בבא מציעא דף יח

מאי ״גובה את הכל״? מנה ומאתים הוא דאית לה.

then what is meant by the wording: She collects all that she is entitled to? What she has is only the main sum of the marriage contract of one hundred or two hundred dinars that she can collect. Clearly, the mishna is referring to a case where the husband wrote a marriage contract, and it does not indicate that a betrothed widow receives payment of her marriage contract.

ואלא, מדתני רב חייא בר אמי: אשתו ארוסה, לא אונן ולא מטמא לה, וכן היא לא אוננת ולא מטמאה לו. מתה – אינו יורשה,

And if one would say that the marriage contract of a betrothed woman is instead derived from that which Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami teaches, that is also difficult. He teaches: One does not enter acute mourning on the day of the death of his betrothed wife, nor may he become ritually impure at her funeral if she dies, if he is a priest; and similarly, she does not enter acute mourning for him if he dies, and she may not become ritually impure at his funeral. If she dies, he does not inherit her property. If he dies, she collects payment of her marriage contract.

מת הוא – גובה כתובתה.

דלמא דכתב לה, וכי תימא: דכתב לה, מאי למימרא? מתה אינו יורשה איצטריכא ליה.

If it is derived from here that a betrothed woman receives payment of a marriage contract, this is not proof, as perhaps this too is referring to a case where he wrote a marriage contract for her. And if you would say that if it is referring to a case where he wrote her a marriage contract, what is the purpose of stating this? One could answer that while this clause is obvious, it was necessary for Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami to state that conversely, if she dies, he does not inherit her property.

אלא אביי מגופה דמתניתין קא הדר ביה, דאי סלקא דעתך במקום שאין כותבין כתובה עסקינן, דגט היינו כתובתה, אטו גט מנה מאתים כתיב ביה?

Rather, Abaye retracted his objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s proof from the mishna, not because of the case of a widow from betrothal, but due to an indication from within the mishna itself. Because if it enters your mind that we are dealing with a place where they do not write a marriage contract, where a woman’s bill of divorce is effectively her marriage contract, and therefore she can use her bill of divorce to collect payment of her marriage contract, that does not make sense; is it written in a bill of divorce that the husband is liable to pay the wife the one hundred or two hundred dinars she is owed? In fact, this is not written in a bill of divorce.

וכי תימא: כיון דתקינו רבנן למגבא (לה) [ביה] כמאן דכתיב ביה דמי, לטעון ולימא פרעתי.

And even if you would say that since the Sages instituted that she use the bill of divorce to collect her marriage contract, it is considered as though the liability of the husband to pay one hundred or two hundred dinars is written in it, and it would still be problematic to say that the bill of divorce is sufficient for her to collect payment. The husband should still be able to claim that he is exempt, and say: I already paid it.

וכי תימא דאמרינן ליה: אי פרעתה איבעי לך למיקרעיה, אמר לן: לא שבקתן, אמרה: בעינא לאנסובי ביה.

And if you would say that if the husband would state such a claim, we would say to him: If, in fact, you paid her, you should have torn up the bill of divorce, and he could respond and say to us: She did not allow me to tear it up, because she said: I need the bill of divorce to remarry, by using it as proof that I am divorced.

וכי תימא אמרינן ליה: איבעי לך למיקרעיה ומכתב אגביה, גיטא דנן דקרענוהו לא משום דגיטא פסולה הוא, אלא כי היכי דלא תגבי ביה זמנא אחריתי. אטו כל דמגבי,

And if you would say that we would then say to him: You should have torn up the bill of divorce and written on the back of it: The reason that we tore up this bill of divorce is not because it is an invalid bill of divorce, but rather it is in order that the woman not collect payment of her marriage contract again with it, this suggestion is not always applicable. Does everyone who collects payment of a marriage contract collect payment in court, where it is possible to write such a legal statement? Therefore, the suggestion that a bill of divorce serves as a marriage contract remains untenable. This leads to the conclusion that the basis for collecting payment of a marriage contract where such a document does not exist must be a court enactment, in accordance with the interpretation of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

בבי דינא מגבי?

מתני׳ מצא גיטי נשים ושחרורי עבדים, דייתיקי, מתנה, ושוברין – הרי זה לא יחזיר. שאני אומר: כתובין היו, ונמלך עליהן שלא לתנן.

MISHNA: If one found bills of divorce, or bills of manumission of slaves, or wills, or deeds of a gift, or receipts, he may not return these items to the one who is presumed to have lost them, as I say it is possible that they were written and then the writer reconsidered about them and decided not to deliver them.

גמ׳ טעמא דנמלך שלא לתנן, הא אמר: ״תנו״ – נותנין, ואפילו לזמן מרובה.

GEMARA: It can be inferred from the mishna that the only reason that these documents are not returned is that there is a concern that the person obligated by the document reconsidered with regard to them and decided not to deliver them. But if the writer says: Give this found document to the intended recipient, the finder must give it to him. And since the mishna places no limitation on this, presumably this is the halakha even if a long time passed since it was lost, and there is no concern that perhaps the document belongs to someone else with the same name.

ורמינהו: המביא גט, ואבד הימנו – מצאו לאלתר כשר, אם לאו – פסול.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Gittin 27a): With regard to an agent who was bringing a bill of divorce to a woman, and it was lost by him, if he found it immediately, the bill of divorce is still valid. If not, then it is not valid, as it is possible that the bill of divorce that he found is not the same one that he lost, and this second bill of divorce belongs to someone else whose name and wife’s name are identical to the names of the husband and wife in the lost bill of divorce.

אמר רבה, לא קשיא: כאן – במקום שהשיירות מצויות, כאן – במקום שאין השיירות מצויות.

Rabba says: This is not difficult, because there, in tractate Gittin, the mishna is stated with regard to a place where caravans passing through are common, and there is a concern that the found bill of divorce belongs to someone else with the identical name. By contrast, the mishna here is stated with regard to a place where caravans passing through are uncommon, so there is no such concern.

ואפילו במקום שהשיירות מצויות – והוא שהוחזקו שני יוסף בן שמעון בעיר אחת.

The Gemara adds: And even in a place where caravans passing through are common, there is not always a concern that the bill of divorce may belong to another man with an identical name, and this concern is only where it has been established that there are two men named, for example, Yosef ben Shimon in that one city.

דאי לא תימא הכי, קשיא דרבה אדרבה. דההוא גיטא דאשתכח בי דינא דרב הונא, דהוה כתוב ביה בשוירי מתא דעל רכיס נהרא. אמר רב הונא:

As, if you do not say so, that this concern is taken into account only in a place where it is known that there are two people with this same name, then there is a difficulty presented in the form of a contradiction between this statement of Rabba and another statement of Rabba. As there was a certain bill of divorce that was found in the court of Rav Huna, in which it was written that the bill of divorce was written in Sheviri City, which is located on the Rakhis River. Rav Huna said about this:

חיישינן לשני שוירי, ואמר ליה רב חסדא לרבה: פוק עיין בה, דלאורתא בעי מינך רב הונא. נפק, דק ואשכח. דתנן: כל מעשה בית דין – הרי זה יחזיר.

We are concerned about the possibility that there are two cities named Sheviri and that this bill of divorce may belong to someone else who lives in the other Sheviri, and therefore it should not be returned. And Rav Ḥisda said to Rabba about this issue: Go out and examine this halakha, as in the evening Rav Huna will ask you about it. He went out, examined it, and discovered a relevant source, as we learned in a mishna (20a): One must return any court enactment, i.e., a promissory note that has been authenticated by the court, to its owner. Since the bill of divorce was found in the court, it is in this category and must be returned.

והא בי דינא דרב הונא, דכי מקום שהשיירות מצויות דמי, וקא פשיט רבה דיחזיר, אלמא אי הוחזקו שני יוסף בן שמעון – אין, אי לא – לא.

The Gemara concludes its proof that even in a place where passing caravans are common, the concern that the bill of divorce belongs to another couple applies only if it is known that there is another couple in the same locale with the same names as those written in the bill of divorce: And the court of Rav Huna is comparable to a place where passing caravans are common, as many people from different places pass through for judgment. And yet, Rabba resolved that if one finds a bill of divorce there, he should return it. Evidently he holds that if it is established that there are two people named Yosef ben Shimon in the city, then there is indeed a concern and the document should not be returned, but if not, there is no concern.

עבד רבה עובדא בההוא גיטא דאשתכח בי כיתנא דפומבדיתא כשמעתיה.

The Gemara relates that Rabba performed an action, i.e., issued a practical ruling, with regard to a certain bill of divorce that was found in a flax house in the city of Pumbedita, in accordance with his halakha, and he instructed that the bill of divorce should be returned.

איכא דאמרי: היכא דמזבני כיתנא והוא שלא הוחזקו, אף על גב דשכיחן שיירתא.

There is disagreement as to the exact details of the case. There are those who say that this occurred in the place where people sell flax, and it is specifically because it was not established that two couples with the same names lived in the city where the bill of divorce was written that Rabba ruled that the bill of divorce should be returned despite the fact that passing caravans are common there.

ואיכא דאמרי: היכא דתרו כיתנא ואף על גב דהוחזקו, דלא (שכיחא שיירות).

And there are those who say that it occurred in the place where people soak flax, and he ruled that the bill of divorce should be returned even though it was established that there were two couples with the same names living in the city where the bill of divorce was written, as passing caravans are uncommon there.

רבי זירא רמי מתניתין אברייתא ומשני. תנן: המביא גט ואבד הימנו, מצאו לאלתר – כשר, ואם לאו – פסול. ורמינהי: מצא גט אשה בשוק,

Similarly, Rabbi Zeira raises a contradiction between the mishna and a baraita, and he resolves the contradiction employing the same distinction. We learned in the mishna: With regard to an agent who was bringing a bill of divorce to a woman and he lost it, if he found it immediately, the bill of divorce is still valid, but if not, it is not valid. And Rabbi Zeira raises a contradiction between this mishna and a baraita that states: If one found a woman’s bill of divorce in the marketplace, in a case when the husband admits that he wrote and gave it to the wife, the finder must return it to the wife; but if the husband does not admit to this, he may return it neither to this one, the husband, nor to that one, the wife.

בזמן שהבעל מודה – יחזיר לאשה. אין הבעל מודה – לא יחזיר לא לזה ולא לזה.

קתני מיהת בזמן שהבעל מודה – יחזיר לאשה, ואפילו לזמן מרובה!

In any event, the baraita teaches that in a case when the husband admits that he wrote it, the finder must return it to the wife, and this is the halakha even if it was found after a long time.

ומשני: כאן במקום שהשיירות מצויות, וכאן במקום שאין השיירות מצויות.

And Rabbi Zeira answers that here, in the case of the mishna, the bill of divorce is valid only if it is found immediately, as it is a case where it is found in a place where passing caravans are common. And there, in the baraita, the bill of divorce can be returned even if it was found after a long time, as it is a case where it is found in a place where passing caravans are uncommon.

איכא דאמרי: והוא שהוחזקו דלא נהדר, והיינו דרבה. איכא דאמרי: אף על גב דלא הוחזקו לא נהדר, ופליגא דרבה.

The Gemara compares the rulings of Rabba and Rabbi Zeira. There are those who say, with regard to Rabbi Zeira’s statement that the finder should not return the bill of divorce in a place where passing caravans are common: And this applies specifically in a case where it is established that there are two couples in the town with the same names. In that case, Rabbi Zeira holds that the bill of divorce should not be returned, and this is the same ruling as that of Rabba. And there are those who say: In a place where passing caravans are common, even if it is not established that there are two couples with the same names, the bill of divorce should not be returned, and Rabbi Zeira disagrees with the ruling of Rabba.

בשלמא רבה לא אמר כרבי זירא, מתניתין אלימא ליה לאקשויי. אלא רבי זירא, מאי טעמא לא אמר כרבה?

The Gemara asks: Granted, Rabba does not state his explanation in accordance with that of Rabbi Zeira and raise a contradiction from the baraita, as he holds that a mishna serves as a stronger basis for raising a difficulty than a baraita, as the Mishna, redacted by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, employs more precise language; but what is the reason that Rabbi Zeira does not state his explanation in accordance with that of Rabba and raise a contradiction from the Mishna?

אמר לך, מי קא תני: הא אמר ״תנו״ – נותנין ואפילו לזמן מרובה? דלמא הא אמר ״תנו״ – נותנין, ולעולם כדקיימא לן לאלתר.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Zeira could have said to you: Does the mishna actually teach that if the one who wrote the document says: Give it to the intended recipient, the finder must give it to him, and that this is the halakha even if a long time passed since it was lost? This was only an inference from the mishna. Perhaps the mishna merely means to indicate that if the writer says: Give it to the intended recipient, the finder must give it to him, but actually, this is to be understood as we maintain in the mishna in Gittin, that this halakha applies only if the document was found immediately. Therefore, Rabbi Zeira posed his question from the baraita.

למאן דאמר לרבי זירא במקום שהשיירות מצויות, ואף על גב שלא הוחזקו שני יוסף בן שמעון, ופליגא דרבה, במאי קא מיפלגי?

The Gemara asks: According to the one who says that according to the opinion of Rabbi Zeira a document may not be returned in a place where passing caravans are common, and this is the halakha even if it was not established that there are two people named Yosef ben Shimon in town, and he disagrees with Rabba, with regard to what do Rabbi Zeira and Rabba disagree? What is the foundation of their dispute?

רבה סבר דקתני כל מעשה בית דין הרי זה יחזיר, דאשתכח בבית דין עסקינן, ובית דין כמקום שהשיירות מצויות, והוא שהוחזקו – לא יחזיר, לא הוחזקו – יחזיר.

The Gemara answers: Rabba maintains his opinion based on the mishna (20a) that teaches: One must return any court enactment. He understands that we are dealing with a document that was found in court, and a court is equivalent to a place where passing caravans are common. And therefore, he maintains that it is specifically in a place where it is established that there are two people with the same name that the finder should not return the document to its presumed owner; but in a place where it is not established that there are two people with the same name, he should return it.

ורבי זירא אמר לך: מי קתני ״כל מעשה בית דין שנמצאו בבית דין״? ״כל מעשה בית דין יחזיר״ קתני, ולעולם דאשתכח אבראי.

And Rabbi Zeira, who disagrees with Rabba, could have said to you: Does the mishna teach that one must return any court enactment that was found in court? It teaches that one must return any court enactment, without specifying the location where the court enactment was found, and it is actually referring to a case where the documents were found outside the court. If it was found inside the court, it should not be returned. Therefore, Rabbi Zeira was not convinced by Rabba’s proof.

רבי ירמיה אמר, כגון דקא אמרי עדים: מעולם לא חתמנו אלא על גט אחד של יוסף בן שמעון.

Rabbi Yirmeya states an alternative resolution to the contradiction between the mishna here and the baraita, on the one hand, and the mishna in Gittin on the other: A found bill of divorce should be returned only in a case where the witnesses who signed the bill of divorce say: We have never signed a bill of divorce of a person named Yosef ben Shimon other than this one, in which case there is no concern that the bill of divorce belongs to someone else.

אי הכי, מאי למימרא? מהו דתימא ליחוש דלמא אתרמי שמא כשמא, ועדים כעדים, קא משמע לן.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, what is the purpose of stating that one returns the bill of divorce? Since it clearly belongs to him, there is no question that it must be returned to him. The Gemara answers that it is necessary lest you say that one should be concerned that perhaps it happened that another bill of divorce was written in which the names of the husband and the wife are identical to the names of the husband and wife of the second bill of divorce, and the names of the witnesses on that bill of divorce are identical to the names of the witnesses on this bill of divorce, when in fact they are different witnesses. To counter this, the mishna teaches us that this is not a concern.

רב אשי אמר, כגון דקא אמר: נקב יש בו בצד אות פלונית.

Rav Ashi stated another resolution to the contradiction: The bill of divorce should be returned only in a case where the person claiming to have lost it provides a clear-cut distinguishing mark, e.g., he says: There is a hole in the bill of divorce next to such and such a letter.

ודוקא בצד אות פלונית, אבל נקב בעלמא – לא.

The Gemara comments: And Rav Ashi permits one to return such a bill of divorce specifically when the one claiming to have lost it says that the hole is next to such and such a letter, as that is a clear-cut distinguishing mark. But if he said only that it had a hole without mentioning its precise location, one should not return the bill of divorce, as that is not considered a clear-cut distinguishing mark.

רב אשי מספקא ליה סימנים אי דאורייתא אי דרבנן.

The Gemara explains: Rav Ashi is uncertain whether a lost item is returned to its owner on the basis of distinguishing marks by Torah law or whether it is by rabbinic law. Therefore, in the case of a bill of divorce, he holds that one may rely only on a clear-cut distinguishing mark, as everyone agrees that a lost item is returned to its owner on the basis of a clear-cut distinguishing mark by Torah law.

רבה בר בר חנה

The Gemara relates that Rabba bar bar Ḥana