימא: ״אין חבוש מתיר עצמו מבית האסורין״, קא משמע לן.

Rav Giddel said that Rav said: A Torah scholar can ostracize himself, and he can nullify the ostracism for himself. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that he can nullify the ostracism for himself, just as he is able to do for others? The Gemara answers: It states this lest you say, as per the popular maxim: A prisoner cannot free himself from prison, and since he is ostracized he cannot dissolve the ostracism for himself; therefore it teaches us that he can do so.

היכי דמי: כי הא דמר זוטרא חסידא, כי מחייב בר בי רב שמתא — משמית נפשיה ברישא, והדר משמת בר בי רב. וכי עייל לביתיה,

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances where a Torah scholar might ostracize himself? It is like that case involving Mar Zutra Ḥasida. When a student in the academy was liable to receive excommunication, Mar Zutra Ḥasida would first excommunicate himself and then he would excommunicate the student of Torah. And when he would enter his home, he would dissolve the excommunication for himself and then dissolve the excommunication for the student.

שרי לנפשיה והדר שרי ליה.

ואמר רב גידל אמר רב:

And Rav Giddel said that Rav said: