כריתות דף ג

לאחותו שהיא בת אביו ובת אמו, לומר שאין עונשין מן הדין.

to teach the halakha in the case of his sister who is both his father’s daughter and his mother’s daughter, and this serves to say that one does not administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference. Although the verses state a punishment both for one who engages in intercourse with his half sister who is his father’s daughter and for his half sister who is his mother’s daughter, one cannot learn via an a fortiori inference that he should also be punished for engaging in intercourse with his sister from both parents, as punishments are applied only when the Torah expressly imposes them.

ורבי יצחק, סבר: עונשין מן הדין. ואיבעית אימא: יליף עונש מאזהרה.

The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yitzḥak, who does not interpret the verses in this manner, maintains that one administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference. And if you wish, say instead a different reason why Rabbi Yitzḥak does not require this exposition: He derives the punishment of karet for engaging in intercourse with a sister from both parents from the warning, i.e., the prohibition that is stated with regard to her. Just as the verse explicitly prohibited engaging in intercourse with a sister from both parents, so too, the same punishment of karet applies to engaging in intercourse with her as it does to engaging in intercourse with other forbidden relatives.

אמר רבי אלעזר אמר רבי הושעיא: כל מקום שאתה מוצא שני לאוין וכרת אחד – חלק חטאת ביניהן. ומאי היא? מפטם וסך, דכתיב:

§ Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Hoshaya says: Anywhere you find two different prohibitions, and only one punishment of karet is stated for both of them, you should divide the sin offering between them, i.e., if one transgressed both prohibitions unwittingly he is liable to bring a sin offering for each. And what is this case? One who blends the anointing oil according to the specifications of the oil prepared by Moses in the wilderness, for purposes other than use in the Temple, and one who applies this anointing oil to the skin of a person, as it is written: “Upon the flesh of man it shall not be applied, neither shall you make any like it according to its composition” (Exodus 30:32). These are two prohibitions, one for applying the oil and the other for blending it, and one karet is stated with regard to both, as it is written: “Whoever compounds any like it, or whoever puts any of it upon a stranger, he shall be cut off from his people” (Exodus 30:33).

״על בשר אדם לא ייסך ובמתכנתו וגו׳״, כרת אחד, דכתיב: ״אשר ירקח כמהו ואשר יתן ממנו על זר ונכרת מעמיו״.

וכי מאחר דלאוין מוחלקים, כרת דאחותו דכתב רחמנא למה לי?

The Gemara challenges this statement: But accordingly, once there are separate prohibitions stated in the Torah with regard to engaging in intercourse with all forbidden relatives (Leviticus, chapter 18), and at the conclusion of that passage it is written: “For whoever shall do any of these abominations, the souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people” (Leviticus 18:29), it is indicated that the punishments of karet or a sin offering apply to all these prohibitions. If so, why do I need the punishment of karet that the Merciful One writes with regard to one’s sister, in a separate passage: “And they shall be cut off in the sight of the children of their people; he has uncovered his sister’s nakedness” (Leviticus 20:17)?

לרבי יצחק – כדאית ליה, לרבנן מיבעיא להו: לומר, שאין עונשין מן הדין! לרבי יצחק, מפיק ליה לחייב על אחותו שהיא אחות אביו ושהיא אחות אמו.

The Gemara explains: This verse is required to teach one halakha according to the opinion of the Rabbis, and one halakha according to Rabbi Yitzḥak, per his opinion. The Gemara elaborates: According to the opinion of the Rabbis, they require this verse to say that one does not administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference. According to Rabbi Yitzḥak, he derives that this verse comes to deem one liable to bring three separate sin offerings for unwittingly engaging in intercourse with his own sister who is also his father’s sister and who is also his mother’s sister.

ורבנן? דנפקא להון מן ״אחתו״ דרישא. ורבי יצחק? סבר ״אחותו״ דרישא אורחיה דקרא היא, ומפיק לחלק מ״אחתו״ דסיפיה דקרא, לחלק על אחותו שהיא אחות אביו ושהיא אחות אמו.

The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, from where do they derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: One can say that they derive it from the term “his sister” written in the first clause of the verse: “And if a man shall take his sister” (Leviticus 20:17). And Rabbi Yitzḥak holds that one cannot derive a halakha from the term “his sister” written in the first clause, as it is the manner of the verse to describe the case in detail before stating the prohibition that applies to it. And therefore he derives from the term “his sister” written in the latter clause of the verse that this comes to separate between the prohibitions and render one liable to bring three separate sin offerings for engaging in intercourse with his own sister who is also his father’s sister and who is also his mother’s sister.

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק, אף אנן נמי תנינא: המפטם את השמן, המפטם את הקטרת, והסך בשמן המשחה.

§ The Gemara returns to Rabbi Elazar’s statement that one who unwittingly blends the anointing oil and applies it to the skin is liable to bring two sin offerings. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: We learn in the mishna as well: And one who blends the anointing oil, and one who blends the incense, and one who applies the anointing oil to his skin.

למה לי דתניא המפטם את הקטרת במיצעא? לאו הא קא משמע לן: מה קטרת לאו בפני עצמו וחייבים עליה כרת בפני עצמו – אף מפטם שמן וסך נמי,

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak explains his inference: Why do I need the tanna to teach the clause: One who blends the incense, in the middle, between the two cases concerning the anointing oil? Is it not correct that this is what the mishna teaches us: Just as blending the incense is an independent prohibition and one is liable to receive karet for it by itself, and to bring a sin offering for its unwitting transgression, so too, with regard to one who blends the anointing oil and one who applies the anointing oil to his skin, since they are each an independent prohibition, one is liable to receive karet for each action by itself, and to bring a sin offering for the unwitting transgression of each of them.

כיון דלאו בפני עצמו – חייבים עליו בפני עצמה?

וכי תימא דקא בעי למיתנא פיטומין בהדי הדדי – ניתנהו איפוך: המפטם את הקטרת, והמפטם את השמן, והסך שמן המשחה, אמאי פלגיה לשמן? לאו הא קמשמע לן,

And if you would say the mishna uses this order because it wants to teach the two cases involving blending together, let the tanna teach those two halakhot in the reverse order: One who blends the incense, and one who blends the anointing oil, and one who applies the anointing oil. In this manner the two clauses addressing blending would be adjacent, and likewise the two clauses addressing the anointing oil would be adjacent. Why did the tanna divide the cases involving the anointing oil by teaching the halakha of one who blends the incense in between them? Is it not correct that this teaches us that there is a separation between the two prohibitions, requiring one to bring two sin offerings? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that this is the case.

דיש חילוק חטאות ביניהן? שמע מינה.

הבא על הזכור. תנא במאי קא חשיב?

§ The mishna included in its list of those liable to receive karet a male who engages in intercourse with another male or one who copulates with an animal, and a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality. The Gemara asks: According to what criteria does the tanna of the mishna tally the prohibitions in the mishna? Rabbi Yoḥanan explained that the tally stated in the mishna serves to teach that one who violated every prohibition against engaging in forbidden intercourse in a single lapse of awareness is liable to receive punishment for each and every one. Which individual could have committed all these transgressions?

אי בגברי – דל האשה הנרבעת, ובצרא לה חדא! אי בנשי קחשיב – דל מינהון הבא על הזכור ועל הבהמה, ובצרי להו תרתי!

The Gemara elaborates: If he is referring to prohibitions transgressed by men, then one should remove the case of a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality, and if so, one case of karet is lacking from the tally. If he is referring to prohibitions transgressed by women, one should remove from them the case of a male who engages in intercourse with another male or with an animal, and if so, two cases of karet are lacking from the tally.

אמר רבי יוחנן: לעולם תנא גברי קחשיב, ותני הכי: הבא על הזכור והביא זכור עליו, ורבי ישמעאל היא, דאמר: חייב שתים.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Actually, the tanna is referring to prohibitions transgressed by men. One should remove the case of a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality, and instead teach the mishna like this: A male who engages in intercourse with another male, and a male who brings another male upon him to engage in intercourse. And this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that one who transgresses both of these prohibitions in a single lapse of awareness is liable to bring two sin offerings.

והא מדקתני מגדף בסיפיה, ומוקמינן לה כרבי עקיבא, רישא נמי רבי עקיבא!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that the mishna teaches in its latter clause the case of one who blasphemes, and we interpret this clause in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

וכי תימא: רבי עקיבא היא, וברישא סבר לה כרבי ישמעאל, והאמר רבי אבהו: הבא על הזכור והביא זכור עליו, לרבי ישמעאל דמפיק ליה מתרתי קראי,

The Gemara suggests: And if you would say the entire mishna is in fact in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and with regard to the halakha listed in the first clause he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, that is not tenable, as doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say: In the case of a male who engages in intercourse with another male, and a male who brings another male upon him to engage in intercourse, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, who derives these prohibitions from two separate verses, from: “And you shall not lie with a man as with a woman” (Leviticus 18:22), and from: “There shall not be a sodomite of the sons of Israel” (Deuteronomy 23:18), which is referring to one who engages in homosexual intercourse passively, one who transgresses both of these prohibitions in a single lapse of awareness is liable to bring two sin offerings.

מ״ואת זכר לא תשכב״, ומ״ולא יהיה קדש מבני ישראל״ – חייב שתים,

לרבי עקיבא אינו חייב אלא אחת, דמחד קרא נפיק ליה: ״את זכר לא תשכב״, קרי ביה: לא תשכיב!

Rabbi Abbahu continues: By contrast, according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as he derives both prohibitions from one verse: “You shall not lie [tishkhav] with a man,” in the active form, as one can read the verb in this verse, written in the Torah without vowels, as though it stated: Enable your being lain with [tishakheiv], in the passive. Evidently, Rabbi Akiva disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael with regard to a male who engages in intercourse with another male and a male who brings another male upon him to engage in intercourse.

אלא: רישא רבי ישמעאל, ובמגדף סבר לה כרבי עקיבא. אי הכי, ניתני נמי: הבא על הבהמה, והביא בהמה עליו!

The Gemara suggests: Rather, the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and with regard to one who blasphemes he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, let the tanna also teach two additional cases with regard to bestiality: One who copulates with an animal, derived from the verse: “And you shall not lie with any beast” (Leviticus 18:23); and a man who brings an animal upon him for bestiality, derived from: “There shall not be a sodomite of the sons of Israel” (Deuteronomy 23:18), which can be interpreted as applying to all forms of male anal intercourse, including with animals.

הא אמר אביי: הבא על הבהמה והביא בהמה עליו, אף לרבי ישמעאל אינו חייב אלא אחת, דכי כתיב קרא – בגברי כתיב.

The Gemara answers: Didn’t Abaye say: With regard to one who copulates with an animal, and who brings an animal upon him to engage in bestiality, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as when the verse: “There shall not be a sodomite,” is written, it is written with regard to men, i.e., the term sodomite does not include one who engages in bestiality. In conclusion, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the mishna is listing prohibitions transgressed by men, and therefore one should remove from the tally the case of a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality, and add the case of a man who brings another male upon him to engage in intercourse, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael.

רבי אלעזר משמיה דרב אמר: תנא תני שלשים ושלש חטאות, ותני שלש כריתות, לסיומינהו בכריתות.

The Gemara cites another interpretation: Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rav: The mishna is listing prohibitions transgressed by men and not women, but one should not remove from the tally the case of a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality. The reason is that the tanna of the mishna teaches thirty-three prohibitions for which a man brings sin offerings, and he teaches another three instances of karet in order to complete the list of transgressions for which one is liable to be punished with karet. Those three do not meet the same criteria as the other thirty-three, and the case of a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality is one of those three.

דקתני סיפא: פסח ומילה במצות עשה – פסח ומילה אמאי קתני להו?

What supports this interpretation? As the mishna teaches in the latter clause: And one is liable to receive karet for failure to fulfill the mitzva of bringing the Paschal offering and the mitzva of circumcision, which unlike the cases of prohibitions enumerated in the mishna, are positive mitzvot. Why does the tanna teach the cases of the Paschal offering and circumcision?

ואיתימא לאיתויי קרבן עליהון, מי מייתי? והתניא: הוקשה כל התורה כולה לעבודה זרה, דכתיב: ״תורה אחת יהיה לכם לעושה בשגגה. והנפש אשר תעשה ביד רמה״ –

And if you say the mishna mentions these positive mitzvot to teach that one brings an offering for unwittingly failing to perform them, does one in fact bring an offering in such a case? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The entire Torah is juxtaposed to idolatry, as it is written: “You shall have one law [torah] for him that does unwittingly. But the soul that does with a high hand, whether he be home-born or a stranger, he blasphemes the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from among his people” (Numbers 15:29–30).

מה עבודה זרה שב ואל תעשה, אף כל שב ואל תעשה!

The phrase “But the soul that does with a high hand, whether he be home-born or a stranger, he blasphemes the Lord” is referring to one who engages in idol worship, and it is derived from here: Just as idol worship is a situation in which the Torah says to a person: Sit and refrain from action, and one who transgresses this prohibition unwittingly must bring a sin offering, so too, with regard to every transgression in which the Torah says that one must sit and refrain from action, one is liable to bring a sin offering for performing the act. Accordingly, one is not liable to bring an offering for the unwitting failure to perform a positive mitzva, such as bringing the Paschal offering or circumcision.

אלא לאו שמע מינה: תנא שלשים ושלש חטאות מאן דעבדי בשוגג, והדר תנא שלש כריתות לסיומינהו לכריתות, שמע מינה.

The Gemara concludes its statement: Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the mishna that the tanna of the mishna taught thirty-three prohibitions for which a man brings sin offerings, which apply to one who acts unwittingly, and he taught another three instances of karet in order to complete the list of transgressions for which one is liable to be punished with karet? These three instances are a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality, one who fails to bring the Paschal offering, and one who fails to perform circumcision. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that this is the case.

המחלל את השבת. אמרי: שבת ארבעים חסר אחת הוויין! אמר רבי יוחנן: תנא שגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות, דלא מחייב אלא חדא.

§ The mishna’s list of prohibitions for whose unwitting violation one must bring a sin offering includes one who desecrates Shabbat. The Sages express their surprise at this ruling and say: The primary labors of Shabbat are forty-less-one, and one is liable to bring a sin offering for each primary labor he violates. That alone totals more than the thirty-six cases mentioned in the mishna. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tanna taught a case where his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat, i.e., he was unaware it was Shabbat, and his action was intentional with regard to the prohibited labors, in that he was aware that the acts he performed were labors that are prohibited on Shabbat. In that case, the halakha is that he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as he committed only a single error.

דתניא: ״הנה״ שהיא ״אחת״ – שגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות.

As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: A soul that sins in error, from all the commandments of God that may not be performed, and performs from one of them [me’aḥat mehena]” (Leviticus 4:2). The expression “me’aḥat mehena” is interpreted in several ways. One of them is: There is an instance of “them [hena],” i.e., many unwitting transgressions, which is like “one [aḥat],” a single unwitting transgression, in that one is liable to bring only one sin offering. How so? When one performed many labors where his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat but his action was intentional with regard to the prohibited labors, he brings only one sin offering. That is the case referred to in the mishna.

וניתני זדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות, דמחייב ארבעים חסר אחת!

The Gemara challenges: But let the tanna teach a case where his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat, i.e., he knew it was Shabbat, but his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors, as he was unaware they were prohibited. In that case, the halakha is that he is liable to bring forty-less-one sin offerings, one for each primary category of labor.

דתניא: ״ועשה מאחת מהנה״ – פעמים שחייב אחת על כולן, ופעמים שחייב על כל אחת ואחת. דתניא: ״אחת״ שהיא ״הנה״ – זדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות!

The Gemara elaborates that this is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And performs from one of them.” This teaches that there are times when one is liable to bring one sin offering for all of his transgressions, and there are times when one is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every transgression. And it is further taught in a baraita: There is “one [aḥat],” i.e., the transgression of one prohibition, which is like “them [hena],” i.e., many unwitting transgressions, in that one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings. How so? When one performs many labors where his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat but his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors, he brings multiple sin offerings.

תנא שגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות עדיפא ליה, דמחטאת מיהא לא מיפטר.

The Gemara answers: The tanna prefers to state the case of one who performed many labors where his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat but it was intentional with regard to the prohibited labors, in order to emphasize that he is not exempt from bringing at least one sin offering, even though he performed the acts of labor intentionally.

וכן אתה מוצא גבי עבודה זרה, דקתני: שגגת עבודה זרה וזדון עבודות.

The Gemara notes: And likewise, you find that the tanna of the mishna taught in this manner with regard to idol worship, as he teaches liability to bring one sin offering, despite the fact that the sinner may have performed four prohibited rites: Slaughtering, burning incense, pouring libations, and bowing. How so? This was a case where, as with Shabbat, his actions were unwitting with regard to idol worship, as he did not know he was worshipping an idol, but they were intentional with regard to the prohibited rites, i.e., he was aware these rites are prohibited.

שגגת עבודה זרה היכי דמי? אילימא דעמד בבית עבודה זרה וסבר בית הכנסת היא והשתחוה – הרי לבו לשמים!

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of performing an act unwittingly with regard to idol worship? If we say it is referring to a case where he was standing in a house of idol worship and thought that it was a synagogue and bowed there, and it turned out that he bowed toward an idol, in this situation he commits no transgression: Since his heart was directed toward Heaven it is not even an unwitting transgression.

ואלא דחזא אנדרטא וסגיד לה? אי דקבליה עליה באלוה – בר סקילה הוא! ואי דלא קבליה באלוה – לאו מידי הוא!

Rather, one might say it is referring to a case where he saw a statue [andarta] in the image of the king and bowed to it. Again, what are the circumstances of this case? If the baraita is referring to a situation where he bowed because he accepted that image upon himself as a god, he engaged in idol worship intentionally and therefore he is subject to death by stoning, and he is not required to bring a sin offering. And if he did not accept that image upon himself as a god and bowed merely in deference to the monarch, it is a meaningless act, not idol worship at all.

אלא, מאהבה ומיראה.

Rather, it is referring to a case where one bowed out of love for someone who requested that he bow before the statue, or out of fear of someone demanding of him to do so. He was under the impression that unless he wholeheartedly has the intention to worship the idol there is no prohibition involved. This is an unwitting transgression.

הניחא לאביי דאמר חייב, אלא לרבא דאמר פטור, מאי איכא למימר?

The Gemara comments: This works out well according to Abaye, who says: One who bows to an idol out of love or fear is liable to bring a sin offering. But according to Rava, who says: One who bows to an idol out of love or fear is exempt from bringing a sin offering, what can be said? What are the circumstances of an unwitting transgression with regard to idol worship?

אלא באומר מותר, דעד כאן לא קבעי מיניה רבא מרב נחמן אלא אי חדא מחייב אי תרתי מחייב, אבל מיפטר לגמרי לא בעא מיניה.

Rather, it is referring to a case where one says to himself that this is permitted. He is under the impression that idol worship is permitted, and his unwitting act was the result of ignorance, not forgetfulness. As, Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman with regard to Shabbat only so it could be determined whether to deem one who is unaware of both the essence of Shabbat and the specific prohibited labors liable to bring one sin offering, or whether to deem him liable to bring two sin offerings. But as for the possibility to exempt him completely, he did not raise such a dilemma before him.

רב פפא אמר: משכחת לה בתינוק שנשבה לבין הגוים, דידע דאסירא עבודה זרה, והני עבודה זרה לא ידע דאסירן.

Rav Pappa says: You find an act performed unwittingly with regard to idol worship in the case of a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and never taught about the Torah, as he knows that idol worship in general is prohibited, but with regard to these particular objects of idol worship that he is worshipping, he does not know that they are prohibited.

ואי בעית אימא: אפילו תימא בגדול – כגון דקא טעי בהדין קרא: ״לא תעשון אתי אלהי כסף ואלהי זהב וגו׳״ סבר: כי אסירא השתחואה לעבודה זרה דכסף וזהב,

And if you wish, say instead: You may even say this ruling is stated with regard to an adult, i.e., one who was not captured by gentiles as a child, and it is speaking of a case where he erred with regard to this verse: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver and gods of gold, you shall not make for yourselves” (Exodus 20:20). This person thinks that when bowing to an idol is prohibited it applies only to an object of idol worship fashioned of silver or gold; but with regard to objects fashioned of other substances, such as wood or stone, it is permitted. And that is a case of an action that is unwitting with regard to idol worship but intentional with regard to the prohibited rites.

אבל דמיני אחריני שריא, דהיינו שגגת עבודה זרה וזדון עבודות.

רב אחא בריה דרב איקא משמיה דרב ביבי אמר: תנא שם שבת ושם עבודה זרה קתני. ממאי? מדקתני: הבא על אשה ובתה ועל אשת איש,

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said a different interpretation of the mishna in the name of Rav Beivai: The tanna teaches the general category of Shabbat and the general category of idol worship, without mentioning the details of how many sin offerings one would be liable to bring for transgressing each prohibition. The Gemara asks: From where can one infer this is the case? From the fact that the mishna teaches: One who engages in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, or with a married woman. But there is the case of one’s daughter from the woman he raped, which the mishna does not teach. The case of a daughter from the woman one raped is included in the category of intercourse with a woman and her daughter, yet it is not taught explicitly. Evidently, it is included in the general category of intercourse with a woman and her daughter.

והא יש בתו מאנוסתו, דלא קתני לה!

אמרי: דכתיבן קתני, דלא כתיבן לא קתני.

The Sages say in response to this inference: The tanna of the mishna teaches those prohibitions that are written explicitly in the Torah; he does not teach those prohibitions that are not written explicitly but are derived from the verses. That is the reason he does not teach the case of intercourse with a daughter from the woman one raped; it is not because he is teaching only general categories.

והאיכא בת אשתו ובת בתה ובת בנה, דכתיבא, ולא קתני! אלא: שם אשה ובתה קתני? הכי נמי: שם שבת ושם עבודה זרה קתני.

The Gemara challenges this explanation: But there is the case of one’s wife’s daughter, and the daughter of her daughter, and the daughter of her son, which are written explicitly, and yet the tanna does not teach them. Rather, you must say that he teaches the general category of intercourse with a woman and her daughter, which includes those cases. So too, he teaches the general category of Shabbat and the general category of idol worship.

רב אחא בריה דרב איקא רמי דיליה אדיליה: מי אמר רב ביבי בר אביי הכי, שם שבת קתני ושם עבודה זרה קתני? והאיתמר:

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, raises a contradiction between one statement of Rav Beivai bar Abaye and another statement of his: Did Rav Beivai bar Abaye actually say this, that the tanna teaches the general category of Shabbat and teaches the general category of idol worship? But wasn’t it stated: One who offers up the limbs of an offering slaughtered inside the Temple outside the Temple, i.e., he slaughtered the animal within the Sanctuary in accordance with halakha but sacrificed its limbs on an altar outside the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin offering if he did so unwittingly. Likewise, if he sacrifices limbs of an offering slaughtered outside the Temple outside the Temple, he is liable.

המעלה אברי פנים בחוץ – חייב, אברי חוץ בחוץ – חייב.

וקשיא ליה לרב ביבי בר אביי: ״אי הכי, הא דתנן: שלשים ושש כריתות בתורה – תלתין ושבע נינהו, דאיכא המעלה והמעלה!״ מאי קשיא ליה? נישני: שם העלאה קתני!

And Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised a difficulty: If so, consider that which we learned in the mishna: There are thirty-six cases in the Torah with regard to which one who performs the action intentionally is liable to receive karet. They are actually thirty-seven, as there is the case of one who offers up the limbs of an offering slaughtered inside the Temple outside the Temple, and one who offers up limbs of an offering slaughtered outside the Temple outside the Temple. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, explains the contradiction: If Rav Beivai bar Abaye maintains that the tanna of the mishna does not tally all the relevant prohibitions but states general categories, what is difficult to him? Let him answer that he teaches the category of offering up in the clause: One who slaughters offerings and who sacrifices them outside the Temple. The tanna would not then need to list these individual transgressions.

מי דמי? שבת ועבודה זרה תנא יתהון אבינכיהון, גבי כריתות, דאיריא, משני: ״שם שבת קתני שם עבודה זרה קתני״, גבי העלאה, מי תנא יתהון בינכיהון דשני הכי?

The Gemara responds: Are these cases comparable? In the cases of Shabbat and idol worship the tanna taught their details in their places [abeinekheihon], on Shabbat 73a and Sanhedrin 60b, respectively. Consequently, with regard to karet, where it is necessary to mention them as part of a list of prohibitions that are punishable by karet, Rav Beivai bar Abaye answers that the tanna teaches the category of Shabbat and teaches the category of idol worship, but he did not need to specify the details in this manner. By contrast, with regard to bringing up an offering, does the tanna teach them in their place, so that Rav Beivai bar Abaye can answer in this manner?

בעא מיניה רבי ירמיה מרבי זירא: שתי כריתות ולאו אחד, מהו? אמר ליה: שוחט והעלה קאמרת? הני שני לאוין נינהו,

§ It was stated earlier that Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: Anywhere you find two different prohibitions but only one punishment of karet is stated for both of them you should divide the sin offering between them, i.e., if one transgressed both prohibitions unwittingly he is liable to bring a sin offering for each. In a similar vein, Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: If there are two punishments of karet and only one prohibition written with regard to a certain act, what is the halakha? Is one liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act? Rabbi Zeira said to him: Are you saying this in reference to one who slaughters offerings outside the Temple and one who offered up the limbs of offerings outside the Temple? These do not match your description, as these are two separate prohibitions.

אי למאן דגמר מגזרה שוה – נאמר כאן הבאה ונאמר להלן הבאה,

Rabbi Zeira elaborates: If one considers the matter according to the one who derives the prohibition from a verbal analogy, it is as though both prohibitions are written explicitly. As it is stated here an expression of bringing: “Or who slaughters it outside the camp, and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it” (Leviticus 17:3–4), and it is stated there an expression of bringing: “Who sacrifices a burnt offering or sacrifice, and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it” (Leviticus 17:8–9).

מה להלן לא ענש אלא אם כן הזהיר – אף כאן לא ענש, אלא אם כן הזהיר.

Since there is a verbal analogy linking slaughtering an offering outside the Temple to sacrificing one outside the Temple, it follows that just as there, with regard to sacrificing, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it explicitly prohibited the act, as it is written: “Take heed to yourself, lest you sacrifice your burnt offerings in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13), so too here, with regard to slaughtering, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it explicitly prohibited the act as a separate prohibition.

למאן דמייתי לה בהיקש – אמר קרא: ״שם תעלה... ושם תעשה״, מקיש שחיטה להעלאה, מה העלאה לא ענש אלא אם כן הזהיר,

If one considers the matter according to the one who derives the prohibition from a juxtaposition, it is also as though both prohibitions are written explicitly. The juxtaposition is that the verse states: “There you shall sacrifice your burnt offerings and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14). Here the verse juxtaposes slaughtering, in the phrase: “And there you shall do,” to offering up. This teaches that just as there, with regard to offering up, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it explicitly prohibited the act, so too here, with regard to slaughtering, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it explicitly prohibited the act. Whether one derives the prohibition by verbal analogy or juxtaposition, it is considered as though the Torah explicitly wrote a prohibition with regard to slaughtering, and therefore this would not meet the criteria of Rabbi Yirmeya’s dilemma.

אף שחיטה לא ענש אלא אם כן הזהיר.

דלמא שתי מיתות ולאו אחד קאמרת? מה היא – אוב וידעוני.

Rabbi Zeira continues to address Rabbi Yirmeya: Perhaps you are stating your dilemma with regard to two prohibitions punishable by the death penalty and only one prohibition is written with regard to them, and your dilemma is whether one brings two sin offerings if one transgressed both unwittingly, despite the fact that only one prohibition is written with regard to both acts. What is such a circumstance? This applies in the case of a necromancer, who raises up the spirit of the dead, and a sorcerer, who places a certain bone in his mouth for it to speak of its own accord (see Leviticus 20:6, 27).

אמר ליה דהא פלוגתא דרבי יוחנן וריש לקיש. דתנו גבי סנהדרין: בעל אוב וידעוני, וקשיא לן, ומאי שנא גבי סקילות תני ידעוני, וגבי כריתות לא תני ידעוני?

Rabbi Zeira further said to Rabbi Yirmeya: This should not be a dilemma, as this matter is a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. As the Sages taught a baraita, where they list those liable to be executed by stoning, in tractate Sanhedrin (53a): A necromancer and a sorcerer, and the following presents a difficulty to us: And what is different with regard to stonings that the tanna teaches the case of a sorcerer, but the tanna does not teach the case of a sorcerer with regard to the list of transgressions punishable by karet, thereby indicating that one is liable to bring only a single sin offering for both transgressions?

אמר רבי יוחנן: הואיל ושניהם בלאו אחד נאמרו. ונימא ידעוני, ולא נימא בעל אוב! קסבר: הואיל ופתח הכתוב בבעל אוב.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tanna in tractate Karetot does not count the case of the sorcerer on its own since both the sorcerer and the necromancer were stated in one prohibition: “Do not turn to the necromancers and the sorcerers” (Leviticus 19:31); therefore, there is no separate obligation to bring an offering for each of them. The Gemara clarifies: And let the tanna say the case of a sorcerer and let him not say the case of a necromancer, rather than the reverse. The Gemara explains: The tanna maintains that since the verse opened with the case of a necromancer, it is proper to list that transgression and omit the case of a sorcerer.

וריש לקיש אמר: הואיל ואין בו מעשה. וריש לקיש מאי טעמא לא אמר כרבי יוחנן?

And Reish Lakish says: The case of the sorcerer is not included in the list of transgressions punishable by karet since it does not involve an action, but only speech, through the use of a bone, and one does not bring a sin offering for a prohibition that does not involve an action. The Gemara asks: And as for Reish Lakish, what is the reason he does not state an explanation in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan?

אמר רב פפא: דהא חלוקין הן במיתות. ורבי יוחנן אמר לך: חלוקה דלאו – הוי חלוקה, חלוקה דמיתה – לא הויא חלוקה.

Rav Pappa said: Reish Lakish disagrees with the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan because the cases of a necromancer and a sorcerer are divided in the verse with regard to the issue of the death penalty, i.e., one is liable to receive the death penalty for transgressing either prohibition, as it is stated: “And a man also or a woman, who are a necromancer or a sorcerer shall be put to death” (Leviticus 20:27). Consequently, one would be liable to bring a separate sin offering for the unwitting transgression of either prohibition were it not for the fact that sorcery does not involve an action. And Rabbi Yoḥanan could say to you that a division of a prohibition is considered a division that leads to separate sin offerings, whereas a division of separate death penalties is not considered a division in this regard.

ורבי יוחנן מאי טעמא לא אמר כריש לקיש? קסבר: מאן תנא כריתות – רבי עקיבא היא, דאמר לא בעינן מעשה.

The Gemara further asks: And as for Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is the reason he does not state an explanation in accordance with the explanation of Reish Lakish, who says the prohibition with regard to a sorcerer is not counted because it does not involve an action? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains: Who is the tanna who taught the list of those liable to receive karet? It is Rabbi Akiva, who says: An action is not required for one to be liable to bring a sin offering.

וריש לקיש? נהי דרבי עקיבא לא בעי מעשה רבה, מעשה זוטא בעי.

The Gemara asks: And as for Reish Lakish, how does he respond to this claim? He could say that although Rabbi Akiva does not require a significant action for one to be liable to bring a sin offering, nevertheless he does require a minor action. The transgression of a sorcerer involves no action, as the voice emerges of its own accord, and therefore even Rabbi Akiva would not hold one liable to bring a sin offering for the unwitting violation of this prohibition.

בעל אוב, מאי מעשה אית ביה? הקשת זרועותיו הוי מעשה. מגדף, מאי מעשה אית ביה? עקימת שפתיו הוי מעשה.

The Gemara asks: In the case of a necromancer, what action is there in this transgression? The Gemara answers: The striking of his arms against each other to raise the spirit of the dead is considered an action. The Gemara further asks: In the case of one who blasphemes, who merely speaks, what action is there in this transgression? Since Rabbi Akiva holds that an unwitting blasphemer is liable to bring a sin offering, this apparently indicates that no action at all is necessary. The Gemara answers: The twisting of his lips while he speaks is considered an action.

קא סלקא דעתין: הקשת זרועותיו הוי מעשה זוטא אפילו לרבנן. מיתיבי: בעבודה זרה אינו חייב אלא על דבר שיש בו מעשה, כגון שזיבח, וקיטר, וניסך, והשתחוה. וקשיא לן,

The Gemara comments: It enters our mind that the striking of the necromancer’s arms against each other is considered a minor action even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, and they would deem him liable. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to idol worship, one is liable to be punished only for a matter that involves an action, for example where one slaughtered an offering, or burned incense, or poured a libation, or bowed. And the following matter poses a difficulty to us: Bowing does not involve an action.

השתחואה לית בה מעשה!

ואמר ריש לקיש: הא מני? רבי עקיבא היא, דאמר לא בעינן מעשה. ורבי יוחנן אמר: אפילו תימא רבנן, כפיפת קומתו הוי מעשה.

And Reish Lakish said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: An action is not required for one to be liable to bring a sin offering for transgressing a prohibition. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as the bending of his height when he bows is considered an action. One can conclude from here by inference that Reish Lakish maintains that according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the bending of his height is not considered an action. If so, can it be said that the striking of his arms against each other, which is less of a movement than bending one’s height, is considered an action?

מכלל דסבירא ליה לריש לקיש אליבא דרבנן כפיפת קומתו לרבנן לא הוי מעשה. הקשת זרועותיו הוי מעשה?!

ואלא כי קאמר ריש לקיש הקשת זרועותיו הוי מעשה זוטא, אליבא דרבי עקיבא, אבל לרבנן לא הוי מעשה.

But rather, you must explain that when Reish Lakish says the striking of his arms against each other is considered a minor action, he is speaking only in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva; but according to the opinion of the Rabbis it is not considered an action.

אי הכי, אמאי תני: יצא מגדף שאין בו מעשה? ניתני: יצא מגדף ובעל אוב! חדא מתרתי קתני.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, that the Rabbis hold that the necromancer does not perform an action, why does the mishna teach that the Rabbis say: The list in the mishna is excluding one who blasphemes, as he does not perform an action, but rather he sins with speech. Let it teach instead: The list in the mishna is excluding one who blasphemes and a necromancer. The Gemara answers: The tanna teaches one of two examples that the Rabbis could have mentioned.

וליתני בעל אוב ולא ליתני מגדף! מגדף איצטריך ליה, סלקא דעתך אמינא: הואיל וכתיב כרת דיליה במקום קרבן, אימא מודה ליה לרבי עקיבא, קא משמע לן דלא.

The Gemara questions this explanation: But if that is so, let the mishna teach the statement of the Rabbis with regard to a necromancer and let it not teach the statement of the Rabbis with regard to one who blasphemes. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the tanna to mention one who blasphemes, as it might enter your mind to say: Since its punishment of karet is written in the place where the verse discusses an offering (see Numbers 15:28–30), one might say that in this case the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Akiva that one is liable to bring a sin offering despite the fact that no action is involved. To counter this, the mishna specifically mentions the exclusion of one who blasphemes to teach us that this is not the case.

עולא אמר: בעל אוב דקתני במקטר לשד. מתקיף לה רבא: אם כן, היינו עובד עבודה זרה! אלא אמר רבא: מקטר לשד על מנת לחברו.

Ulla said: The reason the Rabbis did not state: Excluding one who blasphemes and a necromancer, is that the action of the necromancer that the mishna teaches is referring to one who burns incense to a demon in order to raise the dead, which is a full-fledged action. Rava objects to this answer from Ulla: If so, i.e., if the necromancer burns incense to a demon, this is the same as an idol worshipper, which is already mentioned in the mishna. Rather, Rava said: The mishna is referring to one who burns incense to a demon in order to gather it together with other demons, i.e., he does not burn incense to a demon by means of a rite but in a manner of sorcery, to bring the demons to one place to then make use of them.

אמר ליה אביי: אם כן, היינו חובר חבר! אמר ליה: התורה אמרה חובר חבר כגון זה, בסקילה. ואלא חובר חבר דבלאו – הדין הוא?

Abaye said to Rava: If so, this is the same as a ḥover ḥever, one who gathers together, which is stated in the Torah as a separate prohibition (Deuteronomy 18:11) and which is a prohibition that does not carry the punishment of karet. Rava said to him: It is true that such an individual is also a ḥover ḥever, but the Torah stated: A ḥover ḥever such as this, who gathers demons together, is included in the category of a necromancer and therefore his punishment is death by stoning, and transgressing this prohibition also results in karet. Abaye inquired: But then the case of a ḥover ḥever, which is a prohibition that does not entail karet, what is it?

אמר ליה: כדתניא: ״וחובר חבר״ – אחד חובר גדול ואחד חובר קטן, ואפילו חובר לנחשים ועקרבים – חייב. אמר אביי: האי מאן דבעי למיצמד זיבורא ועקרבא – אסור,

Rava said to Abaye: As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And a ḥover ḥaver” (Deuteronomy 18:11), this is referring to both one who uses sorcery and thereby gathers large beasts into one place, and also to one who gathers small beasts into one place, and even to one who gathers into one place snakes and scorpions; all of these individuals are liable. With regard to this prohibition Abaye says: In the case of this one, who through sorcery wants to gather together a hornet and a scorpion, this is prohibited. But if they are pursuing him and he merely seeks to defend himself, it is permitted.

ואי קאתו בתריה – שרי.

לרבי יוחנן, דאמר כפיפת קומתו הוי מעשה, עקימת

The Gemara objects: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says the bending of one’s height is considered an action, the twisting of