גיטין דף פד

מסתברא, בין לרבי אליעזר בין לרבנן, כיון דפסקה – פסקה.

It stands to reason, both according to Rabbi Eliezer and according to the Rabbis, that once he separates her, he has separated her entirely. By rendering her entirely permitted for one day he dissolves the bond between them and the divorce takes effect.

תנו רבנן: ״הרי זה גיטיך על מנת שתנשאי לפלוני״ – הרי זו לא תנשא, ואם נשאת – לא תצא.

§ The Sages taught (Tosefta 6:7) that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you marry so-and-so, she may not marry that man, but if she marries him the marriage is valid and she need not leave her husband.

מאי קאמר? אמר רב נחמן, הכי קאמר: הרי זו לא תנשא לו, שמא יאמרו נשיהן נותנין במתנה. ואם נשאת לאחר – לא תצא.

The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? She is forbidden from marrying whom? Rav Naḥman said that this is what the baraita is saying: She may not marry him, i.e., she may not marry the man mentioned by her husband in the condition, lest people say that these people are giving their wives to each other as a gift. But if she marries another man she need not leave him.

ומשום גזרה – לא מפקינן מיניה, ושרינן אשת איש לעלמא?!

The Gemara asks: Do we not remove her from him, thereby allowing a married woman to marry anyone, due to a rabbinic decree, lest people say that the husband is giving her as a gift? As long as the condition that she would marry a specific man is not fulfilled, she is a married woman by Torah law.

אלא אמר רב נחמן, הכי קאמר: הרי זו לא תנשא לו, שמא יאמרו נשיהם נותנין במתנה. ואם נשאת לו – לא תצא, דמשום גזרה לא מפקינן.

Rather, Rav Naḥman said that this is what the baraita is saying: She may not marry him, i.e., the man who was specified in the condition, lest people say that they are giving their wives to each other as a gift. But if she marries him she need not leave him, as we do not remove a woman from her husband due to a decree.

אמר ליה רבא: לו – הוא דלא תנשא, הא לאחר – תנשא?! והא בעיא קיומיה לתנאה!

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: It may be inferred from your statement that it is specifically to him that she may not get married, but she may marry another man ab initio. But isn’t she required to fulfill the condition by marrying the specified man before marrying someone else?

וכי תימא: אפשר דמינסבא היום ומיגרשה למחר – ומקיימא לתנאה; ולהך דפליגת עליה דרב יהודה קמדמית ליה – דאתמר: ״קונם עיני בשינה היום, אם אישן למחר״,

And if you would say that it is possible for her to get married today to someone else and get divorced from him tomorrow and then fulfill her condition by marrying the specified man, and you can compare it to that halakha over which you disagree with Rav Yehuda. As it was stated with regard to one who says: Sleeping is forbidden to me as if it were an offering [konam] for my eyes today if I will sleep tomorrow, Rav Yehuda says that he may not sleep today lest he sleep tomorrow, causing the vow to have been violated today, retroactively.

אמר רב יהודה: אל יישן היום, שמא יישן למחר;

ורב נחמן אמר: יישן היום, ואין חוששין שמא יישן למחר;

And Rav Naḥman says: He may sleep today, as there is currently no prohibition, and we are not concerned that perhaps he will sleep tomorrow, as he will be careful not to sleep. This dispute pertains to the general issue of a prohibition that will take effect retroactively if a condition is not fulfilled. Rav Yehuda holds that the prohibition must be observed until the condition is fulfilled, whereas Rav Naḥman maintains that it is not necessary to observe the prohibition, as he assumes that the condition will be fulfilled. Here too, perhaps Rav Naḥman allows the woman to marry another man because she can fulfill the condition after she is divorced from him.

הכי השתא?! התם בדידיה קיימא, דאי בעי – מבריז נפשיה בסילואתא, ולא נאים; הכא – בדידה קיימא לאיגרושי?!

How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the vow, the fulfillment of the condition is in his capability, as, if he wants to prevent himself from falling asleep he can prick himself with thorns [silevata] and he will not fall asleep. Here, is it in the woman’s power to get divorced? Perhaps her husband will not agree to divorce her and the condition will not be fulfilled.

אלא אמר רבא: הרי זו לא תנשא לא לו, ולא לאחר. לו לא תנשא – שמא יאמרו: נשותיהם נותנין במתנה; לאחר לא תנשא – דבעיא קיומיה לתנאה.

Rather, Rava said that the baraita should be interpreted in the following manner: This woman may marry neither the man who was specified in the condition nor another man. She may not marry him lest people say that these men are giving their wives to each other as a gift, and she may not marry another man because she is required to fulfill the condition.

ואם נשאת לו לא תצא – דמשום גזרה לא מפקינן; לאחר תצא – דבעיא לקיומיה לתנאה.

And if she marries the specified man she need not leave him, as we do not remove a woman from her husband due to a decree. But if she gets married to another man she must leave him, as she is required to fulfill the condition before marrying another man.

תניא כוותיה דרבא: הרי זו לא תנשא לא לו ולא לאחר, ואם נשאת לו – לא תצא, לאחר – תצא.

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: This woman may marry neither him nor another man, but if she marries him she need not leave him. But if she gets married to another man she must leave him.

תנו רבנן: ״הרי זה גיטך על מנת שתעלי לרקיע״; ״על מנת שתרדי לתהום״; ״על מנת שתבלעי קנה של ארבע אמות״; ״על מנת שתביאי

§ The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:8) that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you ascend to the sky, or on the condition that you descend to the depths of the sea, or on the condition that you swallow a four-cubit reed, or on the condition that you bring me a hundred-cubit reed, or on the condition that you cross the Great Sea, i.e., the Mediterranean Sea, by foot, or on any other condition that it is impossible to fulfill, it is not a valid bill of divorce.

לי קנה בן מאה אמה״; ״על מנת שתעברי את הים הגדול ברגליך״ – אינו גט.

רבי יהודה בן תימא אומר: כזה – גט. כלל אמר רבי יהודה בן תימא: כל תנאי שאי אפשר לו לקיימו בסופו,

Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima says: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, as the condition is void. Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima said the following principle: With regard to any condition that cannot be fulfilled in the end, yet even so the husband stipulated it initially, he is only hyperbolizing. It is assumed that he did not really intend to attach a condition to the divorce, but rather, to cause her distress, and therefore the divorce is valid without her fulfilling the condition.

והתנה עליו מתחילתו – אינו אלא כמפליגה בדברים, וכשר.

אמר רב נחמן אמר רב: הלכה כרבי יהודה בן תימא. אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק: מתניתין נמי דיקא, דקתני: כל שאפשר לו לקיימו בסופו,

Rav Naḥman says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The language of the mishna is also precisely formulated in support of this opinion, as it teaches: With regard to any condition that can be fulfilled in the end and the husband stipulated it initially, his condition stands (Bava Metzia 94a). Consequently, if his condition cannot be fulfilled it is void. The Gemara concludes: Learn from it that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima.

והתנה עליו בתחילתו – תנאו קיים; הא אי אפשר – תנאו בטל; שמע מינה.

איבעיא להו: ״הרי זה גיטיך על מנת שתאכלי בשר חזיר״, מהו? אמר אביי: היא היא. רבא אמר: אפשר דאכלה ולקיא.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you eat pig meat, what is the halakha? Abaye said: It is the same. This is also a condition that cannot be fulfilled, as it is forbidden by Torah law. Therefore, the condition is void. Rava said: It is possible for her to eat it and be flogged for it. Consequently, the condition can be fulfilled, although it is forbidden for her to do so.

לאביי, ״כלל״ – לאתויי בשר חזיר. לרבא, ״כזה״ – למעוטי בשר חזיר.

The Gemara elaborates: According to Abaye, the principle stated by Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima serves to include a condition to eat pig meat. When a tanna states a general principle, it expands the halakha beyond the specific case mentioned previously. In this case, the stating of the principle serves to apply the halakha to a condition subject to a Torah prohibition, in addition to a physical impossibility. According to Rava, when Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, the limiting term of: Like this, serves to emphasize that only when there is a condition that cannot be physically fulfilled is the bill of divorce valid, and serves to exclude a condition to eat pig meat, which cannot be fulfilled due to a Torah prohibition. Therefore, if she does not fulfill this condition the divorce is invalid.

מיתיבי: ״הרי זה גיטך על מנת שתבעלי לפלוני״, נתקיים התנאי – הרי זה גט, ואם לאו – אינו גט. ״על מנת שלא תבעלי לאבא,

The Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s opinion from a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so, and the condition is fulfilled, this is a valid bill of divorce. And if the condition is not fulfilled then it is not a valid bill of divorce. If he says to her: On the condition that you do not engage in sexual intercourse with my father or your father, she is permitted to remarry, as we are not concerned that perhaps she engaged in sexual intercourse with them.

ולאביך״ – אין חוששין שמא נבעלה להן.

ואילו ״על מנת שתבעלי לאבא ולאביך״ – לא קתני; לאביי ניחא, לרבא קשיא!

But the baraita does not teach that the condition is binding when the husband says: On the condition that you engage in sexual intercourse with my father or your father, which is forbidden by Torah law. According to Abaye it works out well, as in his opinion a condition that violates Torah law is void. According to Rava it is difficult.

אמר לך רבא: בשלמא בשר חזיר – אפשר דאכלה ולקיא; פלוני נמי – אפשר דמשחדא ליה בממונא; אלא אבא ואביך – בדידה קיימא?! נהי דאיהי עבדא איסורא,

The Gemara answers that Rava could have said to you: Granted, with regard to pig meat it is possible for her to eat it and be flogged. Similarly, if the condition is that she engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so, it is also possible for her to bribe him with money to engage in sexual intercourse with her. But with regard to the case of my father or your father, is it in her power to engage in sexual intercourse with them? Though she can potentially perform a forbidden act in order to fulfill her desire to get married, would my father or your father perform a forbidden act? They certainly would not cooperate. Therefore, this is a condition that cannot be fulfilled, and it is considered hyperbole.

אבא ואביך מי עבדי איסורא?!

לרבא, ״כלל״ – לאתויי אבא ואביך; ״כזה״ – למעוטי בשר חזיר.

Based on this analysis, according to Rava, Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated his principle in order to include the condition of my father and your father, as this condition is also considered impossible to fulfill. And the expression: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, serves to exclude the condition of eating pig meat, in which case the divorce is not valid unless she fulfills the condition.

לאביי, ״כלל״ – לאתויי בשר חזיר; ״כזה״ – למעוטי פלוני.

And according to Abaye this principle was stated to include the case of a condition that she should eat pig meat, and the expression: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, serves to exclude a condition that she should engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so, in which case the divorce takes effect only once the condition is fulfilled, as it is possible to fulfill this condition in a permitted manner.

מיתיבי: ״הרי זה גיטיך על מנת שתאכלי בשר חזיר״; ואם היתה זרה – ״על מנת שתאכלי בתרומה״; ואם היתה נזירה – ״על

The Gemara raises an objection from another baraita (Tosefta 6:10): If the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you eat pig meat; or similarly, if she was a non-priestess, i.e., the daughter of an Israelite, and he stipulated: On the condition that you partake of teruma; or if she was a nazirite and he stipulated: On the condition that you drink wine (see Numbers 6:3); in all of these cases, if the condition is fulfilled it is a valid bill of divorce, and if not, it is not a valid bill of divorce. This works out well according to Rava, who holds that a condition that she should perform a forbidden act is binding; according to Abaye it is difficult.

מנת שתשתי יין״; נתקיים התנאי – הרי זה גט; ואם לאו – אינו גט. לרבא ניחא, לאביי קשיא!

אמר לך אביי: מי סברת דברי הכל היא?! הא מני – רבנן היא.

The Gemara answers that Abaye could have said to you: Do you hold that this ruling is agreed upon by everyone? That is not the case. Rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima, maintaining that even a condition that cannot be fulfilled is a valid condition.

ותיפוק ליה דמתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה הוא, וכל המתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה – תנאו בטל!

The Gemara challenges: Regardless of the issue of a condition that cannot be fulfilled, derive that this condition is void from the fact that the husband is stipulating counter to that which is written in the Torah, and there is a principle that with regard to anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void.

אמר רב אדא בריה דרב איקא: כי אמרינן מתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה תנאו בטל – כגון שארה כסותה ועונתה,

Rav Adda son of Rav Ika said in response: When we say that if one stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah his condition is void, the reference is to a case such as a man who betroths a woman on the condition that he will not be obligated to provide her with her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights, as there he is uprooting a matter of Torah law by fulfilling the condition. But here, it is she who is uprooting a matter of Torah law by fulfilling the condition and not him.

דהוא קא עקר; אבל הכא – איהי קא עקרה.

מתקיף לה רבינא: כלום קא עקרה איהי – אלא לקיומי לתנאי דידיה; אישתכח דאיהו קא עקר!

Ravina strongly objects to this response: Isn’t she uprooting it only in order to fulfill his condition? It is therefore found that he is uprooting a matter of Torah law by attaching this condition to the divorce.

אלא אמר רבינא: כי אמרינן מתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה תנאו בטל – כגון שארה כסותה ועונתה, דודאי קא עקר; אבל הכא – מי קאמר לה:

Rather, Ravina said: When we say that if one stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, that his condition is void, the reference is to a case such as that of a man who stipulates that he will not be obligated to provide his wife with her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights, as by attaching this condition he is definitely uprooting a matter of Torah law. But here, is he saying to her that it is not possible for her not to eat? She may not eat and not get divorced. The condition does not counter Torah law in and of itself, as the wife has the choice of whether or not to fulfill it.

לא סגיא דלא אכלה?! לא תיכול, ולא תיגרש.

כיצד יעשה – יטלנו הימנה וכו׳: מאן תנא? אמר חזקיה: רבי שמעון בן אלעזר היא.

§ It is stated in the mishna: What should he do after giving her the bill of divorce and stipulating that she is not permitted to so-and-so? He should take it from her, and hand it to her again, and say to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that? Ḥizkiyya said that it is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

דתניא, רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר: עד שיטלנו הימנה, ויחזור ויתננו לה, ויאמר לה: ״הי גיטיך״.

As it is taught in a baraita: If a husband gives his wife a bill of divorce without her knowledge, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that it does not take effect until he takes it from her, and hands it to her again, and says to her: This is your bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it is not necessary for him to hand it to her a second time; rather, it is sufficient for him to tell her that he is giving her a bill of divorce. The mishna is therefore in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who holds that the husband must hand it to her again.

רבי יוחנן אמר: אפילו תימא רבי – דילכון אמר: שאני הכא, הואיל וקנאתו ליפסל בו לכהונה.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You can even say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Your Sage, referring to Rav Kahana, who came from Babylonia to study in Eretz Yisrael, said that it is different here, since the wife has already acquired the bill of divorce with regard to her becoming disqualified from marrying into the priesthood due to it, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that he need not take it back and give it to her again. Since the bill of divorce was already partially effective, it is in the wife’s possession and cannot be used by the husband to divorce her in full unless she gives it back to him and he gives it to her again. Therefore, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees that he must give it to her a second time.

כתבו בתוכו: אמר רב ספרא: ״כתבו בתוכו״ תנן.

§ It is stated in the mishna that if the husband wrote his qualification inside the bill of divorce, it is invalid even if he subsequently erased it. Rav Safra said: We learned in the mishna that the bill is invalid only if he wrote the qualification inside the bill of divorce, not if he stated it orally.

פשיטא, ״כתבו בתוכו״ תנן! מהו דתימא הני מילי לאחר התורף, אבל לפני התורף – אפילו על פה נמי פסול, קא משמע לן.

The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case, as we learned in the mishna explicitly that he wrote it inside. The Gemara answers: Rav Safra stated this lest you say that this matter applies only when the qualification was written after the essential part of the bill of divorce, which contains the names of the husband and wife and the date, but before the essential part was written; even if the qualification was stated orally, the bill of divorce is invalid, as it was written with the intention that the wife would not be permitted to marry any man. Rav Safra therefore teaches us that only a written qualification in the bill of divorce renders it invalid, and an oral statement does not render it invalid. Consequently, the husband can hand this bill of divorce to his wife without stating the qualification and it will be valid.

ורבא אמר: לא שנו אלא לאחר התורף, אבל לפני התורף – אפילו על פה נמי פסול.

And Rava said: They taught that it is specifically writing the qualification that invalidates the bill of divorce only when the qualification is stated after the writing of the essential part. But if the qualification is stated before the essential part of the bill of divorce is written, even if it is stated orally, the bill of divorce is invalid.

ואזדא רבא לטעמיה – דאמר להו רבא להנהו דכתבי גיטי: שתקו שתוקי לבעל, עד דכתביתו ליה לתורף דגיטא.

And Rava followed his line of reasoning, as Rava said to those who write bills of divorce: Silence the husband until you write the essential part of the bill of divorce, lest he state a condition, thereby rendering the bill of divorce invalid.

תנו רבנן: כל התנאין פוסלין בגט, דברי רבי. וחכמים אומרים: כל שפוסל על פה פוסל בכתב, וכל שאינו פוסל על פה אינו פוסל בכתב – ״חוץ״,

The Sages taught: All conditions that are written in a bill of divorce invalidate it, this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: Any qualification that invalidates the divorce when stated orally by the husband while he hands the bill of divorce to his wife invalidates it when written, and any qualification that does not invalidate it when stated orally does not invalidate it when written. Therefore, issuing a qualification that she is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, which invalidates the divorce when stated orally, invalidates it as well when written, whereas attaching a standard condition, which does not invalidate it when stated orally, does not invalidate it when written.

שפוסל על פה, פוסל בכתב; ״על מנת״, שאינו פוסל על פה, אינו פוסל בכתב.

אמר רבי זירא: מחלוקת לפני התורף – דרבי סבר: גזרינן ״על מנת״ אטו ״חוץ״; ורבנן סברי: לא גזרינן ״על מנת״ אטו ״חוץ״. אבל לאחר התורף –

Rabbi Zeira said: This dispute applies to a case where the condition was written in the bill of divorce before the essential part was written, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that we issue a decree that a stipulation invalidates the bill of divorce due to a case of an exception, and the Rabbis hold that we do not issue a decree that a stipulation invalidates it due to a case of an exception. But if it was written after the essential part,