מכות דף ט

שאין בה שוה פרוטה. דאמר רבי אמי אמר רבי יוחנן: הכהו הכאה שאין בה שוה פרוטה – לוקה. ולא מקשינן הכאה לקללה.

that does not have the capacity to cause damage worth one peruta, as Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Although one who strikes another pays damages and is not flogged, if he struck him with a blow that does not have the capacity to cause damage worth one peruta, since there is no payment, he is flogged for violating a Torah prohibition. The Gemara comments: And according to this opinion, contrary to those who hold that based on their virtual juxtaposition (see Exodus 21:15, 17) or on an analogy between them, the halakhot of striking and cursing are identical, we do not liken striking to cursing. Therefore, although one is flogged for cursing another only if the other comports himself as an observant, God-fearing Jew, one is liable for striking another even if the other was a sinner, e.g., a Samaritan.

חוץ מעל ידי גר תושב וכו׳. אלמא גר תושב גוי הוא. אימא סיפא: גר תושב גולה על ידי גר תושב! אמר רב כהנא: לא קשיא,

§ The mishna teaches: Everyone is exiled due to their unintentional murder of a Jew, and a Jew is exiled due to all of them, except for when it is due to a ger toshav. And a ger toshav is exiled due to his unintentional murder of a ger toshav. The Gemara comments: Apparently, one may conclude that a ger toshav is a gentile, and therefore he is not exiled when he unintentionally kills a Jew. Say the latter clause of the mishna: A ger toshav is exiled due to his unintentional murder of a ger toshav, indicating that his halakhic status is not that of a gentile, as gentiles are not liable to be exiled. There is an apparent contradiction between the two clauses in the mishna. Rav Kahana said: This is not difficult. Here, in the latter clause of the mishna, it is in the case of a ger toshav who killed a ger toshav that he is exiled; there, in the first clause, it is in the case of a ger toshav who killed a Jew. In the case described in the first clause he is not exiled, as his halakhic status is not that of a Jew, for whom the sin of unintentional murder of a Jew can be atoned through exile.

כאן בגר תושב שהרג גר תושב, כאן בגר תושב שהרג ישראל.

איכא דרמי קראי אהדדי, כתיב: ״לבני ישראל ולגר ולתושב בתוכם תהיינה שש הערים״, וכתיב: ״והיו לכם הערים למקלט״, ״לכם״ – ולא לגרים! אמר רב כהנא: לא קשיא,

There are those who raised a contradiction between two verses. It is written: “For the children of Israel and for the stranger and for the resident [velatoshav] among them, shall these six cities be for refuge” (Numbers 35:15), indicating that a ger toshav is exiled. And it is written in a previous verse: “And the cities shall be for you for refuge” (Numbers 35:12), from which it is inferred: A refuge for you but not for a ger toshav, indicating that a ger toshav is not exiled. Rav Kahana said: This is not difficult. Here, the verse that indicates that they are not exiled is concerning a ger toshav who killed a Jew; there, the verse that indicates that they are exiled is concerning a ger toshav who killed a ger toshav.

כאן – בגר תושב שהרג ישראל, כאן – בגר תושב שהרג גר תושב.

ורמינהי: לפיכך גר וגוי שהרגו – נהרגין. קתני גר דומיא דגוי: מה גוי לא שנא דקטל בר מיניה, ולא שנא דקטל דלאו בר מיניה – נהרג, אף גר,

And the Gemara raises a contradiction to the halakha of the mishna from a baraita, which teaches: Therefore, a ger toshav and a gentile who killed a person are killed, even if they did so unintentionally. The Gemara infers based on the juxtaposition of a ger toshav and a gentile in the baraita: The tanna teaches the case of a ger toshav in a manner similar to the case of a gentile: Just as with regard to a gentile it is no different in a case where he killed one of his kind, a gentile, and it is no different in a case where he killed one not of his kind, a Jew, as in either case he is executed and is not exiled, so too, with regard to a ger toshav, it is no different in a case where he killed one of his kind, a ger toshav, and it is no different in a case where he killed one not of his kind, a Jew, as in either case he is executed and is not exiled.

לא שנא דקטל בר מיניה ולא שנא קטל דלאו בר מיניה – נהרג!

אמר רב חסדא: לא קשיא, כאן שהרגו דרך ירידה, כאן שהרגו דרך עלייה. דרך ירידה, דישראל גלי – איהו נמי סגי ליה בגלות. דרך עלייה,

Rav Ḥisda said: The contradiction between the mishna and the baraita is not difficult. Here, the mishna is referring to a case where he killed him in a downward motion; there, the baraita is referring to a case where he killed him in an upward motion. Rav Ḥisda elaborates: If one ger toshav killed another ger toshav in a downward motion, which is a case where if the perpetrator were a Jew, he would be exiled, the ger toshav also suffices with exile. But if the ger toshav killed his counterpart in an upward motion, which is a case where if the perpetrator were a Jew, he would be exempt from exile, the ger toshav is executed.

דישראל פטור – הוא נהרג.

אמר ליה רבא: ולאו קל וחומר הוא? ומה דרך ירידה דישראל גלי, איהו נמי סגי ליה בגלות, דרך עלייה, דישראל פטור, איהו נהרג?!

Rava said to him: And is it not derived by means of an a fortiori inference to the contrary? If one unintentionally kills another in a downward motion, which is a case where if the perpetrator were a Jew, he would be exiled, the ger toshav also suffices with exile and nothing more, but if he killed in an upward motion, which is a case where if the perpetrator were a Jew, he would be exempt from exile, is he killed?

אלא אמר רבא: באומר מותר. אמר ליה אביי: אומר מותר אנוס הוא! אמר ליה: שאני אומר, אומר מותר – קרוב למזיד הוא.

Rather, Rava said: The case in the baraita where a ger toshav is killed rather than exiled is where the ger toshav who killed another ger toshav says that it is permitted to kill the victim. If he killed him unintentionally he is exiled, in accordance with the ruling in the mishna. Abaye said to him: One who says that it is permitted to kill the victim is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, as he was unaware of the prohibition. Why, then, should he be executed? Rava said to him: That is not a problem, as I say that with regard to one who says that it is permitted, since he intended to kill the other, his action borders on the intentional.

ואזדו לטעמייהו, דאיתמר: כסבור בהמה ונמצא אדם, גוי ונמצא גר תושב. רבא אומר: חייב, אומר מותר קרוב למזיד הוא. רב חסדא אומר: פטור, אומר מותר אנוס הוא.

The Gemara observes: And Rava and Rav Ḥisda follow their standard line of reasoning, as is indicated by the fact that it was stated that they disagree in the case of a ger toshav who killed a person. If he thought he was killing an animal and it was discovered that it was a person, or if he thought he was killing a gentile and it was discovered that he was a ger toshav, Rava says he is liable to be executed, as with regard to one who says that it is permitted, his action borders on the intentional. Rav Ḥisda says he is exempt, as one who says that it is permitted to kill the victim is a victim of circumstances beyond his control.

איתיביה רבא לרב חסדא: ״הנך מת על האשה אשר לקחת״. מאי לאו בידי אדם?

Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda from that which is written with regard to Abimelech, king of Gerar, who took Sarah, Abraham’s wife: “And God came to Abimelech in a dream of the night and said to him: You shall die for the woman you took, as she is a man’s wife” (Genesis 20:3). When Abimelech took Sarah he was under the impression that she was unmarried, as Abraham said that she was his sister. Despite the fact that Abimelech was one who says that it is permitted, he was liable to be executed for his action. What, is it not that he was liable to be executed at the hand of a court composed of people, indicating that one who says that it is permitted is liable?

לא, בידי שמים. דיקא נמי, דכתיב: ״מחטוא לי״.

The Gemara rejects that conclusion: No, it means that he was liable to be executed at the hand of Heaven, but not by a court. The Gemara adds: The language of the verses is also precise in this regard, as it is written: “And I also prevented you from sinning against Me” (Genesis 20:6), indicating that it was a sin vis-à-vis God and was not in the jurisdiction of a court of men.

ולטעמיך, ״וחטאתי לאלהים״ – לאלהים ולא לאדם? אלא, דינו מסור לאדם, הכא נמי דינו מסור לאדם.

The Gemara asks: And according to your reasoning that based on the formulation of the verse one concludes that it was a sin exclusively vis-à-vis God, where Joseph says to Potiphar’s wife: “And how can I perform this great evil, and sin to God” (Genesis 39:9), may one also infer that it was a sin vis-à-vis God and not vis-à-vis man? Joseph is referring to adultery, which is punishable by execution according to the Noahide laws as well. Rather, in that case it means that although he performed a sin vis-à-vis God, his judgment is given over to the ruling of man; here too, in the verse about Abimelech, it can be explained that although he performed a sin vis-à-vis God, his judgment is given over to the ruling of man. There is no proof from this verse with regard to the status of one who says that it is permitted to perform a transgression.

איתיביה אביי לרבא: ״הגוי גם צדיק תהרג״! התם כדקא מהדרי עלויה: ״ועתה השב אשת האיש כי נביא הוא״ –

Abaye raised an objection to the opinion of Rava from the reply of Abimelech: “Will You even slay a righteous nation?” (Genesis 20:4). God appears to accept Abimelech’s contention, as He did not respond by calling him wicked, indicating that one who says that it is permitted to perform a transgression is a victim of circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara rejects that understanding. There, the reason for the rejection of Abimelech’s contention is as they responded to him from Heaven: “And now, restore the man’s wife, as he is a prophet” (Genesis 20:7).

אשת נביא הוא דתיהדר, דלאו נביא לא תיהדר?!

This Gemara questions that response. Is it the wife of a prophet that is returned, and the wife of one who is not a prophet is not returned?

אלא כדאמר רבי שמואל בר נחמני. דאמר רבי שמואל בר נחמני אמר רבי יונתן: הכי קאמר ליה: ״ועתה השב אשת האיש״, מכל מקום. ודקאמרת: ״הגוי גם צדיק תהרג,

Rather, the explanation is as Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says, as Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: This is what God is saying to Abimelech: “And now, restore the man’s wife” (Genesis 20:7), in any case, whether or not he is a prophet. And as for that which you said: “Will You even slay a righteous nation? Didn’t he say to me: She is my sister” (Genesis 20:4–5), claiming that you are a victim of circumstances beyond your control and exempt from punishment, that is not a valid claim. He is a prophet and it is from you that he learned to conduct himself in that manner. With regard to a stranger [akhsenai] who comes to the city, one asks him about matters of eating and drinking, e.g., whether he is hungry or thirsty. Does one ask him: Is that your wife? Is that your sister? Abraham understood from this line of questioning that you are suspect with regard to abducting women, and that is the reason that he introduced Sarah as his sister. Therefore, you are liable to be executed for her abduction.

הלא הוא אמר לי אחותי היא וגו׳״ – נביא הוא וממך למד. אכסנאי (הוא) שבא לעיר, על עסקי אכילה ושתייה שואלין אותו,

כלום שואלין אותו ״אשתך זו״ ״אחותך זו״?

מכאן שבן נח נהרג, שהיה לו ללמוד ולא למד.

The Gemara comments: From here it is derived that a descendant of Noah, i.e., a gentile, is executed for a capital offense even if he says that it is permitted, as he should have learned that it is prohibited and he did not learn.

מתני׳ הסומא אינו גולה, דברי רבי יהודה. רבי מאיר אומר: גולה. השונא אינו גולה. רבי יוסי אומר: השונא נהרג, מפני שהוא כמועד. רבי שמעון אומר:

MISHNA: A blind person who unintentionally murdered another is not exiled; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: He is exiled. The enemy of the victim is not exiled, as presumably it was not a completely unintentional act. Rabbi Yosei says: Not only is an enemy not exiled, but he is executed by the court, because his halakhic status is like that of one who is forewarned by witnesses not to perform the action, as presumably he performed the action intentionally. Rabbi Shimon says: There is an enemy who is exiled and there is an enemy who is not exiled. This is the principle: In any case where an observer could say he killed knowingly, where circumstances lead to the assumption that it was an intentional act, the enemy is not exiled, even if he claims that he acted unintentionally. And if it is clear that he killed unknowingly, as circumstances indicate that he acted unintentionally, he is exiled, even though the victim is his enemy.

יש שונא גולה ויש שונא שאינו גולה. זה הכלל: כל שהוא יכול לומר לדעת הרג – אינו גולה, ושלא לדעת הרג – הרי זה גולה.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן: ״בלא ראות״ – פרט לסומא, דברי רבי יהודה. רבי מאיר אומר: ״בלא ראות״ – לרבות את הסומא.

GEMARA: Apropos the dispute in the mishna between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir with regard to a blind person, the Sages taught: It is written that one is exiled to a city of refuge if he killed another “without seeing” (Numbers 35:23), indicating that the reference is to one who has the capacity to see. This serves to exclude a blind person; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: On the contrary, the term “without seeing” serves to include a blind person.

מאי טעמא דרבי יהודה – דכתיב: ״ואשר יבא את רעהו ביער״ – אפילו סומא. אתא ״בלא ראות״, מעטיה.

The Gemara elaborates: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is as it is written with regard to those who are exiled: “And as one who goes with his neighbor into the forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5), which is stated in general terms, applying even to a blind person. The phrase “without seeing” comes and excludes a blind person from this halakha.

ורבי מאיר: ״בלא ראות״ – למעט, ״בבלי דעת״ – למעט, הוי מיעוט אחר מיעוט, ואין מיעוט אחר מיעוט אלא לרבות.

And Rabbi Meir interprets the verses differently: “Without seeing” serves to exclude a blind person, and “without knowledge” (Deuteronomy 19:4) also serves to exclude a blind person. This is an example of a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression, and there is a hermeneutical principle that a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify the halakha and include additional cases. In this case, it includes a blind person in the halakhot of exile as well.

ורבי יהודה? ״בבלי דעת״ – פרט למתכוין הוא דאתא.

The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda respond to that derivation? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda says that the phrase “without knowledge” comes to exclude one with intent, e.g., one who had intent to kill an animal and who killed a person, from the halakha of exile. Rabbi Yehuda interprets the two restrictive expressions as excluding two unrelated cases from the halakha of exile, and therefore the principle of: A restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify, is not relevant in this case.

רבי יוסי אומר השונא נהרג כו׳. והא לא אתרו ביה! מתניתין רבי יוסי בר יהודה היא, דתניא: רבי יוסי בר יהודה אומר: חבר אינו צריך התראה,

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei says: An enemy is executed because his halakhic status is like that of one who is forewarned. The Gemara asks: But why is an enemy executed? The witness did not actually forewarn him, and courts administer corporal punishment only to a defendant who was forewarned. The Gemara answers: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One who is devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot [ḥaver] does not require forewarning for the court to administer corporal punishment to him, because fundamentally the obligation to issue forewarning was established only to distinguish between unwitting and intentional actions. The presumptive status of a ḥaver is that of one who knows the halakha; therefore, his action is presumed to have been intentional.

לפי שלא ניתנה התראה אלא להבחין בין שוגג למזיד.

רבי שמעון אומר: יש שונא גולה וכו׳. תניא: כיצד אמר רבי שמעון יש שונא גולה ויש שונא שאינו גולה? נפסק – גולה, נשמט – אינו גולה.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: There is an enemy who is exiled and there is an enemy who is not exiled. The Gemara adds: It is taught in a baraita: In what circumstances did Rabbi Shimon say that there is an enemy who is exiled and there is an enemy who is not exiled? He said that in a case where the rope snapped and the object attached to the rope fell and killed a person, he is exiled, as that appears to be an accident. But if an object was displaced from his hands, he is not exiled, as presumably he loosened his grip until it fell.

והתניא רבי שמעון אומר: לעולם אינו גולה עד שישמט מחצלו מידו. קשיא נפסק אנפסק, קשיא נשמט אנשמט!

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: One is never exiled unless his trowel with which he was working was displaced from his hand? As Rabbi Shimon stated that halakha without distinguishing between friend and enemy, therefore, the apparent contradiction between a case where the rope snapped, according to the first baraita, and a case where the rope snapped, according to the second baraita, is difficult. And the apparent contradiction between a case where the object was displaced, according to the first baraita, and a case where the object was displaced, according to the second baraita, is difficult.

נפסק אנפסק לא קשיא: הא באוהב, והא בשונא.

The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between a case where the rope snapped according to the first baraita and a case where the rope snapped according to the second is not difficult. This case in the second baraita is referring to a friend of the victim, and presumably if the rope snapped it is considered a case of circumstances beyond his control and he is exempt from exile, and that case in the first baraita is referring to an enemy of the victim. In that case, although the presumption is that the act was not intentional, due to his enmity toward the victim, it is also not assumed to be the result of circumstances that were completely beyond his control. Therefore, he is exiled.

נשמט אנשמט לא קשיא: הא רבי, והא רבנן.

The apparent contradiction between a case where the object was displaced according to the first baraita and a case where the object was displaced according to the second baraita is not difficult, as this case in the first baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who ruled in a mishna (7b) that if the blade of one’s ax was displaced from its handle and flew through the air and killed a person, he is exempt from exile, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and that case in the second baraita is the opinion of the Rabbis, who rule that in that case, the person wielding the ax is exiled, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

מתני׳ להיכן גולין? לערי מקלט, לשלש שבעבר הירדן ולשלש שבארץ כנען. שנאמר: ״את שלש הערים תתנו מעבר לירדן ואת שלש הערים תתנו בארץ כנען וגו׳״.

MISHNA: To where are the unintentional murderers exiled? They are exiled to cities of refuge, to three cities that were in the east bank of the Jordan and to three cities that were in the land of Canaan, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated: “Three cities shall you give beyond the Jordan and three cities shall you give in the land of Canaan; they shall be cities of refuge” (Numbers 35:14). The mishna comments: Until the three cities of refuge that were in Eretz Yisrael were selected, an unintentional murderer would not be admitted to the three that were in the east bank of the Jordan, even though the latter three were already selected by Moses (see Deuteronomy 4:41), as it is stated: “Six cities of refuge shall they be” (Numbers 35:13), from which it is derived that they do not become cities of refuge until all six of them admit unintentional murderers as one.

עד שלא נבחרו שלש שבארץ ישראל לא היו שלש שבעבר הירדן קולטות, שנאמר: ״שש ערי מקלט תהיינה״ – עד שיהיו ששתן קולטות כאחת.

ומכוונות להן דרכים מזו לזו, שנאמר: ״תכין לך הדרך ושלשת וגו׳״.

The mishna continues: And roads were aligned for them from this city, i.e., all cities, to that city, i.e., they would pave and straighten the access roads to the cities of refuge, as it is stated: “Prepare for you the road, and divide the borders of your land, which the Lord your God causes you to inherit, into three parts, that every murderer may flee there” (Deuteronomy 19:3).

ומוסרין להן שני תלמידי חכמים, שמא יהרגנו בדרך, וידברו אליו. רבי מאיר אומר: אף הוא מדבר על ידי עצמו, שנאמר: ״וזה דבר הרצח״.

And the court would provide the unintentional murderers fleeing to a city of refuge with two Torah scholars, due to the concern that perhaps the blood redeemer, i.e., a relative of the murder victim seeking to avenge his death, will seek to kill him in transit, and in that case they, the scholars, will talk to the blood redeemer and dissuade him from killing the unintentional murderer. Rabbi Meir says: The unintentional murderer also speaks [medabber] on his own behalf to dissuade the blood redeemer, as it is stated: “And this is the matter [devar] of the murderer, who shall flee there and live” (Deuteronomy 19:4), indicating that the murderer himself speaks.

רבי יוסי בר יהודה אומר: בתחלה, אחד שוגג ואחד מזיד מקדימין לערי מקלט ובית דין שולחין ומביאין אותו משם. מי שנתחייב מיתה בבית דין – הרגוהו,

Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: Initially, either one who killed another unintentionally or one who killed another intentionally would hurry and flee to the cities of refuge, and the court in his city would send for him and would bring him from there to stand trial. For one who was found liable to receive the death penalty in court for intentional murder, the court would execute him, and for one who was not found liable to receive the death penalty, e.g., if they deemed that the death occurred due to circumstances beyond his control, they would free him. For one who was found liable to be exiled, the court would restore him to his place in the city of refuge, as it is stated: “And the congregation shall judge between the murderer and the blood redeemer…and the congregation shall restore him to his city of refuge, that he fled there” (Numbers 35:24–25), indicating that he had been in a city of refuge before his trial.

ושלא נתחייב מיתה – פטרוהו. מי שנתחייב גלות – מחזירין אותו למקומו, שנאמר: ״והשיבו אתו העדה אל עיר מקלטו וגו׳״.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן: שלש ערים הבדיל משה בעבר הירדן וכנגדן הבדיל יהושע בארץ כנען, ומכוונות היו כמין שתי שורות שבכרם: חברון בהר יהודה כנגד בצר במדבר,

GEMARA: The Sages taught: Moses designated three cities of refuge in the east bank of the Jordan, and corresponding to them, Joshua designated three cities of refuge in the land of Canaan. And the cities were aligned like two rows of vines in a vineyard: In Eretz Yisrael there was Hebron in Mount Judea, corresponding to Bezer in the wilderness; Shechem in Mount Ephraim, corresponding to Ramoth in the Gilead; and Kadesh in Mount Naphtali, corresponding to Golan in the Bashan. From the term “And you shall divide [veshilashta]” (Deuteronomy 19:3), it is derived that the three cities in Eretz Yisrael will serve as three [meshulashin] lines of demarcation dividing the length of the land into four equal parts, in a manner that the distance from the southern border of Eretz Yisrael to Hebron, the southernmost city of refuge, will be like the distance from Hebron to Shechem, and the distance from Hebron to Shechem will be like the distance from Shechem to Kadesh, and the distance from Shechem to Kadesh will be like the distance from Kadesh to the northern border.

שכם בהר אפרים כנגד רמות בגלעד, קדש בהר נפתלי כנגד גולן בבשן. ״ושלשת״ – שיהו משולשין, שיהא מדרום לחברון כמחברון לשכם, ומחברון לשכם כמשכם לקדש,

ומשכם לקדש כמקדש לצפון.

בעבר הירדן תלת, בארץ ישראל תלת?! אמר אביי: בגלעד שכיחי רוצחים,

The Gemara questions the distribution of the cities: Why were there three cities designated on the east bank of the Jordan, where two and a half tribes resided, and three cities designated in Eretz Yisrael, where more than nine tribes resided? Abaye said: In Gilead, which is located on the east bank of the Jordan, murderers are common.