כריתות דף י

בטומאה מה לי אמר רבי יהודה? מי אמרינן: עד כאן לא קאמר רבי יהודה ולד שני כמאן דליתיה דמי אלא לענין קרבן,

Concerning ritual impurity, what does Rabbi Yehuda say? Do we say that Rabbi Yehuda says that the second offspring is considered as though it does not exist only with regard to the matter of an offering? In other words, since the time in which it was possible to sacrifice an offering for the second fetus had not yet emerged, since that is so, the second offspring is considered as though it does not exist. But concerning the matter of ritual impurity and purity, we say that he holds that it is considered as something that does exist, and accordingly, the days of impurity brought on by the second birth interrupt the days of purity following the first birth. The woman must therefore observe the days of impurity for the second birth, and afterward she completes the days of purity for the first birth, and then counts the days of purity brought on by the second fetus.

כיון דלא יצאה שעה שראויה להקריב בה קרבן, הואיל וכן – ולד שני כמאן דליתיה דמי, אבל לענין טומאה וטהרה, אימא סבירא ליה כמאן דאיתיה דמי,

ומפסקא טומאה דשני, וממלא יומי טהרה דראשון והדר (מונה) [מני ליה] יומי,

או דלמא לרבי יהודה חומרא הוא דאית ליה, אבל הכא – קולא הוא, וקולא לית ליה.

Or perhaps, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the second offspring is considered as though it exists only where there is a stringency that results from that definition. But here, if the woman would complete the days of purity of the first birth after the days of impurity of the second, this is a leniency, as she is deemed pure even if she sees blood during these days, and therefore, perhaps Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that the offspring is considered existent where this results in a leniency.

אמר רב הונא מסורא, תא שמע: יולדת, שוחטין וזורקין עליה ביום ארבעים לזכר וביום שמונים לנקבה.

Rav Huna from Sura said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of a woman after childbirth, one slaughters the Paschal offering and sprinkles its blood on her account on the fourteenth of Nisan, if this occurs on the fortieth day after giving birth to a male or on the eightieth day after giving birth to a female. Although she is still impure at the time of the sacrifice, she will be able to partake of the Paschal offering on the night of the fifteenth of Nisan.

עד כאן? טמאה היא! ואמר רב חסדא: הא מני? רבי יהודה היא, דאמר: ולד שני כמאן דליתיה דמי.

The Sages challenged this baraita: Is that so? But she is still impure on the night of the fifteenth of Nisan, and she may not partake of sacrificial meat until she brings her offering on the forty-first day for a male or the eighty-first day for a female. And Rav Ḥisda said in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the second offspring is deemed as though it does not exist. The baraita is dealing with a case where the woman gave birth to two male offspring on two consecutive days, and the fourteenth of Nisan occurred on the fortieth day after the birth of the second offspring, which is the forty-first day following the birth of the first.

ואי אמרת בטומאה סבירא ליה לרבי יהודה ולד שני כמאן דאיתיה דמי, היכי שחטינן עלה ביום ארבעים? לאורתא נמי לא מציא אכלה! אלא לאו שמע מינה:

And if you say that concerning impurity, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the second offspring is considered as though it is extant, which means that the days of purity following the first birth are delayed by the second birth and the mother does not become pure until the second term is complete, how may one slaughter the Paschal offering on her account on the fortieth day? After all, in the evening of the fifteenth she also may not eat the Paschal offering, because only forty days will have passed from the time of the second birth, and she would still be impure. Rather, must one not conclude from it that concerning ritual purity and impurity, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the second offspring is considered as though it does not exist?

לטהרה ולטומאה סבירא ליה לרבי יהודה ולד שני כמאן דליתיה דמי!

לעולם אימא לך: לטומאה ולטהרה סבירא ליה לרבי יהודה דולד שני כמאן דאיתיה דמי, וכי תניא ההיא – בפסח הבא בטומאה.

The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, I could say to you: Even concerning impurity and purity, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the second offspring is considered as something that does exist; and when that baraita is taught, it is dealing with a case of a woman who gave birth to one child, and it is referring to a case of a Paschal offering that is brought in impurity. When the majority of a community is impure, the Paschal offering is brought even in impurity.

ומי אכלה? והתנן: פסח הבא בטומאה, לא יאכלו ממנו זבים וזבות, נדות ויולדות!

The Gemara objects: And in that case, does she partake of it, as the baraita suggests? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pesaḥim 95b): With regard to a Paschal offering brought in impurity, men who experience a gonorrhea-like discharge [zavim], women who experience a discharge of uterine blood after their menstrual periods [zavot], menstruating women, and women after childbirth may not partake of it?

ההיא, לא אכלן כי לא טבילן. כי תניא ההיא דשוחטין וזורקין עליה, דהא טבלה. אי הכי, משמיני דיליה הוא דחזיא!

The Gemara explains: In that case, they do not partake of it because they did not immerse themselves in a ritual bath. But when that mishna is taught, that one slaughters the Paschal offering and sprinkles its blood on her account, the reason is that she had already immersed herself on the eighth day after giving birth. The Gemara objects: If that is so, then it is from the eighth day following his birth that she is fit to eat a Paschal offering brought in impurity, and there is no reason for the baraita to specify that the offering is slaughtered on the fortieth day.

משמיני לא חזיא, קסבר: טבול יום דזב – כזב דמי.

The Gemara explains: Actually, she is not fit from the eighth day, because the tanna maintains that a zav who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed is considered to have the status of a zav and may not partake of a Paschal offering brought in ritual impurity. Similarly, a woman who immerses after giving birth is considered like one who immersed that day, and therefore she cannot partake of sacrificial meat until the end of the forty-day period.

אי הכי, ביום ארבעים נמי לא חזיא! לאיי, ביום ארבעים חזיא, קסבר: מחוסר כפורים דזב – לאו כזב דמי.

The Gemara objects: If that is so, then on the fortieth day she is also not fit to eat the Paschal offering. The Gemara explains: This is not so; on the fortieth day she is fit to partake of the Paschal offering after nightfall, because the tanna holds that a zav who has immersed himself and waited for nightfall but is lacking atonement, i.e., he has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, is not considered to have the status of a zav. Therefore, after completing the purification period, the woman may partake of the offering, despite the fact that she has not yet brought her atonement offering.

ולרבא, דאמר מחוסר כפורים דזב כזב דמי, הא מתנייתא היכי מתרץ לה? אמר רב אשי: רבא מתרץ לה ביום ארבעים ליצירת זכר וביום שמונים ליצירת נקבה,

The Gemara asks: But according to Rava, who says that a zav who is lacking atonement is considered to have the status of a zav, how does he resolve the problem in this baraita? Rav Ashi said that Rava resolves it as follows: The baraita is not referring to the fortieth day after the birth of a male, but to a miscarriage that occurred on the fortieth day after the conception of a male, or the eightieth day after the conception of a female. And it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that it takes forty-one days for a male fetus to be formed, and eighty-one days for a female fetus to be formed. Since the miscarriage occurred before the forty-first or eighty-first day, it does not render the woman impure with the impurity of childbirth, and therefore she may partake of the Paschal offering.

ורבי ישמעאל היא, דאמר: לזכר ארבעים ואחד, לנקבה שמונים ואחד.

סוף סוף, תיפוק לי דטמאה היא משום נדה! – בלידה יבישתא. אי הכי, מאי למימרא? מהו דתימא: אי אפשר לפתיחת הקבר בלא דם,

The Gemara objects: But ultimately, one should conclude that she is impure because she has the status of a menstruating woman. The Gemara explains: The mishna was stated with regard to the case of a dry birth, in which no blood was expelled, and therefore no impurity imparted. The Gemara asks: If that is so, then what is the purpose of stating it? The ruling in such a case is obvious. The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state it, lest you say that it is impossible for the womb to open without blood being expelled. The tanna therefore teaches us that it is possible for the womb to open without blood being expelled. Accordingly, Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion with regard to the impurity of a second birth cannot be deduced from this mishna.

קא משמע לן דאפשר לפתיחת הקבר בלא דם.

אמר רבי שמעיה, תא שמע: ״ששים״, יכול בין רצופין בין מפוזרין? תלמוד לומר: ״יום״, מה יום רצוף – אף ששים כולן רצופין. מני? אלימא רבנן,

Rabbi Shemaya said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: The verse states with regard to a woman who gave birth to a female: “And she shall continue in the blood of purification sixty days and six days” (Leviticus 12:5). One might have thought that she counts the days whether they are continuous or dispersed. Therefore, the verse states: “Sixty days and six days,” to teach that just as a day is a continuous time period, so too all sixty days are continuous. And whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of the Rabbis, that cannot be correct, as are the Rabbis of the opinion that it is possible for a woman who gave birth to count dispersed days? This is not the case, as the Rabbis count the days of purification from the second birth.

מי אית [להו] לרבנן מפוזרין?

אלא לאו רבי יהודה היא, ומדקא יהיב לה ששים רצופים בהדי הדדי, שמע מינה חומרא אית ליה, לרבי יהודה קולא לית ליה!

Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? And from the fact that he prescribes for her sixty continuous days to be counted together, conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the second offspring is considered extant only where a stringency results, but where a leniency results, in that she continues counting the days of purity of the first birth after completing the days of impurity for the second birth, he does not maintain that the second offspring is considered as though it exists.

לא, לעולם רבנן היא. והכא במאי עסקינן – ליולדת זכר מתוך שמונים של נקבה.

The Gemara rejects this proof: No, actually, the baraita is stated in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a woman who gives birth to a male within the eighty-day period following the birth of a female, so that the forty-day period for the male is entirely subsumed within the purification period for the female. In such a case, even the Rabbis would maintain that the second birth does not interrupt the term following the first. She would observe the seven days of impurity for the male, and then complete the days of purity for the female. Consequently, the verse teaches that the sixty-six days of purity following the first birth are observed continuously, and there is no need to observe additional days due to the intervening days of impurity.

סוף סוף, שלמין יומי דקדמאה, ועד כאן דבתראה לא שלמין, דהא רבנן לולד שני מנו! אלא משכחת לה לרבנן – ביולדת תאומים, נקבה קדמייתא וזכר בתראה,

The Gemara objects: But ultimately, this scenario is impossible; the reason is that the days of the first birth are completed while the days of the latter birth are not completed, as the Rabbis count the days following the second birth, and therefore the term relating to the first birth is abandoned. The Gemara offers a different explanation of the baraita: Rather, you find a case of counting dispersed days according to the Rabbis in a case where a woman gives birth to twins, first a female and then a male, and for example, she gives birth to the latter offspring, the male, on the twentieth day of the days of purity for the female, as she is required to observe for him seven days of impurity for birth.

וכגון דילידתיה לזכר בתראה בעשרים ליומי טהרה, דבעיא מינקט ליה שבעה יומי טומאה דלידה (תאומים נקבה),

והכי קאמר: יכול היכא דילדה תאומים, נקבה מעיקרא וזכר לבסוף, תפסיק טומאה דלידה במיצעי, ונימני לה ששה וששים מפוזרין? תלמוד לומר: ״יום״,

The Gemara explains: And this is what the baraita is saying: One might have thought that where she gave birth to twins, a female initially and a male afterward, that the impurity of the second birth interrupts the term following the first birth in the middle, and she counts sixty-six dispersed days. Therefore, the verse states: “Sixty days and six days,” to teach that just as a day is an entirely continuous time period, so too all sixty days are to be continuous. Since the baraita could be in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, no proof can be inferred with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

מה יום כולו רצוף – אף ששים כולם רצופין.

אמר אביי, תא שמע: ״שלשים״ – יכול בין רצופין בין מפוזרין? תלמוד לומר: ״יום״, מה יום כולו רצוף – אף שלשים רצופין. מני הא? אלימא רבנן,

Abaye said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita which discusses a woman who gave birth to a male. The verse states: “And she shall continue in the blood of purification three days and thirty days” (Leviticus 12:4). One might have thought that she counts the days whether they are continuous or dispersed. Therefore, the verse states: “Three days and thirty days,” to teach that just as a day is an entirely continuous time period, so too all thirty days are to be continuous. And whose opinion is this? If we say it is the Rabbis, that cannot be correct, as are the Rabbis of the opinion that

ומי אית להו לרבנן

מפוזרין? הא אמרי רבנן: לולד שני מניא! אלא לאו רבי יהודה היא, ושמע מינה: חומרא אית ליה, קולא לית ליה.

it is possible for a woman who gave birth to count dispersed days? No, as the Rabbis say that she counts the days from the birth of the second fetus. Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? And therefore, conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda is of the opinion that the second offspring is considered as though it exists only where a stringency results, but where a leniency results, he is not of the opinion that the second offspring is considered to have existed.

ועוד אמר רב אשי, תא שמע: ״וששת ימים״ – יכול בין רצופין ובין מפוזרין? תלמוד לומר: ״ששים״,

And further, Rav Ashi said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita, which discusses the verse: “Sixty days and six days” (Leviticus 12:5). One might have thought that she counts these six days whether they are continuous or dispersed, so that if, for example, she miscarried on the sixty-third day, she would complete the remaining three days of purity for the first fetus after completing the period of purification for the second. Therefore, the verse states: “Sixty” to teach that just as the sixty days are all continuous, so too, the six days are all continuous. Whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of the Rabbis, that cannot be correct, as are the Rabbis of the opinion that it is possible for a woman who gave birth to count dispersed days? Didn’t the Rabbis say that she counts for the second offspring?

מה ששים כולן רצופין – אף ששה כולן רצופין. מני? אלימא רבנן, מי אית להו לרבנן מפוזרין? האמרי רבנן: לולד שני מניא!

אלא לאו רבי יהודה היא, ושמע מינה: חומרא אית ליה, קולא לית ליה? שמע מינה.

Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? And therefore, may one conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda is of the opinion that the second offspring is considered extant only where a stringency results; but where a leniency results, he is not of the opinion that the second offspring is considered to have existed? The Gemara rules: Indeed, conclude from it that this is the case.

מתני׳ אלו מביאין קרבן עולה ויורד: על שמיעת קול, ועל בטוי שפתים, ועל טומאת מקדש וקדשיו, והיולדת, והמצורע.

MISHNA: These are the five situations mentioned in the mishna (9a) in which one brings a sliding-scale offering: For hearing the voice of an oath, i.e., where one took a false oath that he does not have any testimony to provide on a given issue; and for the utterance of the lips, which is a case where one took a false oath about a different matter; and for the defiling of the Temple, by entering it while ritually impure, or defiling its sacrificial foods, by partaking of them while ritually impure; and a woman after childbirth; and a leper at the end of his purification process.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן: יש מביא בדלות ועשירות, ויש מביא בדלות ויש מביא בדלי דלות:

GEMARA: The Sages taught a baraita with regard to the nature of a sliding-scale offering, which varies depending on the owner’s financial status: There is a case in which one brings the offering in one of two possible states, either a bird offering if the individual is in a state of poverty or an animal offering if he is in a state of wealth; and there is a case in which one brings the offering in one of three possible states, of wealth, of poverty, or of extreme poverty.

יולדת – מביאה בדלות ועשירות. מצורע – מביא בדלות. שמיעת הקול ובטוי שפתים וטומאת מקדש וקדשיו – מביאין בדלות ודלי דלות.

The Gemara elaborates: A woman after childbirth brings a sliding-scale offering either in poverty, i.e., two doves or two pigeons, one as a burnt offering and one as a sin offering, or in wealth, i.e., a lamb as a burnt offering and a dove or a pigeon as a sin offering (see Leviticus 12:1–8). A leper brings the offering either in poverty in the form of a lamb for a guilt offering, and two doves or two pigeons, one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering, or in wealth in the form of a lamb for a guilt offering, a lamb as a burnt offering, and a female lamb as a sin offering (see Leviticus 14:10–22). For the hearing of the voice, i.e., taking a false oath that one cannot provide testimony, or the utterance of the lips, or the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, one brings an offering either in wealth, i.e., a female lamb or goat as a sin offering, or in poverty, i.e., two doves or two pigeons, one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering, or in extreme poverty, i.e., a meal offering.

תניא אידך: יש מביא אחד תחת אחד, יש מביא שנים תחת שנים, יש מביא שנים תחת אחד, יש מביא אחד תחת שנים, מכאן אתה למד לעשירית האיפה בפרוטה.

It is taught in another baraita: When offerings are brought in poverty rather than wealth, there is a case in which one brings one offering instead of a different one; there is a case in which one brings two offerings instead of two other offerings; there is a case in which one brings two offerings instead of one offering; and there is a case in which one brings one offering instead of two offerings. From here you may derive that the offering of one-tenth of an ephah may be worth as little as one peruta.

יולדת מביאה אחת תחת אחת – פרידה אחת ועוף תחת כבש, מצורע – שתי פרידין תחת שני כבשים, שמיעת הקול ובטוי שפתים וטומאת מקדש וקדשיו

A woman after childbirth brings one offering instead of one offering: One young bird, as a sin offering that she would bring even in wealth, and another bird as a burnt offering instead of the lamb. A leper brings two young birds instead of two lambs. For the hearing of the voice and the utterance of the lips and the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, one brings two young birds instead of one female lamb, and in a case of extreme poverty one brings one meal offering of one-tenth of an ephah instead of two young birds.

– מביאין שתי פרידין תחת כבשה אחת, ומביאין בדלי דלות עשירית האיפה תחת שתי פרידין.

קתני: מכאן אתה למד לעשירית האיפה שהיא בפרוטה. מנלן? דתנו רבנן: האומר ״הרי עלי בסלע למזבח״ – מביא כבש, שאין דבר קרב בסלע אלא כבש.

The baraita teaches: From here you may derive that the offering of one-tenth of an ephah may be worth as little as one peruta. The Gemara asks: From where do we learn this halakha? The Gemara answers that it is as the Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering worth one sela to the altar, he brings a lamb, as there is nothing that is sacrificed upon the altar that is worth one sela other than a lamb.

ממאי? מדאמר רחמנא ״איל אשם בכסף שקלים״, מכלל דכבש בן שנה בסלע, מדכתיב ״כבש בן שנתו״. ותנן: עמדו קינין בו ביום ברבעתים.

From where is this halakha derived? It is derived from the fact that the Merciful One states in the Torah that the ram brought in its second year as a guilt offering must be “according to your valuation in silver by shekels” (Leviticus 5:15), i.e., it must be worth two sela. It may therefore be understood by inference that a lamb, i.e., a young ram, in its first year is worth one sela. And it is known that a lamb is brought when it is within its first year, as it is written: “A lamb of the first year” (Leviticus 12:6). And we learned in a mishna (8a): The price of nests, i.e., pairs of birds brought by an impoverished person instead of a lamb, stood that day at one-quarter of a silver dinar. A quarter-dinar is one-sixteenth of a sela, the price of a lamb.

ומדחס רחמנא עליה דדלות למיהוי חד משית עשר בעשירות, חס רחמנא עליה דדלי דלות למיהוי חד משית עשר בדלות.

And from the fact that the Merciful One has mercy upon one who brings an offering in poverty, in that He permits him to bring an offering that is worth one-sixteenth of the value of the lamb that is brought in wealth, it may be inferred that the Merciful One takes pity upon one who brings an offering in extreme poverty, and consequently He permits him to bring an offering which is worth one-sixteenth of the value of the offering brought in moderate poverty. Accordingly, the offering brought in extreme poverty may be equal to a two hundred fifty-sixth part of the value of a sela.

אם כן, דלות כמה הויא – ריבעא, וכמה פריטי בריבעא – ארבעים ותמניא פריטי, חד משית עשר כמה הוי דדלות – תלתא פריטי.

The Gemara examines the mathematics necessary to determine that the value of the offering brought in extreme poverty is equal to one peruta: If so, how much is the offering brought in poverty worth? It is worth one-quarter of a dinar. And how many perutot are in one-quarter of a dinar? Forty-eight perutot. Accordingly, how many perutot are in the offering brought in extreme poverty, which is worth one-sixteenth of the offering brought in poverty? Three perutot.

דקתני: מכאן אתה למד לעשירית האיפה בפרוטה, אמאי פרוטה? האמרת: עשירית האיפה דלי דלות הוא, ואמרת חד משית סרי דדלות הוא, דחשבינן דתלתא פריטי הויין!

The Gemara objects: But with regard to that which the baraita teaches: From here you may derive that the offering of one-tenth of an ephah may be worth as little as one peruta, why did the baraita teach that it may be worth one peruta, rather than three perutot? Didn’t you say that one-tenth of an ephah is brought in extreme poverty, and you also said that this offering should be worth one-sixteenth of the offering brought in poverty, which we calculated to be three perutot?

תנא מיולדת יליף, דמתיא פרידה אחת תחת כבש, דהוי חד מתלתין ותרין דכבש. ועד כאן, דלי דלות כמה הוי – חד משית עשר בדלות,

The Gemara answers: The tanna derives the cost of an offering brought in poverty from the case of a woman after childbirth, who brings one bird instead of a lamb, as a bird is worth one thirty-second of the value of a lamb. The Gemara asks: But until now, how much was the offering brought in extreme poverty calculated to be worth? One-sixteenth of the value of the offering brought in poverty. And from where is this derived? It is derived from the value of the lamb and the ram, as explained earlier. If so, until now, the calculations lead to the conclusion that the offering brought in extreme poverty is worth one and one-half perutot, as one thirty-second of the value of a lamb is equal to one-eighth of a silver dinar rather than one-quarter, which means that the offering brought in poverty is worth twenty-four perutot, one-sixteenth of which is equal to one and one-half perutot.

דמהיכא יליף – מכבש ואיל. עד כאן, פרוטה ופלגא הוי!

אמר רבא: כולה מילתא מיולדת יליף, והכי קאמר: מדחס רחמנא עליה דדלות למיהוי חד מתלתין ותרין בעשירות, ומאי היא – יולדת, הכי חס רחמנא עליה דדלי דלות למיהוי

Rather, Rava said a different answer: The entire matter is derived from the offering brought by a woman after childbirth, and this is what the tanna is saying: It is derived from the fact that the Merciful One has mercy upon one who brings an offering in poverty, in that he may bring an offering which is worth one thirty-second of the value of the offering brought in wealth. Rava adds parenthetically: And from what case is this principle derived? From the case of a woman after childbirth. So too, the Merciful One has mercy upon one who brings an offering in extreme poverty, in that he may bring an offering that is worth one thirty-second of the value of the offering brought in moderate poverty.

חד מן תלתין ותרין בדלות.

אי הכי, נכי ריבעא דפרוטה הוי! הכי נמי, אלא דלאו אורח ארעא לאיתויי פחות מפרוטה למקום.

The Gemara objects: If so, the value should be one peruta minus one-quarter, i.e., three-quarters of a peruta. The Gemara explains: Indeed that is so, but it is not proper conduct to bring an offering worth less than one peruta before God.

מתני׳ מה בין שפחה לבין כל העריות? שלא שוותה להן לא בעונש ולא בקרבן. שכל העריות בחטאת, ושפחה באשם. כל העריות בנקבה, ושפחה בזכר.

MISHNA: What are the differences between an espoused maidservant and all those others with whom relations are forbidden? The difference is that the status of the maidservant is not equal to their status, neither with regard to punishment nor with regard to an offering, as one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden is liable to bring a sin offering, and by contrast, one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant is liable to bring a guilt offering. One who unwittingly engages in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden brings a female animal, and one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant brings a male animal, as a sin offering is a female and a guilt offering is a male.

כל העריות אחד האיש ואחד האשה שוין במכות ובקרבן, ובשפחה לא השוה לא האיש לאשה במכות, ולא השוה אשה לאיש בקרבן.

Furthermore, with regard to engaging in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden, both the man and the woman are equal with regard to liability to receive lashes if they were forewarned, and with regard to liability to bring an offering if they did so unwittingly. And in the case of one who engages in intercourse with a maidservant, the Torah did not equate the man with the woman with regard to lashes, as she alone is flogged, as will be explained, and the Torah did not equate the woman with the man with regard to bringing an offering, as she does not bring an offering.

כל העריות עשה בהן את המערה כגומר, וחייב על כל ביאה וביאה.

With regard to intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden, the Torah rendered the halakhic status of one who engages in the initial stage of intercourse [hame’areh] to be like that of one who completes the act, and one is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act of intercourse that he performs unwittingly. By contrast, in the case of relations with an espoused maidservant, one is liable only for completing the act of intercourse, and the man brings a single offering for several transgressions.

(זו חומר) החמיר בשפחה,

This is a stringency that the Torah imposed with regard to the maidservant relative to other individuals with whom relations are forbidden: