ביצה דף לו

התם תנן ״אבל לא את האוצר״, ואמר שמואל: מאי ״אבל לא את האוצר״ — אבל לא יגמור את האוצר כולו, דלמא אתי לאשויי גומות. הכא מאי?

The Gemara poses another question with regard to the same issue. We learned elsewhere, at the end of the mishna cited above concerning clearing out sacks for guests and study: But one may not clear out a storeroom. And Shmuel said: What is the meaning of: But not a storeroom? It means: But one may not finish clearing out the entire storeroom while clearing out the sacks, exposing the floor of the storeroom. The reason this is prohibited is lest he come to level out depressions in the dirt floor of the storeroom, which would constitute a biblically prohibited labor. What would be the halakha here, with regard to lowering the produce from the roof on a Festival to prevent its ruin in the rain? Is it prohibited also in this case to remove all of it and thereby expose the floor of the roof?

התם הוא בשבת דאסור — משום דחמיר, אבל יום טוב דקיל — שפיר דמי. או דלמא: התם דאיכא בטול בית המדרש — אמרת לא,

The Gemara specifies the possible arguments: Perhaps it is there, on Shabbat, that it is prohibited, because punishment for Shabbat desecration is severe, but on a Festival, which has a lighter punishment for desecration, it is acceptable. Or perhaps it can be argued to the contrary: There, in the case of the sacks on Shabbat, even though there is suspension of study in the study hall, i.e., the clearing out facilitates a mitzva, you say that they did not permit exposing the floor. Here, in the case of lowering produce on a Festival to prevent its ruin, where there is no suspension of study in the study hall, i.e., clearing out the produce does not facilitate any mitzva, is it not all the more so prohibited?

הכא דליכא בטול בית המדרש — לא כל שכן.

והכא תנן: משילין פירות דרך ארובה ביום טוב, ואמר רב נחמן: לא שנו אלא באותו הגג, אבל מגג לגג — לא. ותניא נמי הכי:

The Gemara poses a further question. And here we learned in the mishna: One may lower produce through a skylight on a Festival, and Rav Naḥman said: They taught this halakha only with regard to the same roof, i.e., only if the skylight is in the same roof where the produce is located, but to carry the produce from one roof to another roof in order to lower it through a skylight in the second roof is not permitted. This would involve too much exertion to be permitted on the Festival. And this ruling is also taught in a baraita: One may not carry from one roof to another roof, even when the two roofs are on the same level and there is no extra effort of lifting or lowering the produce while transporting it between the roofs.

אין מטלטלין מגג לגג אפילו כשגגותיהן שוין.

התם מאי? (כל שכן שבת דחמירא, או דלמא:) הכא הוא דאסור — משום יום טוב דקיל, ואתי לזלזולי ביה, אבל שבת דחמירא,

The question arises: There, in the case of moving sacks on Shabbat for guests or for study, what is the halakha? May the sacks be moved from one roof or house to another for this purpose? Perhaps all the more so they may not be moved on Shabbat, because Shabbat is more severe than a Festival? Or perhaps it can be argued to the contrary: It is here, with regard to a Festival, that it is prohibited to transfer from one roof to another, because a Festival is regarded lightly by people and they might consequently come to belittle it; but on Shabbat, which is severe in people’s eyes and so they will not come to belittle it, it is acceptable to transfer even from one house to another.

ולא אתי לזלזולי בה — שפיר דמי.

או דלמא: מה הכא דאיכא הפסד פירות — אמרת לא, התם דליכא הפסד פירות — לא כל שכן.

Or perhaps it may be argued: If here, in the case of clearing produce from the roof, when there is the issue of the loss of the produce, you say he may not transfer from one roof to another, then there, in the case of moving sacks on Shabbat for guests or study, when there is no issue of loss of produce, is it not all the more so prohibited?

הכא (תנן): לא ישלשלם בחבל בחלונות, ולא יורידם דרך סולמות, התם מאי? הכא ביום טוב הוא דאסור — דליכא בטול בית המדרש, אבל שבת,

The Gemara presents yet another dilemma: Here, with regard to bringing produce into one’s house from the roof, we learned in a baraita: If there is no skylight from the roof to the house, necessitating another method of moving the produce out of the rain, he may not lower them by means of a rope through the windows, nor may he take them down by way of ladders. There, with regard to moving sacks on Shabbat, what is the halakha? May they be moved by ropes or using a ladder? Perhaps it is only here, in the case of moving produce out of the rain on a Festival, that it is prohibited, because produce left on a roof does not entail suspension of a mitzva such as study in the study hall; but on Shabbat, when there is the possibility that leaving the sacks in their current location will lead to suspension of study in the study hall, it is acceptable to remove them even via windows and ladders.

דאיכא בטול בית המדרש — שפיר דמי.

או דלמא: הכא דאיכא הפסד פירות — אמרת לא, התם דליכא הפסד פירות — לא כל שכן. תיקו.

Or perhaps it can be argued to the contrary: Here, in the case of the produce on the roof, when there is the issue of the loss of the produce, you say it is not permitted. There, in the case of clearing out sacks on Shabbat, where there is no issue of the loss of produce, should it not all the more so be prohibited to lower them via windows and ladders? No resolution was found, so the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

ומכסין את הפירות. אמר עולא: ואפילו אוירא דלבני. רבי יצחק אמר: פירות הראוין. ואזדא רבי יצחק לטעמיה. דאמר רבי יצחק: אין כלי ניטל אלא לדבר הניטל בשבת.

§ It was taught in the mishna: And one may cover produce with cloths to prevent damage due to a leak. Ulla said: And even a row of bricks that might be ruined by the rain may be covered to prevent damage. Although the halakha in the mishna mentions produce, it is not limited to that case, but extends to any item liable to be spoiled. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: It applies only to an item like produce, which is fit for use on the Festival, but not to items such as bricks, which are designated for building and are not fit for use on the Festival. The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yitzḥak follows his line of reasoning in this regard, as Rabbi Yitzḥak said: A vessel, even if it is of the type that may be handled on Shabbat, may be handled on Shabbat only if it is going to be used for something that may itself be handled on Shabbat, but not for the sake of set-aside [muktze] objects. Since the bricks are muktze, one may not handle cloths to cover the bricks.

תנן: מכסין את הפירות בכלים. פירות — אין, אוירא דלבני — לא! הוא הדין דאפילו אוירא דלבני, ואיידי דתנא רישא משילין פירות — תנא

The Gemara attempts to find a proof for this view: We learned in the mishna: One may cover produce with cloths, which seems to imply: Produce, yes, because it may be handled on the Festival, but muktze items such as a row of bricks, no. The Gemara rejects this argument: This is no proof, as it is possible that the same is true even for a row of bricks, i.e., that they may be covered. But since the tanna taught in the first clause of the mishna: One may lower produce, and there it is referring specifically to produce, as bricks may not be handled at all and surely not lowered from the roof, he taught also in the latter clause: One may cover produce. The example of produce was chosen to parallel the first clause in the mishna, not in order to imply exclusion of bricks.

סיפא נמי מכסין את הפירות.

תנן: וכן כדי יין וכן כדי שמן! הכא במאי עסקינן, בטיבלא.

The Gemara offers a different proof. We learned in the mishna: And similarly one may cover jugs of wine and jugs of oil due to a leak in the ceiling. This choice of examples seems to indicate that one may cover only things that are fit for use on the Festival, as opposed to objects such as bricks, which are muktze. The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? With jugs that contain wine and oil that are untithed, which are not fit for Festival use and are therefore muktze. And the same would be true for bricks.

הכי נמי מסתברא, דאי סלקא דעתך כדי יין וכדי שמן דהתירא, הא תנא ליה רישא פירות?

The Gemara goes further: So, too, it is in fact more reasonable that this is the case, as if it enters your mind that the mishna is referring to jugs of wine and jugs of oil containing permitted liquids, didn’t the tanna already teach in the first clause of this part of the mishna that it is permitted to cover produce? What new information would be added by specifying jugs as well?

כדי יין וכדי שמן אצטריכא ליה, סלקא דעתך אמינא: להפסד מרובה — חששו, להפסד מועט — לא חששו, קא משמע לן.

The Gemara rejects this assertion. It is possible that the mishna is referring specifically to jugs containing permitted liquids. Nevertheless, it was necessary for the tanna to add the example of jugs of wine and jugs of oil, as it could enter your mind to say that the Sages were concerned over a substantial loss, such as of produce, which can be ruined by drops of rain that leak on it. But with regard to a minor loss, such as drops of rain falling into a wine jug or an oil jug, they were not concerned, and they did not permit covering them. The mishna therefore teaches us that those may be covered as well.

תנן: נותנין כלי תחת הדלף בשבת. בדלף הראוי.

The Gemara raises objections against Rabbi Yitzḥak’s view: We learned in the mishna: One may place a vessel beneath a leak on Shabbat. It is permitted, then, to bring a bucket for the purpose of containing the water leaking into the house, although that water is ostensibly not fit for drinking and is therefore muktze. The Gemara rejects this objection: The case in the mishna is of leakage of water that is in fact fit to be drunk, at least by animals, and is consequently fit for Festival use.

תא שמע: פורסין מחצלת על גבי לבנים בשבת! דאייתור מבנינא, דחזי למזגא עלייהו.

Come and hear another objection from a baraita: One may spread a mat over bricks on Shabbat to protect against rain. The baraita explicitly permits covering bricks, which Rabbi Yitzḥak prohibited. The Gemara rejects this argument: This baraita is referring to bricks that were left over from building and are no longer designated for use in building, and which are consequently fit for use on the Festival by sitting on them.

תא שמע: פורסין מחצלת על גבי אבנים בשבת! באבנים מקורזלות, דחזיין לבית הכסא.

Come and hear another objection. It was taught in a baraita: One may spread a mat over stones on Shabbat, although stones are muktze. The Gemara responds: That baraita is speaking not of ordinary stones but of rounded [mekurzalot] stones, which are fit for use in personal hygiene in the lavatory on Shabbat, and are therefore not muktze.

תא שמע: פורסין מחצלת על גבי כורת דבורים בשבת, בחמה — מפני החמה, ובגשמים — מפני הגשמים, ובלבד שלא יתכוין לצוד! התם נמי, דאיכא דבש.

Come and hear an objection from a different source. One may spread a mat over a beehive on Shabbat to protect it from the elements, in the sun due to the sun, and in the rain due to the rain, provided he does not have the intent to trap the bees inside by covering the hive, as trapping is prohibited on Shabbat. A beehive and its bees are not fit for Shabbat use, yet it is permitted to handle a mat in order to cover the hive. The Gemara rejects this: There, too, the reference is to an item that is fit for Shabbat use, as it is discussing a hive when there is honey in it, which can be eaten on Shabbat. It is therefore permitted to handle the mat for the sake of the honey.

אמר ליה רב עוקבא ממישן לרב אשי: התינח בימות החמה, דאיכא דבש. בימות הגשמים, מאי איכא למימר? לא נצרכא אלא לאותן שתי חלות. אותן שתי חלות מוקצות הן!

Rav Ukva from Meishan said to Rav Ashi: This explanation works out well with regard to the summer, when there is honey, but in the rainy season, when there is no honey in beehives, what can be said? The baraita explicitly mentioned the two phrases in the sun and in the rain. The Gemara answers: This halakha is necessary only for those two honeycombs left in the beehive in the winter to sustain the bees. The Gemara questions this: Are those two honeycombs not muktze, as they have clearly been left for the sake of the bees, and not to be used by humans? The Gemara replies: With what case are we dealing here? This is a case when the beekeeper had in mind before the Festival that he was going to take them from the bees and eat them himself.

הכא במאי עסקינן — שחשב עליהם.

אבל לא חשב עליהם מאי — אסור? אדתני ובלבד שלא יתכוין לצוד, לפלוג ולתני בדידה: במה דברים אמורים — שחשב עליהן, אבל לא חשב עליהם — אסור!

The Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation. But if he did not have in mind to take them for himself, what would be the halakha? Wouldn’t it be prohibited to spread a mat over the hive? If so, when the baraita goes on to specify that sometimes it is prohibited to cover the hive, rather than teaching: As long as he does not have the intent to trap the bees, introducing a totally new factor into the discussion, let it make a distinction within the case itself by saying: In what case is this statement said, that the beehive may be covered? When he had in mind beforehand to take the honeycombs; but if he did not have in mind to take them, it is prohibited.

הכי קאמר: אף על פי שחשב עליהן — ובלבד שלא יתכוין לצוד.

The Gemara responds: This is what the tanna is saying: Even if he had in mind to take the honeycombs, so that there is no problem of the hive’s being muktze, it is still permitted to cover it provided he does not have intent to trap the bees.

במאי אוקימתא — כרבי יהודה, דאית ליה מוקצה? אימא סיפא: ובלבד שלא יתכוין לצוד — אתאן לרבי שמעון, דאמר: דבר שאין מתכוין מותר!

The Gemara raises a further objection against this interpretation of the baraita. In what manner did you establish and explain this baraita? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who, in disagreement with Rabbi Shimon, holds that the halakhot of muktze apply. But now say the latter clause of the baraita: Provided he does not have the intent to trap. This indicates that even though the bees may be trapped in the process of covering, it is permitted if this was not his intention. If so, we have come to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who, in disagreement with Rabbi Yehuda, said: An unintentional act is permitted even though it leads inadvertently to a prohibited result. This interpretation of the baraita is internally conflicted, half in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda and half in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

ותסברא דרבי שמעון? והא אביי ורבא דאמרי תרוייהו: מודה רבי שמעון בפסיק רישיה ולא ימות!

The Gemara rejects this argument. And how can you understand that the baraita follows the view of Rabbi Shimon at all? But didn’t Abaye and Rava both say: Rabbi Shimon concedes that even an unintentional act is prohibited in a case of: Cut off its head and will it not die? In this case the person covering the hive with a mat inevitably traps the bees, even if he does not have intent to do so, and this act should be prohibited even by Rabbi Shimon.

לעולם כולה רבי יהודה היא, והכא במאי עסקינן — דאית ביה כוי. ולא תימא לרבי יהודה, ובלבד שלא יתכוין לצוד,

Rather, actually all of the baraita is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, and with what case are we dealing here? With a beehive that has windows, i.e., small openings, besides the main opening on top, so that some of the windows remain uncovered and covering the hive does not inevitably trap the bees. And in the baraita you should not say, according to Rabbi Yehuda: Provided he does not have intent to trap the bees, which would imply that the deciding factor is the intention of the one who covers them,

אלא אימא: ובלבד שלא יעשנה מצודה. פשיטא! מהו דתימא: במינו נצוד — אסור, שלא במינו נצוד — מותר, קא משמע לן.

but rather say the following: Provided he does not make it a trap as he covers it, i.e., as long as he takes care not to cover all the openings. The Gemara questions this: But it is obvious that it is prohibited to directly trap bees on Shabbat; why would the baraita mention it? The Gemara responds: It does inform us of something that is not obvious: Lest you say: An animal whose type is generally trapped and hunted by people for some purpose is prohibited to be trapped on Shabbat, whereas an animal whose type is not generally trapped, such as a bee, is permitted to be trapped even ab initio, as this is not considered to be the normal manner of hunting. The baraita therefore teaches us that one may not in fact trap bees.

רב אשי אמר: מי קתני בימות החמה ובימות הגשמים? בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים קתני — ביומי ניסן וביומי תשרי, דאיכא חמה, ואיכא גשמים, ואיכא דבש.

Rav Ashi said a different elucidation: Is it taught in the baraita: In the summer, and: In the rainy season? No, it is taught: In the sun due to the sun and in the rain due to the rain. The baraita speaks not of the summer and the rainy season, but of the spring days of Nisan and the autumn days of Tishrei, when there is sometimes sun and there is sometimes rain, and when there is also honey in the hive. It is possible, then, that the baraita permits covering the hive during these seasons because of the honey that is in it, as initially proposed.

ונותנין כלי תחת הדלף בשבת. תנא: אם נתמלא הכלי — שופך ושונה, ואינו נמנע.

§ It was taught in the mishna: And one may place a vessel beneath a leak in order to catch the water on Shabbat. A Sage taught in a baraita: If the vessel became full with the leaking water, he may pour out its contents, place the vessel back under the leak, and repeat the entire process if necessary, and he need not refrain from doing so.

בי רחיא דאביי דלוף. אתא לקמיה דרבה, אמר ליה: זיל עייליה לפוריך להתם, דלהוי כגרף של רעי, ואפקיה.

The Gemara relates: Abaye’s millhouse once developed a leak on Shabbat. Abaye was concerned about the potential damage to the millstones, which were made partly of clay and which would become ruined from the leaking water, and he did not have enough buckets to catch all the water without emptying and refilling them. But the water was unfit for drinking and was therefore muktze and could not be removed. Abaye came before Rabba to ask him how to proceed. Rabba said to him: Go and bring your bed into the millhouse, so that the dirty water will be considered like a container of excrement, which, despite being muktze, may be removed from one’s presence due to its repulsive nature, and then remove the water.

יתיב אביי וקא קשיא ליה: וכי עושין גרף של רעי לכתחלה? אדהכי נפל בי רחיא דאביי. אמר: תיתי לי דעברי אדמר.

Abaye sat and examined the matter and posed a difficulty: And may one initiate a situation of a container of excrement, i.e., may one intentionally place any repulsive matter into a situation which will bother him and will then have to be removed, ab initio? In the meantime, as he was deliberating the issue, Abaye’s millhouse collapsed. He said: I had this coming to me for having gone against the words of my master, Rabba, by not following his ruling unquestioningly.

אמר שמואל: גרף של רעי ועביט של מימי רגלים — מותר להוציאן לאשפה, וכשהוא מחזירו — נותן בו מים ומחזירו.

Shmuel said: With regard to a container of excrement and a container of urine, it is permitted to remove them on Shabbat to a garbage heap. And when he returns the container to the house he must place water in it first and then return it, for it is prohibited to carry these containers alone, as their foul odor makes them muktze due to their repulsive nature.

סבור מינה: גרף של רעי, אגב מנא — אין, בפני עצמו — לא. תא שמע: דההוא עכברתא דאשתכח בי אספרמקי דרב אשי. אמר להו רב אשי:

Some Sages at first understood from the wording of Shmuel’s statement that with regard to removing a container of excrement on account of the vessel, i.e., along with its vessel: Yes, this is permitted; but to remove the excrement by itself, without a vessel containing it: No, this is prohibited. The Gemara counters this conclusion with the following story: Come and hear that a certain dead mouse was discovered in Rav Ashi’s storeroom for spices [isparmekei]. Rav Ashi said to them: Take hold of it by its tail and remove it. This shows that repulsive matter may be removed even directly.

נקטה בצוציתה ואפקוה.

מתני׳ כל שחייבין עליו משום שבות, משום רשות, משום מצוה, בשבת — חייבין עליו ביום טוב.

MISHNA: Any act for which one is liable due to a rabbinic decree made to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest [shevut]; or if it is notable because it is optional, i.e., it involves an aspect of a mitzva but is not a complete mitzva; or if it is notable because it is a full-fledged mitzva, if it is prohibited on Shabbat, one is liable for it on a Festival as well.

ואלו הן משום שבות: לא עולין באילן, ולא רוכבין על גבי בהמה, ולא שטין על פני המים, ולא מטפחין ולא מספקין ולא מרקדין.

And these are the acts prohibited by the Sages as shevut: One may not climb a tree on Shabbat, nor ride on an animal, nor swim in the water, nor clap his hands together, nor clap his hand on the thigh, nor dance.

ואלו הן משום רשות: לא דנין, ולא מקדשין, ולא חולצין, ולא מיבמין.

And the following are acts that are prohibited on Shabbat and are notable because they are optional, i.e., which involve an aspect of a mitzva but are not complete mitzvot: One may not judge, nor betroth a woman, nor perform ḥalitza, which is done in lieu of levirate marriage, nor perform levirate marriage.

ואלו הן משום מצוה: לא מקדישין, ולא מעריכין, ולא מחרימין, ולא מגביהין תרומה ומעשר.

And the following are prohibited on Shabbat despite the fact that they are notable because of the full-fledged mitzva involved in them: One may not consecrate, nor take a valuation vow (see Leviticus 27), nor consecrate objects for use by the priests or the Temple, nor separate teruma and tithes from produce.

כל אלו ביום טוב אמרו, קל וחומר בשבת. אין בין יום טוב לשבת אלא אוכל נפש בלבד.

The Sages spoke of all these acts being prohibited even with regard to a Festival; all the more so are they prohibited on Shabbat. The general principle is: There is no difference between a Festival and Shabbat, except for work involving preparation of food alone, which is permitted on a Festival but prohibited on Shabbat.

גמ׳ לא עולין באילן — גזרה שמא יתלוש.

GEMARA: The Gemara clarifies the reasons for each of these halakhot: One may not climb a tree. This is a decree that was made lest one detach branches or leaves as he climbs, thereby transgressing the prohibited labor of reaping.

ולא רוכבין על גבי בהמה — גזרה שמא יצא חוץ לתחום. שמע מינה תחומין דאורייתא! אלא: גזרה שמא יחתוך זמורה.

Nor ride on an animal: This is a decree that was made lest one go beyond the Shabbat limit on the animal. The Gemara asks: Can one then learn from here that the prohibition against venturing beyond the Shabbat limits, which applies also to Festivals, is by Torah law? If the prohibition with regard to the Shabbat limit were rabbinic, the Sages would not have reinforced it with the additional decree against riding an animal. It is known that this is a matter of dispute; in light of this explanation of the mishna it would be a proof that Shabbat boundaries are of Torah origin. Rather, give a different reason for the prohibition: It is a decree that was made lest one cut off a branch to use as a riding switch, and thereby perform the labor of reaping, which is prohibited by Torah law.

ולא שטין על פני המים — גזרה שמא יעשה חבית של שייטין.

Nor swim in the water: This is a decree that was made lest one make a swimmer’s barrel, i.e., an improvised flotation device used to teach beginners how to swim.

ולא מטפחין ולא מספקין ולא מרקדין — גזרה שמא יתקן כלי שיר.

Nor clap one’s hands together, nor clap his hand on the thigh, nor dance: All of these are prohibited due to a decree that was made lest one fashion a musical instrument to accompany his clapping or dancing.

ואלו הן משום רשות: לא דנין. והא מצוה קעביד! לא צריכא, דאיכא דעדיף מיניה.

§ It was taught in the mishna: And the following are acts that are prohibited on Shabbat and are notable because they are optional, i.e., which involve an aspect of a mitzva but are not complete mitzvot: One may not judge. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t one perform a full-fledged mitzva by acting as a judge in a court? Why is it categorized as optional rather than as a full-fledged mitzva? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the mishna to categorize it as optional, as it is speaking of a case where there is another person who is more qualified than he. Since the other person can judge even better, it is not considered an absolute mitzva for the first one to judge.

ולא מקדשין. והא מצוה קעביד! לא צריכא,

§ Nor betroth a woman: The Gemara asks: Why is this categorized as optional, indicating that it is not a full-fledged mitzva? But doesn’t one perform a full-fledged mitzva when he marries, as this enables him to fulfill the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the mishna to categorize it as optional,