ערכין דף כ

בחד זימנא אמדינן ליה, או דלמא כיון דבזה אחר זה נדר, תרי זימני אמדינן ליה?

we assess him once and he donates twice the value of that single assessment, or perhaps since he vowed sequentially we assess him twice?

ואם תמצא לומר: כיון דבזה אחר זה נדר תרי זימני אמדינן ליה, אמר: ״שני דמי עלי״ בבת אחת, מהו? הכא ודאי בבת אחת נדר, בבת אחת אמדינן ליה,

And if you say in that case that since he vowed sequentially we assess him twice, if he says at the same time: My assessment is twice incumbent upon me, what is the halakha? Do we say that here certainly he vowed at the same time, and therefore we assess him once, or perhaps since he says the word: Twice, it is considered as though he vowed sequentially and therefore he must be assessed twice?

או דלמא כיון דקאמר ״שני״, כזה אחר זה דמי?

אם תימצי לומר: כיון דקאמר ״שני״ כזה אחר זה דמי, אמדוהו מאליו מהו? מי אמרינן: הא אמיד מאליו וקאי, או דלמא בעינן כוונה לאומדנא?

Finally, if you say that since he says the word: Twice, it is considered as though he vowed sequentially and he must be assessed twice, if a court of ten assessed him on its own,i.e., not for the purpose of assessing a vow, what is the halakha? Do we say that he has already been assessed on his own and now stands before us, and therefore there is no need for another assessment, or perhaps we require an assessment to be performed with intent for the sake of consecration to the Temple treasury.

פשוט מיהא חדא, דתנן: ״דמי עלי״ ומת — לא יתנו יורשין, שאין דמים למתים.

The Gemara suggests: Resolve at least one of these dilemmas, as we learned in the mishna below: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my assessment, and then dies, his heirs need not give his assessment to the Temple treasury, as there is no monetary value for the dead, and his assessment at the time of his vow is unknown.

ואי סלקא דעתך אמדוהו מאליו הוי אומדנא, הא אמיד וקאי, מי איכא גברא דלא שוי ארבעה זוזי?

The Gemara explains the resolution: And if it enters your mind that in a case where a court of ten assessed him on its own it is a valid assessment with regard to his vow, why does the mishna state that his heirs do not have to donate to the Temple treasury? Isn’t he considered as standing assessed from the outset, as is there a person who is not worth at least four zuz? This proves that an assessment is required to be performed with intent for the sake of consecration to the Temple treasury.

אמדוהו מאליו — נחית לאומדנא, ״דמי עלי״ — לא נחית לאומדנא.

The Gemara rejects this resolution: In a case where a court of ten assessed him on its own before he took his vow, he has entered into an assessment, i.e., an assessment has actually been performed. By contrast, in the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my assessment, and then dies, he has not entered into an assessment, i.e., no actual assessment has been conducted at all.

מתני׳ חומר בערכין מבנדרים, כיצד? האומר: ״ערכי עלי״ ומת — יתנו היורשים, ״דמי עלי״ ומת — לא יתנו היורשים, שאין דמים למתים.

MISHNA: There are halakhot that are more stringent with regard to valuations than with regard to vows of assessment. How so? In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and then dies, his heirs must give his valuation to the Temple treasury. But one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my assessment, and then dies, his heirs need not give his assessment to the Temple treasury, as there is no monetary value for the dead.

״ערך ידי״, ו״ערך רגלי עלי״ — לא אמר כלום. ״ערך ראשי״, ו״ערך כבידי עלי״ — נותן ערך כולו. זה הכלל: דבר שהנשמה תלויה בו — נותן ערך כולו.

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my forearm, or: The valuation of my leg, has not said anything, as there are valuations in the Torah only for a complete person. But if one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my head, or: The valuation of my liver, he gives the valuation of his entire self. This is the principle: One who valuates an item upon which the soul is dependent, i.e., without which one will die, gives the valuation of his entire self.

״חצי ערכי עלי״ — נותן חצי ערכו, ״ערך חציי עלי״ — נותן ערך כולו, ״חצי דמי עלי״ — נותן חצי דמיו,

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate half of my valuation, gives half of his valuation. But one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of half of me, gives the valuation of his entire self. Likewise, one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate half of my assessment, gives half of his assessment; one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the assessment of half of me, gives the assessment of his entire self. This is the principle: One who takes a vow with regard to an item upon which the soul is dependent gives the assessment of his entire self.

״דמי חציי עלי״ — נותן דמי כולו. זה הכלל: דבר שהנשמה תלויה בו — נותן דמי כולו.

האומר: ״ערכו של פלוני עלי״, מת הנודר והנידר — יתנו היורשין. ״דמיו של פלוני עלי״, ומת הנודר — יתנו היורשין, מת הנידר — לא יתנו היורשין,

With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of so-and-so, and both the one who vowed and the object of the vow die, the heirs of the one who vowed must give the valuation of the object of the vow to the Temple treasury. With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the assessment of so-and-so, and the one who vowed dies, his heirs must give his assessment to the Temple treasury. If the object of the vow dies, the heirs of the one who vowed need not give his assessment to the Temple treasury, as there is no monetary value for the dead.

שאין דמים למתים.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן: חומר בנדרים מבערכין, שהנדרים חלין על בהמה חיה ועוף, ואין נדונים בהשג יד, מה שאין כן בערכין.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: There are halakhot that are more stringent with regard to vows of assessment than with regard to valuations, as vows of assessment take effect with regard to a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, and a bird. If one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the assessment of this bird, he must donate that assessment. This is not the case with regard to valuations, as they do not take effect with regard to animals and birds. And another halakha that is more stringent with regard to vows of assessment than with regard to valuations is that the destitute who take vows of assessment are not assessed based on affordability. This is not the case with regard to valuations, which are assessed based on whether the one who vows can afford to pay what they vowed.

חומר בערכין מבנדרים, כיצד? אמר: ״ערכי עלי״ ומת — יתנו יורשין, ״דמי עלי״ ומת — לא יתנו יורשין, שאין דמים למתים.

There is a halakha that is more stringent with regard to valuations than with regard to vows of assessment. How so? In the case of one who said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and dies, his heirs must give his valuation to the Temple treasury. But one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my assessment, and dies, his heirs need not give his assessment to the Temple treasury, as there is no monetary value for the dead.

אמר ״ערכי עלי״ ומת — יתנו יורשין. שמע מינה מלוה על פה גובה מן היורשין? שאני הכא, דמלוה כתובה בתורה היא.

The baraita taught with regard to a person who said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and dies, that his heirs must give his valuation to the Temple treasury. The Gemara suggests one can conclude from this ruling that one collects a loan by oral agreement from the heirs, as no promissory note was written with regard to this obligation. The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Here the heirs’ obligation to pay the valuation of the deceased is different, i.e., it is not the same as a loan by oral agreement, as a valuation is considered a loan, i.e., debt, written in the Torah, in accordance with the deceased’s age and sex at the time of the vow.

שמע מינה: מלוה הכתובה בתורה ככתובה בשטר דמיא? הכא במאי עסקינן — כשעמד בדין.

The Gemara objects: If so, can one conclude from the baraita that a loan that is written in the Torah, i.e., any financial obligation that applies by Torah law, is considered as though it were written in a document? The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Here we are dealing with a case where he stood in judgment before he died, and the court obligated him to donate his valuation. The court’s ruling is considered like a financial obligation written in a document, and therefore the heirs are required to pay his valuation.

דכוותה גבי ״דמי עלי״ שעמד בדין, אמאי לא יתנו יורשין ״דמי עלי״? מחוסר אומדנא. ״ערכי עלי״ — לא מחוסר ולא כלום.

The Gemara asks: If so, then in the corresponding situation, with regard to one who said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my assessment, the baraita must also be referring to one who stood in judgment. But in that case, why don’t the heirs have to donate his assessment? The Gemara answers that in the case of one who said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my assessment, even if he stood in judgment and the court obligated him to pay, the assessment of the precise amount he must pay is still lacking, as that amount is determined only through the assessment of a court. By contrast, with regard to one who said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, if he stood in judgment and the court obligated him to pay, nothing is lacking, as the amount he pays is fixed by the Torah.

ערך ידי ורגלי עלי וכו׳. אמר רב גידל אמר רב: ונותן דמיה.

§ The mishna teaches that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my forearm, or of my leg, has not said anything, as there are valuations in the Torah only for a complete person. Rav Giddel says that Rav says: And although he is exempt from donating the valuation, he must give the assessment of the forearm or leg.

והא ״לא אמר כלום״ קתני! לא אמר כלום לרבנן, ונותן דמיה לרבי מאיר.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in the mishna that he has not said anything? The Gemara answers: The ruling of the mishna that he has not said anything applies according to the opinion of the Rabbis, but he must give the assessment according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir maintains that a person does not utter a statement for naught, and therefore he must have intended to vow to donate the assessment of the limb, as there is no valuation for limbs.

הא אמרה חדא זימנא, דאמר רב גידל אמר רב: האומר ״ערך כלי זה עלי״ נותן דמיו!

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rav Giddel already say it once, as Rav Giddel says that Rav says: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of this vessel, although he is exempt from donating the valuation of the vessel, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir he must give the assessment of the vessel.

מהו דתימא: התם הוא דאדם יודע שאין ערך לכלי, וגמר ואמר לשם דמים, אבל הכא מיטעא קטעי, דסבר כי היכי דאיכא ״ערך ראשי״ ו״ערך כבידי״,

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for Rav Giddel to repeat that halakha with regard to one who vowed the valuation of his forearm or leg, lest you say this ruling is applicable only there, with regard to a vessel, as a person knows that there is no valuation for a vessel, and he therefore intended and said his vow for the sake of assessments. But here, with regard to his forearm or leg, he erred, as he thought that just as there is an obligation to donate the valuation in a case where one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my head, or: The valuation of my liver, so too, there is an obligation to donate the valuation if one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my forearm or the valuation of my leg. But he did not intend to say a vow of assessments. Therefore, Rav Giddel teaches us that even in the case of one who vowed to donate the valuation of his forearm or leg, he did not speak in error but intended to donate the assessment.

איכא נמי ״ערך ידי״ ו״ערך רגלי״, אבל דמי לא קאמר — קא משמע לן.

״ערך ראשי״ ו״ערך כבידי״ — נותן ערך כולו. מאי טעמא? ״נפשות״ קאמר רחמנא.

§ The mishna teaches that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my head, or: The valuation of my liver, he gives the valuation of his entire self. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? The Gemara answers that the Merciful One states: “A valuation of living people” (Leviticus 27:2), which indicates that in the case of one who valuates an item upon which the soul is dependent and without which one will die, he must give the valuation of his entire self.

זה הכלל: דבר שהנשמה תלויה בו וכו׳. לאתויי מן הארכובה ולמעלה.

The mishna further teaches that this is the principle: One who valuates an item upon which the soul is dependent and without which one will die gives the valuation of his entire self. The Gemara explains that the phrase: This is the principle, serves to include one who vowed to donate the valuation of his leg from the knee and above. Since one would die if his leg were severed above the knee, this is considered an item upon which the soul is dependent, and therefore he gives the valuation of his entire self.

חצי ערכי עלי נותן כו׳. תנו רבנן: ״חצי ערכי עלי״ — נותן חצי ערכו. רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר: לוקה ונותן ערך שלם.

The mishna teaches that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate half of my valuation, gives half of his valuation. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 3:3): One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate half of my valuation, gives half of his valuation. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He is flogged and must give his full valuation.

לוקה?! אמאי? אמר רב פפא: לוקה בערך שלם, מאי טעמא? גזירה ״חצי (ערכי) [ערכו]״ אטו ״ערך חציו״, וערך חציו הוי דבר שהנשמה תלויה בו.

The Gemara asks: Since he did not commit a sin, why is he flogged? Rav Pappa said in response: He is flogged, i.e., punished, in that he must donate his full valuation. What is the reason he needs to give his full valuation? A rabbinic decree was issued that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate half of my valuation, must give the value of his entire self, due to a concern that this case might become confused with the similar one of a person who vows to donate the valuation of half of himself. And the halakha in such a case is that he must give the value of his entire self, as the valuation of half of him is an item upon which the soul is dependent.

״חצי דמי עלי״ — נותן כו׳. ״דמי חציי עלי״ — נותן דמי כולו, מאי טעמא?

The mishna further teaches that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate half of my assessment, gives half of his assessment. But one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the assessment of half of me, gives the assessment of his entire self, as one who takes a vow of assessment with regard to an item upon which the soul depends must give the assessment of his entire self. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? After all, it is only with regard to valuations that the Torah states: “A valuation of living people” (Leviticus 27:2), indicating that one who valuates an item upon which the soul depends must give the valuation of his entire self; but this is not stated with regard to assessments.

״נדר בערכך נפשות״ כתיב.

The Gemara answers that it is written: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow [neder] with regard to a valuation [be’erkekha] of living people” (Leviticus 27:2). The verse juxtaposes vows of assessment [neder] and valuations [erekh], thereby teaching that just as one who takes a vow of valuation with regard to an item upon which the soul depends must give the valuation of his entire self, so too, one who takes a vow of assessment with regard to an item upon which the soul is dependent must give the assessment of his entire self.

זה הכלל: דבר שהנשמה תלויה בו, לאתויי מן הארכובה ולמעלה.

The mishna further teaches that this is the principle: One who takes a vow of assessment with regard to an item upon which the soul is dependent gives the assessment of his entire self. The Gemara explains that the phrase: This is the principle, serves to include one who vowed to donate the assessment of his leg from the knee and above. Since one would die if his leg were severed above the knee, this is an item upon which the soul depends, and therefore he gives the assessment of his entire self.

תנו רבנן: המעריך חצי ערך כלי, רבי מאיר אומר: נותן דמיו, וחכמים אומרים: לא אמר כלום. רבא חלש, עול לגביה אביי ורבנן, ויתבי וקאמרי:

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to one who valuates in order to donate half the valuation of a vessel, Rabbi Meir says: He gives half the assessment of the vessel, and the Rabbis say: He has not said anything. The Gemara relates: Rava became sick, and Abaye and other Sages came to visit him. As they were sitting and talking, they said: Granted that Rabbi Meir holds that a person does not utter a statement for naught, and therefore there is no difference whether one vowed to donate the entire valuation of a vessel, and there is no difference whether one vowed to donate half its valuation; in either case he must have intended to donate the assessment, as there is no valuation with regard to vessels.

בשלמא רבי מאיר קסבר אין אדם מוציא דבריו לבטלה, לא שנא כולו ולא שנא חציו.

אלא רבנן מאי קסברי? אי אדם מוציא דבריו לבטלה — אפילו כולו נמי, ואי אין אדם מוציא דבריו לבטלה — אפילו חציו נמי!

But with regard to the Rabbis in the baraita, what do they hold? If they maintain that a person utters a statement for naught, then even if one vowed to donate the entire valuation of a vessel, he should be exempt and the Rabbis should disagree with regard to that case. And if the Rabbis maintain that a person does not utter a statement for naught, then even one who vowed to donate half the valuation of a vessel should be obligated to give half of the assessment.

אמר להו רבא ואביי: רבנן דהכא כרבי מאיר סברי לה, וסברי לה כרבי׳ שמעון. סברי לה כרבי מאיר, דאמר: ״אין אדם מוציא דבריו לבטלה״.

Rava and Abaye said to the Sages in response: The Rabbis here in the baraita hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, but they also hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Rava and Abaye elaborated: They hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a person does not utter a statement for naught, and therefore one who vows to donate the valuation of a vessel must give its assessment.

וסברי לה כרבי שמעון, דאמר שלא התנדב כדרך המתנדבים; כוליה אורחיה לאיתנדובי, פלגיה לאו אורחיה לאיתנדובי.

And they also hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to one who consecrated an item for a purpose for which it was unsuited, e.g., if one sought to bring a barley meal offering even though meal offerings may be brought only from wheat (see Menaḥot 103a). Rabbi Shimon says he is exempt from any obligation, as this person did not donate in the manner typical of donors. So too, with regard to one who vows to donate the valuation of a vessel, it is the typical manner for one to donate an entire vessel, and therefore one who does so is obligated to donate the assessment of the vessel. But it is not the typical manner for one to donate half a vessel, and therefore one who vows in this manner has not said anything and is exempt.

האומר ״ערכו של פלוני עלי״, ומת הנודר כו׳. מאי ניהו? שעמד בדין.

§ The mishna teaches that if one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of so-and-so, and both the one who vowed and the object of the vow die, the heirs of the one who vowed must give his valuation to the Temple treasury. The Gemara asks: What is the specific case to which the mishna is referring? It must be referring to a case where he stood in judgment, and the court obligated him to donate his valuation before he died. The court’s ruling is considered like a financial obligation written in a document, and therefore the heirs of the one who vowed are required to pay his valuation.

היינו הך! סיפא איצטריך ליה, דמיו של פלוני עליו, ומת הנודר — יתנו היורשים.

If so, this clause in the mishna is identical to that previous clause in the mishna, which states that if one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and he dies, his heirs must give his valuation to the Temple treasury. Since it was explained that the earlier clause is also dealing with a case where he stood in judgment, for what purpose was this halakha repeated in the mishna? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to repeat this halakha in order to teach the latter clause of the mishna: With regard to one who says it is incumbent upon him to donate the assessment of so-and-so, and the one who vowed dies, his heirs must give his assessment to the Temple treasury.

מהו דתימא, כיון דלא אמדוהו לא אישתעבוד נכסי, קא משמע לן: כיון דעמד בדין אישתעבודי אישתעבוד נכסי, ואומדנא גלויי מילתא בעלמא הוא.

This is necessary lest you say: Although the one who took the vow stood in judgment before he died and the court obligated him, since the object of his vow was not assessed before he died, the property of the one who vowed is not liened to the debt, and consequently the heirs are not obligated to pay. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that the property of the one who took the vow was liened, since he stood in judgment while he was still alive, and the assessment of the object of the vow is considered to be a mere disclosure of the matter, which can be performed after the death of the one who vowed.

מתני׳ ״שור זה עולה״, ו״בית זה קרבן״, ומת השור ונפל הבית — פטור מלשלם. ״שור זה עלי עולה״, ו״בית זה עלי קרבן״,

MISHNA: In the case of one who says: This bull is consecrated as a burnt offering, or: This house is consecrated as an offering, and the bull died or the house collapsed, he is exempt from paying his commitment. But in the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to give this bull as a burnt offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to give this house as an offering, if the bull died or the house collapsed, he is obligated to pay its value.

מת השור ונפל הבית — חייב לשלם.

גמ׳ אמר רבי חייא בר רב: לא שנו אלא דאמר ״דמי שור זה עלי עולה״, אבל אמר ״שור זה עלי עולה״,

GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav says: The Sages taught in the mishna only that one who said: It is incumbent upon me to give the monetary value of this bull as a burnt offering, is obligated to pay its value if it dies. But if he said: It is incumbent upon me to give this bull as a burnt offering, since he said: This, thereby referring specifically to that animal, and then the bull died, he does not bear financial responsibility for its loss. And as for his statement: It is incumbent upon me, he did not intend to accept financial responsibility for the loss of the bull. Rather, he meant to say: It is incumbent upon me to bring this bull as an offering to the Temple.

כיון דאמר ״זה״ ומת — אינו חייב באחריותו, ״עלי להביאו״ קאמר.

מיתיבי: שור זה עולה — השור הקדש ומועלין בו, מת או נגנב — אינו חייב באחריותו. ״שור זה עלי עולה״ — השור הקדש ומועלין בו,

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita (Tosefta 3:11): With regard to one who says: This bull is consecrated as a burnt offering, the bull is consecrated property and one who benefits from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property. If the bull dies or is stolen, he does not bear financial responsibility for its loss. If one says: It is incumbent upon me to give this bull as a burnt offering, the bull is consecrated property, and one who benefits from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property. If the bull dies or is stolen, he bears financial responsibility for its loss, despite the fact that he did not vow to give the monetary value of the bull.

מת או נגנב — חייב באחריותו.

מי אלימא ממתניתין, דאוקימנא דקאמר ״דמי״? הכא נמי דקאמר ״דמי״.

The Gemara answers: Is the baraita stronger than the mishna, with regard to which we established that it is referring to a case where he says: The monetary value of the bull? Here too, in the case of the baraita, he says: It is incumbent upon me to give the monetary value of this bull as a burnt offering.

והא מדסיפא דקאמר ״דמי״, רישא דלא קאמר ״דמי״! דקתני סיפא: דמי שור עולה — השור חולין ואין מועלין בו, מת או נגנב — אינו חייב באחריותו,

The Gemara objects: But from the fact that the latter clause of the baraita is referring to a case where he says: Monetary value of, it may be inferred that the first clause of the baraita is referring to a case where he does not say monetary value. As it teaches in the latter clause of the baraita (Tosefta 3:12): With regard to one who said: It is incumbent upon me to give the monetary value of this bull as a burnt offering, the bull is non-sacred property and one who benefits from it is not liable for misuse of consecrated property. If the bull dies or is stolen, he does not bear financial responsibility for its loss. But if he sold the bull and received money for the sale, he does bear financial responsibility for that money, since he accepted financial responsibility for the monetary value of the bull in his vow.

אבל חייב באחריות דמיו!

רישא וסיפא דקאמר ״דמי״, רישא דאמר: ״יקדיש השור לדמיו״, וסיפא דקאמר: ״לכשיבאו דמיו יקדשו״.

The Gemara explains: The first clause and the latter clause of the baraita are both referring to one who says: Monetary value of, in his vow. The difference between them is that the first clause is dealing with one who says: Let the bull be consecrated for its monetary value, and therefore the bull is consecrated and he bears financial responsibility for its value. But the latter clause is referring to one who says: When this bull shall be sold, the money received from the sale shall be consecrated for use as a burnt offering.

והא אין אדם מקדיש דבר שלא בא לעולם? אמר רב יהודה אמר רב: הא מני? רבי מאיר היא, דאמר: אדם מקדיש דבר שלא בא לעולם.

The Gemara asks: Can this possibly be the case of the latter clause of the baraita? But a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, and therefore one cannot consecrate the money he will receive in the future from the sale of the bull. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: A person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world.

איכא דאמרי, אמר ליה רב פפא לאביי, ואמרי לה רמי בר חמא לרב חסדא: כמאן? כרבי מאיר, דאמר: אדם מקדיש דבר שלא בא לעולם? אמר ליה: ואלא כמאן?

Some say a slightly different version of this discussion, that Rav Pappa said to Abaye, and some say Rami bar Ḥama said to Rav Ḥisda: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world? Abaye said to him: Rather, in accordance with who else’s opinion could this baraita be? Certainly it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

ואיכא דמתני לה אהא, המשכיר בית לחברו ונתנגע, אף על פי שחלטו כהן, אומר לו: ״הרי שלך לפניך״, נתצו — חייב להעמיד לו בית.

And some teach this discussion with regard to this baraita (Tosefta, Bava Metzia 8:30): In the case of one who rents a house to another and the house became ritually impure with leprosy, even though a priest confirmed the house as impure, condemning it to be dismantled, as long as the house is still standing its owner may say to the renter: That which is yours is before you, and the owner is not required to compensate the renter. Nevertheless, in accordance with the halakha of a house afflicted with leprosy, once the priest has dismantled the house the owner is obligated to provide a new house for the renter.