בבא מציעא דף פא

הא ״גמרתיו״ – שומר שכר. לא, הא ״הבא מעות וטול את שלך״ – שומר שכר.

This indicates that if the skilled laborer said only: I completed the work with it, he is considered a paid bailee, i.e., even after he completes the work the item remains within his responsibility. The Gemara rejects this line of reasoning: No, this is not what should be deduced from the mishna. Rather, the correct deduction is that one who says: Give money first and then take what is yours, is a paid bailee.

אבל ״גמרתיו״ מאי שומר חנם? אי הכי, אדתני ״וכולן שאמרו טול את שלך והבא מעות – שומר חנם״, נשמעינן ״גמרתיו״, וכל שכן ״טול את שלך״!

The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, when one says only: I completed the work with it, what is the halakha? Is he considered an unpaid bailee? If so, rather than teaching a new halakha in the mishna: And all those who say: Take what is yours and bring money, each of them is considered an unpaid bailee, let it teach us instead the halakha of one who says: I completed the work with it, and it can be deduced that all the more so is this the halakha if he says to him: Take what is yours.

״טול את שלך״ אצטריכא ליה. סלקא דעתך אמינא: שומר חנם נמי לא הוי, קא משמע לן.

The Gemara rejects this line of reasoning: The case of take what is yours must be taught explicitly. Otherwise, it might enter your mind to say that once he issues this statement, he is not considered even an unpaid bailee and retains no responsibility whatsoever for the item. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that even in this case he is still considered an unpaid bailee and continues to bear certain responsibilities.

איכא דאמרי, אמר רב נחמן בר פפא: אף אנן נמי תנינא, וכולן שאמרו ״טול את שלך והבא מעות״ – שומר חנם, מאי לאו הוא הדין ״גמרתיו״. לא,

There are those who say that there is a different version of this discussion. Rather than challenging that Rav Ḥisda’s opinion is opposed by the ruling of the mishna, Rav Naḥman bar Pappa said: We, too, learn a proof for Rav Ḥisda’s statement from the mishna: And all those who say: Take what is yours and bring money, each of them is considered an unpaid bailee. What, is it not correct to say that the same is true when he says: I have completed the work with it? The Gemara rejects this claim. No, the case of one who says take what is yours is different, as stated above, as one might think that this statement frees the laborer of all responsibility.

״טול את שלך״ שאני.

הונא מר בר מרימר קמיה דרבינא רמי מתניתין אהדדי ומשני. תנן: וכולן שאמרו ״טול את שלך והבא מעות״ – שומר חנם. והוא הדין ל״גמרתיו״. ורמינהו:

The Gemara cites a third version of this discussion. Huna Mar bar Mareimar raised a contradiction between the mishnayot before Ravina and resolved it himself. We learned in the mishna: And all those who say: Take what is yours and bring money, each of them is considered an unpaid bailee. And apparently the same is true for one who said: I completed the work with it. And Huna Mar bar Mareimar raises a contradiction from the aforementioned mishna: If the borrower said to the lender: Send the animal to me, and he sent it to him and it died on the way, the borrower is liable, and similarly when he returns it. And he resolves this contradiction in accordance with that which Rafram bar Pappa said that Rav Ḥisda said: They taught this halakha only when he returned it during the period of its loan. But if he returned it after the period of its loan, he is exempt.

אמר לו שואל ״שלח״, ושלחה ומתה – חייב. וכן בשעה שמחזירה. ומשני, אמר רפרם בר פפא אמר רב חסדא: לא שנו אלא שהחזיר בתוך ימי שאילתה,

אבל לאחר ימי שאילתה, פטור.

איבעיא להו: פטור משואל וחייב כשומר שכר, או דלמא שומר שכר נמי לא הוי? אמר אמימר: מסתברא פטור משואל וחייב כשומר שכר, הואיל ונהנה מהנה הוה.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When Rav Ḥisda said that a borrower who returned the item after the period of the loan is exempt, is he exempt only from the strict obligations of a borrower, but he remains liable as a paid bailee, or perhaps he is also not liable as a paid bailee? Ameimar said: It stands to reason that he is exempt as a borrower but is still liable as a paid bailee. Ameimar’s reasoning is that since he previously had benefit, he must provide benefit in return, by safeguarding the item as a paid bailee until the item reaches the owner’s possession.

תניא כוותיה דאמימר: הלוקח כלים מבית האומן לשגרן לבית חמיו, ואמר לו: אם מקבלין אותן ממני – אני נותן לך דמיהן, ואם לאו – אני נותן לך לפי

It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Batra 6:5) in accordance with the opinion of Ameimar: With regard to one who takes vessels from an artisan’s house to send them as a gift to his father-in-law’s house, and he said to the artisan: If they accept them from me as a gift I will give you the money for them, and if not, i.e., if they return the gift, I will give you money in accordance with the financial advantage I received from them, i.e., I will pay you the benefit that I accrued through their knowledge that I tried to send them a gift; and an accident happened to the vessels and they were broken, if this incident occurred on their way to the recipient the customer is liable.

טובת הנאה שבהן, ונאנסו בהליכה – חייב,

בחזירה – פטור, מפני שהוא כנושא שכר.

If they broke on the way back he is exempt, because he is like a paid bailee, who is not liable for accidents. If this individual, who pays for the financial advantage he received, is considered a paid bailee, all the more so should this apply to a borrower who returned the item after the period of the loan, in accordance with the opinion of Ameimar, as he did not offer to pay anything.

ההוא גברא דזבין ליה חמרא לחבריה, אמר ליה: קא ממטינא ליה לדוכתא פלוני, אי מזדבנא – מוטב, ואי לא – מהדרנא ליה נהליך. אזל ולא אזדבנא,

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who sold a donkey to another. The buyer said to him: I will bring it to such and such a place; if it is sold, well and good; and if not, I will return it to you. He went and it was not sold, and on his way back the donkey was injured in an accident. The case came before Rav Naḥman, who deemed the buyer liable to pay.

ובהדי דקא אתא אתניס. אתא לקמיה דרב נחמן, חייביה.

איתיביה רבה לרב נחמן: נאנסו, בהליכה – חייב, ובחזרה – פטור, מפני שהוא כנושא שכר!

Rabba raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from the baraita: If an accident happened to the vessels on their way to the recipient, the customer is liable; if they broke on the way back he is exempt, because he is like a paid bailee. If so, why did you deem this buyer liable, when the accident occurred on his return?

אמר ליה: חזרה דהאי – הליכה היא. מאי טעמא? סברה הוא: בחזירתו, אילו אשכח לזבוניה מי לא זבנה?

Rav Naḥman said to Rabba that there is a difference between the cases, as the way back of this one is considered like the way to the recipient. What is the reason for this? It is based on logical reasoning: Even on his way back, if he found an opportunity to sell the donkey, wouldn’t he have sold it? Therefore, as he was in possession of the animal the entire time, the halakha treats his going and returning equally, and he retains the responsibility of a borrower until he actually returns the animal to its owner.

״שמור לי ואשמור לך״ – שומר שכר. ואמאי? שמירה בבעלים היא! אמר רב פפא: דאמר ליה ״שמור לי היום ואשמור לך למחר״.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to one who says to another: Safeguard my property for me and I will safeguard your property for you, each of them is a paid bailee. The Gemara asks: But why is this the halakha? It is a case of safeguarding with the owners. There is a principle that a bailee is exempt from paying for the damage if the owner of the item is present with the bailee or in his employ when he is safeguarding the item. Rav Pappa said: The mishna means that he said to him: Safeguard my property for me today and I will safeguard your property for you tomorrow. At the time of his safeguarding, the owner was not in the bailee’s employ.

תנו רבנן: ״שמור לי ואשמור לך״, ״השאילני ואשאילך״, ״שמור לי ואשאילך״, ״השאילני ואשמור לך״ – כולן נעשו שומרי שכר זה לזה. ואמאי, שמירה בבעלים היא!

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:10): If one said: Safeguard my property for me and I will safeguard your property for you, or: Lend money to me and I will lend money to you, or: Safeguard my property for me and I will lend money to you, or: Lend money to me and I will safeguard your property for you, they all become paid bailees for each other. The Gemara asks: Why are they liable as paid bailees? Is this not a situation of safeguarding with the owners? Rav Pappa again said: This is referring to a case where he said to him: Safeguard my property for me today and I will safeguard your property for you tomorrow.

אמר רב פפא: דאמר ליה, ״שמור לי היום ואשמור לך למחר״.

הנהו אהלויי דכל יומא הוה אפי לה[ו] חד מינייהו. ההוא יומא אמרו ליה לחד מינייהו: זיל אפי לן. אמר להו: נטרו לי גלימאי.

The Gemara relates: There were certain ice plant dealers [ahaluyei], and every day one of them would have a turn to bake for the group. One day the others said to one of them: Go and bake for us. He said to them: Safeguard my cloak for me. Before he came back they were negligent with it and it was stolen. They came for judgment before Rav Pappa, and he deemed them liable to pay for the cloak.

אדאתא פשעו בה (ואגנוב) [ואגניב] אתו. לקמיה דרב פפא, חייבינהו.

אמרו ליה רבנן לרב פפא: אמאי? פשיעה בבעלים היא! אכסיף. לסוף איגלאי מילתא דההוא שעתא שכרא הוה קא שתי.

The Rabbis said to Rav Pappa: Why did you deem them liable to pay? This is akin to a case of negligence by a bailee while he is with the owners, as the owner of the cloak was baking for them at the time the cloak was stolen due to their negligence. Rav Pappa was embarrassed over his apparent mistake. Ultimately, it was discovered that at that time, when the cloak was stolen, the cloak owner was drinking beer and not baking. Since he was not doing work for them, this was not a case of safeguarding with the owner, and therefore Rav Pappa’s ruling was vindicated.

הניחא למאן דאמר פשיעה בבעלים פטור – משום הכי אכסיף, אלא למאן דאמר חייב – אמאי אכסיף? אלא ההוא יומא לאו דידיה הוה, ואמרו ליה לדידיה:

The Gemara comments: This works out well according to the one who says that in a case of negligence by a bailee while he is with the owners he is exempt; due to that reason Rav Pappa was embarrassed. But according to the one who says that in a case of negligence he is liable even while he is with the owners, why was Rav Pappa embarrassed? Rather, this is what actually happened: That day was not his turn to bake, and they said to him: You go and bake for us, and he said to them: As payment for baking for you when it is not my turn, safeguard my cloak. In other words, they were paid bailees.

זיל אפי לן את, ואמר להו: בההוא אגרא דקא אפינא לכו נטורו גלימאי.

עד דאתא – אגניב. אתו לקמיה דרב פפא חייבינהו. אמרו ליה רבנן לרב פפא: הא שמירה בבעלים היא! אכסיף. לסוף איגלאי מילתא דההיא שעתא שכרא הוה שתי.

Before he came back it was stolen. They came before Rav Pappa, who deemed them liable to pay. The Sages said to Rav Pappa: This is a case of safeguarding with the owners. Rav Pappa was embarrassed. Ultimately it was discovered that at that time the cloak owner was drinking beer and not baking, and therefore this was not a case of safeguarding with the owners.

הנהו בי תרי דהוו קא מסגו באורחא, חד אריך וחד גוצא. אריכא רכיב חמרא והוה ליה סדינא, גוצא מיכסי סרבלא וקא מסגי בכרעיה. כי מטו לנהרא,

The Gemara relates: An incident occurred with these two people who were going on the way, one of whom was tall and one of whom was short. The tall one was riding on a donkey and he had a sheet. The short one was covered with a woolen cloak [sarbela] and was walking on foot. When the short one reached a river, he took his cloak and placed it on the donkey in order to keep the cloak dry, and he took that tall man’s sheet and covered himself with it, and the water washed away his sheet.

שקליה לסרבליה ואותביה עילוי חמרא, ושקליה לסדיניה דההוא ואיכסי ביה. שטפוה מיא לסדיניה.

אתא לקמיה דרבא, חייביה. אמרו ליה רבנן לרבא: אמאי? שאלה בבעלים היא! אכסיף. לסוף איגלאי מילתא דבלא דעתיה שקליה, ובלא דעתיה אותביה.

The tall man came for judgment before Rava, who deemed the short man liable to pay for the sheet. The Rabbis said to Rava: Why did you deem him liable to pay? This is a case of borrowing with the owners present. Rava was embarrassed. Ultimately, it was discovered that the short man took the sheet without the tall man’s knowledge and placed it back without his knowledge, and therefore this was not borrowing, but theft.

ההוא גברא דאוגר ליה חמרא לחבריה, אמר ליה: חזי, לא תיזול באורחא דנהר פקוד דאיכא מיא, זיל באורחא דנרש דליכא מיא.

The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who rented a donkey to another. The owner said to the renter: Look, do not go on the path of Nehar Pekod, where there is water and the donkey is likely to drown. Instead, go on the path of Neresh, where there is no water. The renter went on the path of Nehar Pekod and the donkey died. When he came back, he said: Yes, I went on the path of Nehar Pekod; but there was no water there, and therefore the donkey’s death was caused by other factors.

אזיל באורחא דנהר פקוד ומית חמרא. כי אתא, אמר: אין, באורחא דנהר פקוד אזלי, ומיהו ליכא מיא.

אמר ליה רבא: מה ליה לשקר, אי בעי אמר ליה: אנא באורחא דנרש אזלי. אמר ליה אביי: ״מה לי לשקר״ במקום עדים – לא אמרינן.

Rava said: The renter’s claim is accepted, due to the reasoning of: Why should he lie? In other words, if this man wanted to lie, he could have told the donkey’s owner: I went on the path of Neresh, as the owner instructed. Abaye said to Rava: We do not say the principle of: Why would I lie, in a place where there are witnesses. Since witnesses can be summoned to establish conclusively whether there was water along the path of Nehar Pekod, the reasoning that the renter could have stated a different claim is not employed.

״שמור לי״, ואמר לו ״הנח לפני״ – שומר חנם. אמר רב הונא: אמר לו הנח לפניך – אינו לא

§ The mishna teaches that if one says to another: Safeguard my property for me, and the other says to him: Place it before me, the second individual is an unpaid bailee. Rav Huna said: If the second individual said to him: Place it down before yourself, he is neither an unpaid bailee nor a paid bailee, and he has no responsibility at all. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If he said simply: Place it down, without specifying further, what is the halakha? The Gemara attempts to provide an answer from the mishna. Come and hear: If one says to another: Safeguard my property for me, and the other says to him: Place it before me, the second individual is an unpaid bailee. This indicates that an unspecified statement is nothing.

שומר חנם ולא שומר שכר. איבעיא להו: הנח סתמא, מאי? תא שמע: שמור לי ואמר לו הנח לפני – שומר חנם. הא סתמא – ולא כלום.

אדרבה, מדאמר רב הונא: ״הנח לפניך״ – הוא דאינו לא שומר חנם ולא שומר שכר, הא סתמא שומר חנם הוי! אלא מהא ליכא למשמע מינה.

The Gemara rejects this inference: On the contrary, one can infer the opposite from that which Rav Huna says: If the second individual said to him: Place it down in front of yourself, it is in this case that he is neither an unpaid bailee nor a paid bailee. This indicates that if he said simply: Place it down, without specifying further, he is an unpaid bailee. Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna, as the inferences are contradictory concerning this halakha.

לימא כתנאי: אם הכניס ברשות בעל חצר – חייב. רבי אומר: בכולם אינו חייב עד שיקבל עליו בעל הבית לשמור.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this matter is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a mishna (Bava Kamma 47b): If one brought his items into the courtyard of another with the permission of the owner of the courtyard and they were damaged there, the owner of the courtyard is liable. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: In all cases he is liable only if the owner of the courtyard explicitly accepts upon himself to safeguard the items. That mishna is apparently referring to one who places his items in a yard without specification, and the tanna’im disagreed on the question of liability; it therefore has a parallel application to the case in this mishna.

ממאי? דלמא עד כאן לא קאמרי רבנן התם אלא בחצר דבת נטורי היא, וכי קאמר ליה ״עייל״ – ״עייל דאינטר לך״ קאמר ליה. אבל הכא,

The Gemara refutes this claim. From where do you know that these cases are parallel? Perhaps the Rabbis there say their opinion only in a courtyard, which can be safeguarded, and therefore when the owner of the courtyard allowed the other to bring his items into the courtyard and said to him: Place them in, what he was saying to him was: Place them in so that I can safeguard it for you. But here, in a market, which is a place where goods cannot be safeguarded, he was actually saying to him: Place it down and sit and safeguard it yourself.

שוקא לאו בר נטורי הוא, ״אנח ותיב נטר לך״ קאמר ליה.

אי נמי: עד כאן לא קאמר רבי התם אלא בחצירו, דלעיולי רשותא קא בעי למשקל מיניה וכי יהיב ליה רשותא לעיולי – ״תיב ונטר לך״ קאמר ליה.

Alternatively, one can say the opposite: Perhaps Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says his ruling, that the owner of the courtyard is not liable, only there, in his courtyard, as he requires permission from the owner of the courtyard to enter, and when the owner of the courtyard gave him permission to enter, all he said to him was: Sit and safeguard it. But here, in the market, when he said to the owner of the item: Place it down, he was saying to him: Place it down and I will safeguard it for you. As if it enters your mind that he was saying to him: Place it down and sit and safeguard it yourself, does the owner of the item really require permission from him to put an item down in a public place? In light of these suggestions, there is not necessarily a connection between the two mishnayot.

אבל הכא – ״הנח ואנא מנטרנא״ קאמר ליה. דאי סלקא דעתך ״הנח ותיב ונטר״ קאמר ליה, אי לאותבה, רשותא בעי למשקל מיניה?

הלוהו על המשכון – שומר שכר. לימא מתניתין דלא כרבי אליעזר? דתניא: המלוה את חבירו על המשכון ואבד המשכון – ישבע ויטול מעותיו, דברי רבי אליעזר.

§ The mishna teaches: One who lent to another based on collateral is a paid bailee for the collateral. The Gemara comments: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who lends to another based on collateral and the collateral was lost, the lender takes an oath that he was not negligent in his safeguarding, and then he may take his money that he lent him. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, who apparently maintains that the lender took the collateral as proof of the loan, and therefore he is considered an unpaid bailee, who is liable for negligence unless he takes an oath.

רבי עקיבא אומר: יכול לומר לו: כלום הלויתני אלא על המשכון? אבד המשכון – אבדו מעותיך. אבל הלוהו אלף זוז בשטר והניח לו משכון עליהם, דברי הכל:

The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva says that the borrower can say to him: Didn’t you lend to me only based on the collateral? If the collateral is lost, your money is lost. In other words, the collateral was taken as security for the debt. But if he lent him one thousand dinars by means of a promissory note and the borrower left him collateral against the money, everyone agrees that if the collateral is lost, his money is lost. In this case it cannot be claimed that the collateral was held as proof of the debt, as there is a document attesting to the debt. Consequently, it was evidently taken as security corresponding to the loan, which means that if the collateral is lost, the lender loses his money.

אבד המשכון – אבדו מעותיו.

אפילו תימא רבי אליעזר, ולא קשיא: כאן – שמשכנו בשעת הלואתו, כאן – שמשכנו שלא בשעת הלואתו.

The Gemara refutes this suggestion: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, it is not difficult. Here, the baraita is referring to a case where the lender took his collateral at the time of his loan, and therefore the collateral served as proof of the loan, whereas there, the mishna is referring to a case where the lender took his collateral later, not at the time of his loan, to enhance his ability to collect payment. In this latter case, the collateral is clearly security for the money, and therefore he is considered a paid bailee.

והא אידי ואידי,

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But don’t both this and that, the mishna and the baraita,