בבא קמא דף פח

דאפחתה מכספה; אבל פציעה – דלא אפחתה מכספה, לא קמיבעיא ליה!

by which he lowered her monetary value, diminishing the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal. But with regard to a wound, by which he did not lower her monetary value, Rabbi Elazar did not even raise a dilemma.

אמר רבי יוסי בר חנינא: שפצעה בפניה, ואפחתה מכספה.

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: Rabbi Yoḥanan is discussing a case where someone wounded her on her face, and he thereby lowered her monetary value, as this affects the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal.

החובל בעבד כנעני של אחרים – חייב וכו׳. מאי טעמא דרבי יהודה? אמר קרא: ״כי ינצו אנשים יחדו איש ואחיו״ – במי שיש לו אחוה,

§ The mishna teaches: One who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to others is liable for all of the five types of indemnity. Rabbi Yehuda says: Canaanite slaves do not have humiliation, so one who injures a slave pays only the other four types of indemnity. What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains: The verse states with regard to the indemnity of humiliation: “When men strive together, a man and his brother” (Deuteronomy 25:11). The formulation “and his brother” teaches that the payment of compensation for humiliation is applicable with regard to someone who has a relationship of brotherhood with a Jew. This is excluding a Canaanite slave, who does not have a relationship of brotherhood with Jews. And the Sages, who hold that a Canaanite slave is included in the halakhot of compensation for humiliation, maintain that he is the Jews’ brother with regard to the observance of mitzvot, as a Canaanite slave is obligated to observe most mitzvot.

יצא עבד שאין לו אחוה. ורבנן – אחיו הוא במצות.

אלא מעתה, לרבי יהודה – זוממי עבד לא יהרגו, דכתיב: ״ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו״! אמר רבא אמר רב ששת, אמר קרא:

The Gemara challenges: If that is so, then according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that slaves are not in the category of brothers, conspiring witnesses who testify that a Canaanite slave committed a sin punishable by capital punishment should not be put to death by the court, as it is written: “You shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19), and the slave is not considered a brother. Rava said that Rav Sheshet said: The same verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “And you shall put away the evil from your midst,” indicating that the punishment for conspiring witnesses should be applied in any case, including when they testified about a slave.

״ובערת הרע מקרבך״ – מכל מקום.

אלא מעתה, לרבנן – עבד יהא כשר למלכות! אמרי: ולטעמיך, תיקשי לך גר – לדברי הכל! אלא אמר קרא: ״מקרב אחיך״ – ממובחר שבאחיך.

The Gemara raises another challenge: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit for kingship, as it is written: “One from among your brothers shall you set a king over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15). The Sages say in response: But according to your reasoning, the halakha disqualifying a convert from being king should pose a difficulty for you according to all opinions, both according to the opinion of the Sages and of Rabbi Yehuda: Why is a convert not fit to be a king, as he is certainly in the category of brother? The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “One from among your brothers shall you set a king over you,” which indicates that the king must be from the choicest among your brothers, which disqualifies both converts and slaves.

אלא מעתה, לרבנן – יהא עבד כשר לעדות, דכתיב: ״והנה עד שקר העד, שקר ענה באחיו״!

The Gemara challenges further: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit to bear witness, as it is written: “And behold, the witness is a false witness, and has testified falsely against his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:18). If a slave is considered a brother, why is he not eligible to testify in court?

אמר עולא: עדות לא מצית אמרת; אתיא עדות בקל וחומר מאשה: ומה אשה, שהיא ראויה לבא בקהל – פסולה לעדות; עבד,

Ulla said: You cannot say that a slave is fit to bear witness, because the halakha concerning the testimony of a slave is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha concerning the testimony of a woman: And just as a woman, who is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., to marry a Jew of fit lineage, is nevertheless disqualified from bearing witness, so too, with regard to a slave, who is not fit to enter the congregation, is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?

שאינו ראוי לבא בקהל – אינו דין שפסול לעדות?

מה לאשה – שכן אינה ראויה למילה; תאמר בעבד שהוא ראוי למילה?! קטן יוכיח – שישנו במילה, ופסול לעדות.

The Gemara counters this derivation: What is notable about a woman? She is notable in that she is not fit to undergo the mitzva of circumcision. Would you say that from the fact that a woman is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is fit to undergo circumcision? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a minor shall prove that one’s fitness to undergo circumcision is not germane to one’s qualification to bear witness, as a minor is included in the mitzva to undergo circumcision, and yet he is disqualified from bearing witness.

מה לקטן – שאינו במצות; תאמר בעבד, שהוא במצות?! אשה תוכיח – שישנה במצות, ופסולה לעדות.

This is countered: What is notable about a minor? He is notable in that he is not obligated in the performance of mitzvot. Would you say that from the fact that a minor is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is obligated in the performance of mitzvot? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a woman shall prove the matter, as she is obligated in the performance of mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.

וחזר הדין: לא ראי זה כראי זה, ולא ראי זה כראי זה; הצד השוה שבהן – שכן אינן בכל המצות, ופסולין להעיד; אף אני אביא את העבד

And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case, as each case has its own unique halakha. Their common denominator is that both a woman and a minor are not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. I will also bring the case of the slave for inclusion in this halakha, as he is also not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.

– שאינו בכל המצות, ופסול להעיד.

מה להצד השוה שבהם – שכן אינו איש; תאמר בעבד, שהוא איש?!

This derivation is rejected: What is notable about their common denominator? It is notable in that a woman or a minor is not a man, and this is why they are disqualified from bearing witness. Would you say that from the fact that they are disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is a man?

אלא תיתי מגזלן. מה לגזלן – שכן מעשיו גרמו לו; תאמר בעבד – שאין מעשיו גרמו לו?!

The Gemara offers a different derivation: Rather, derive the halakha that a slave is disqualified from bearing witness from that of a robber, who is disqualified from bearing witness. The Gemara objects: What is notable about a robber? He is notable in that his actions caused him to be disqualified. Would you say that from the fact that a robber is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, whose actions did not cause him to be unfit?

אלא תיתי מגזלן ומחד מהנך.

The Gemara answers: Rather, derive the halakha from a robber and from one of these other two, either a woman or a minor. Their common denominator is that they do not observe all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. So too, a slave does not observe all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.

מר בריה דרבינא אמר, אמר קרא: ״לא יומתו אבות על בנים״ – לא יומתו על פי אבות שאין להם חייס בנים. דאי סלקא דעתך כדאמרינן:

Mar, son of Ravina, said another derivation. The verse states: “Fathers shall not be put to death for children” (Deuteronomy 24:16), meaning that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage [ḥayis] with their children. This is referring to Canaanite slaves, whose children are not considered to be related to them. For if it enters your mind to interpret the verse according to its straightforward meaning, as we say: “Fathers shall not be put to death for children,” meaning by the testimony of their children, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children. What does the verse teach by stating only: “Children,” without the word their? Learn from this formulation that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children.

״לא יומתו אבות על בנים״ – בעדות בנים; לכתוב רחמנא: ״לא יומתו אבות על בניהם״! מאי ״בנים״? שמע מינה דלא יומתו על פי אבות שאין להם חייס בנים.

אלא מעתה, ״ובנים לא יומתו על אבות״ – הכי נמי, לא יומתו על פי בנים שאין להם חייס אבות? אלא גר הכי נמי דפסול לעדות?!

The Gemara challenges this: If that is so, when the end of the verse states: “Nor shall children be put to death for fathers” (Deuteronomy 24:16), does this also mean that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? But if that were the case, it would also be the case that a convert would be disqualified from bearing witness, as one who converts no longer shares common lineage with his parents.

אמרי: הכי השתא?! גר, נהי דאין לו חייס למעלה, למטה יש לו חייס; לאפוקי עבד, דאין לו חייס לא למעלה ולא למטה.

The Sages say in response: How can these cases be compared? With regard to a convert, although he has no common lineage with those above him, i.e., his parents, he does have common lineage with those below him, i.e., his children. This serves to exclude a slave, who has no common lineage either with those above him or with those below him.

דאי סלקא דעתך גר פסול לעדות, לכתוב רחמנא: ״לא יומתו אבות על בניהם״ לכדאמרינן – לא יומתו בעדות בנים; ונכתוב רחמנא:

The Sages prove that a convert is fit to bear witness: As, if it enters your mind that a convert is disqualified from bearing witness, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children, according to the interpretation that we say: Fathers shall not be put to death based on the testimony of their children; and let the Merciful One also write: “Nor shall children be put to death for fathers,” from which you learn two halakhot: One, that children shall not be put to death by the testimony of their fathers, and another, that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers, i.e., converts.

״ובנים לא יומתו על אבות״ – דשמעת מינה תרי: חדא – לא יומתו בנים בעדות אבות, ואידך – לא יומתו על פי בנים שאין להם חייס אבות!

ועבד – נפקא ליה בקל וחומר מגר; ומה גר, דלמעלה הוא דאין לו חייס, אבל למטה יש לו חייס – פסול לעדות; עבד,

The Gemara continues the statement: And the halakha with regard to a slave being disqualified from bearing witness is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a convert: And just as with regard to a convert, that it is the case concerning those above him that he has no common lineage, but with those below him he does have common lineage, and he is disqualified from bearing witness, then with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, all the more so is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?

שאין לו חייס לא למעלה ולא למטה – אינו דין שיהא פסול לעדות?

אלא מדכתב רחמנא: ״לא יומתו אבות על בנים״ – דמשמע: לא יומתו על פי אבות שאין לו חייס בנים; שמע מינה, עבד,

The Gemara continues the statement: Rather, due to the fact that the Merciful One did not write the verse that way, but instead wrote: “Fathers shall not be put to death for children,” which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children, learn from this formulation that with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, he is the one who is disqualified from bearing witness. But with regard to a convert, since he has common lineage with those below him, he is fit to bear witness.

שאין לו חייס לא למעלה ולא למטה – הוא דפסול לעדות; אבל גר, כיון דיש לו חייס למטה – כשר לעדות.

וכי תימא, לכתוב רחמנא: ״ובנים לא יומתו על אבותיהם״, למה לי דכתב רחמנא: ״ובנים לא יומתו על אבות״ – דמשמע:

And if you would say: Let the Merciful One write: Nor shall children be put to death for their fathers, why do I need that which the Merciful One wrote: “Nor shall children be put to death for fathers,” which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One wrote: “Fathers shall not be put to death for children,” He also wrote in the same manner: “Nor shall children be put to death for fathers.”

לא יומתו על פי בנים שאין להם חייס אבות? איידי דכתב: ״לא יומתו אבות על בנים״, כתב נמי: ״ובנים לא יומתו על אבות״.

חרש, שוטה וקטן פגיעתן רעה. אימיה דרב שמואל בר אבא מהגרוניא הות נסיבא ליה לרבי אבא, כתבתינהו (לנכסי) [לנכסה] לרב שמואל בר אבא ברה. בתר דשכיבא,

§ The mishna (87a) teaches: With regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured, they are exempt. The Gemara relates an incident: The mother of Rav Shmuel bar Abba from the city of Hagroneya was married to Rabbi Abba. She wrote, i.e., signed over, her property to Rav Shmuel bar Abba, her son. After she died,

אזל רב שמואל בר אבא קמיה דרבי ירמיה בר אבא, אוקמיה בנכסי. אזל רבי אבא אמרה למילתא קמיה דרב הושעיא,

Rav Shmuel bar Abba went before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba to claim his mother’s property. Rabbi Yirmeya established him as the owner of the property, in accordance with what was written in the document. Rabbi Abba, the mother’s husband, went and said a report of the matter before Rav Hoshaya. Rav Hoshaya went and said a report of the matter before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to Rav Hoshaya: This is what Shmuel says: In a case of a woman who sold her usufruct property, which belongs to her but whose profits her husband garners, in her husband’s lifetime, and then she died, the husband repossesses the property from the purchasers. The granting of her property by means of the document is analogous to a sale, and Rabbi Abba can repossess the property from Rav Shmuel bar Abba.

אזל רב הושעיא אמרה קמיה דרב יהודה. אמר ליה, הכי אמר שמואל: האשה שמכרה בנכסי מלוג בחיי בעלה, ומתה – הבעל מוציא מיד הלקוחות.

אמרוה קמיה דרבי ירמיה בר אבא, אמר להו: אנא מתניתא ידענא, דתנן: הכותב נכסיו לבנו לאחר מותו – הבן אינו יכול למכור,

The Sages said that halakha before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, who had ruled that the property belongs to Rav Shmuel bar Abba. He said to them: I know the mishna that supports my opinion, as we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 136a): In the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, stating that the transfer should take effect immediately but the son will have use of it only after the father’s death, the son cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is still in the father’s possession. And the father, even though he retained the right to use the property, cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is written as belonging to the son. If the father sold the property, then it is sold to the extent that the purchaser may use it until the father dies. If the son sold the property during his father’s lifetime, the purchaser does not have the right to use the property until the father dies.

מפני שהן ברשות האב; והאב אינו יכול למכור, מפני שהן כתובין לבן. מכר האב – מכורים עד שימות. מכר הבן – אין לו ללוקח עד שימות האב.

כי מיית אב מיהא אית ליה ללוקח, ואף על גב דמת הבן בחיי אב – דלא אתו לידי הבן.

Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba infers: In any event, if the son sold the property during his father’s lifetime, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property. And this would be so even though it is a case where the son died in the father’s lifetime, where the property never came into the son’s possession.

כרבי שמעון בן לקיש, דאמר: לא שנא מת הבן בחיי האב – דלא אתו לידיה דבן, לא שנא מת האב בחיי הבן – דאתו לידיה דבן; קנה לוקח.

Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba’s analysis is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who says: There is no difference if the son died in the father’s lifetime, where the property never came into the son’s possession, and there is no difference if the father died in the son’s lifetime, where the property came into the son’s possession. In any event, the purchaser acquired the property.

דאתמר: מכר הבן בחיי האב, ומת הבן בחיי האב – רבי יוחנן אמר: לא קנה לוקח, ריש לקיש אמר: קנה לוקח.

The Gemara records a dispute between the amora’im with regard to this point. As was stated: In a case where the son sold the property in the father’s lifetime, and the son died in the father’s lifetime, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property. Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property.

רבי יוחנן אמר לא קנה לוקח – אמר לך: כי קתני מתניתין ״מכר הבן – לא קנה לוקח עד שימות האב״, וכי מיית האב אית ליה ללוקח –

The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property, because he could have said to you: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his father’s lifetime the purchaser does not acquire any rights to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna is discussing a case where the son did not die during the father’s lifetime, so that the property came into the son’s possession upon the father’s death, before the purchaser acquired it. But if the son died in the father’s lifetime, so that the property did not come into the son’s possession, then even when the father dies the purchaser does not have rights to the property.

דלא מת הבן בחיי האב, דאתו לידי הבן. אבל מת הבן בחיי האב, דלא אתו לידיה דבן – כי מיית אב נמי לית ליה ללוקח.

אלמא קא סבר: קנין פירות – כקנין הגוף דמי, וכי זבין – לאו דידיה זבין.

The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Even though the property itself did not belong to the father, it is as though the father owned the property, because all of the produce belonged to him in practice. Therefore, when the son sold the property, he sold property that did not belong to him.

רבי שמעון בן לקיש אומר קנה לוקח – כי קתני מתניתין: ״מכר הבן אין ללוקח עד שימות האב״ – כי מיית אב מיהת אית ליה

The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the purchaser acquired the property based on this claim: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his father’s lifetime the purchaser does not have any right to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that in any event, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna means that there is no difference if the son did not die in the father’s lifetime, where the property came into the son’s possession, and there is no difference if the son died in the father’s lifetime, where the property did not come into the son’s possession. In either case, the purchaser acquired the property.

ללוקח; לא שנא לא מת הבן בחיי האב – דאתו לידיה דבן, ולא שנא מת הבן בחיי האב – דלא אתו לידיה דבן; קנה לוקח.

אלמא קסבר: קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי, וכי (קא) זבין – דידיה (קא) זבין.

The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And therefore when the son sold the property, he sold property that belonged to him.

ואנן השתא, בין רבי ירמיה בר אבא ובין רב יהודה – כרבי שמעון בן לקיש סבירא להו. וקאמר רבי ירמיה בר אבא:

The Gemara returns to the discussion of the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba. And now for us, whether if one discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba and whether one discusses the opinion of Rav Yehuda, they both hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: If it enters your mind that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself, then when the father dies and the son had died in the father’s lifetime, why does the purchaser have rights to the property? When the son sold it, didn’t he sell property that did not belong to him?

אי סלקא דעתך קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי, כי מיית אב ומיית הבן בחיי האב, אמאי אית ליה ללוקח? כי (קא) זבין האי – לאו דידיה (קא) זבין!

אלא לאו שמע מינה קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי?

Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself? Therefore, Rav Shmuel bar Abba should receive the property transferred to him by his mother, as the fact that the husband owned the rights to its produce does not limit her ability to transfer her property to her son.

אהדרוה לקמיה דרב יהודה, אמר להו, הכי אמר שמואל: זו אינה דומה למשנתנו.

The Sages brought back Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba’s reply before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to them: This is what Shmuel said: This halakha, that a husband can repossess the property that his wife sold before she died, is not similar to the halakha of our mishna concerning a father who transfers his property to his son while retaining the right to garner the profits.

מאי טעמא? אמר רב יוסף, בשלמא אי תני איפכא: ״הכותב נכסיו לאביו״ – איכא למפשט מינה דקנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי.

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning for distinguishing between the two cases? Rav Yosef said: Granted, if the mishna had taught the opposite and stated that in the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his father after his death, with the son retaining the right to garner the profits until then, and the father sold the property during his son’s lifetime, the purchaser has rights to the property after the son dies, then it is possible to resolve from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself.

אלא השתא דקתני: ״הכותב נכסיו לבנו״, משום דראוי ליורשו הוא.

Rav Yosef continues: But now that the mishna teaches specifically: One who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, the ability of the son to sell the property is due to the fact that the son is fit to inherit from him and already has a right to the property, and not just due to the existence of the document. In the case of Rav Shmuel bar Abba as well, the woman’s property is inherited by her husband, not her son, so she cannot transfer it to Rav Shmuel bar Abba.

אמר ליה אביי: אטו ברא ירית אבא, אבא לא ירית ברא?! אלא לאברוחינהו לנכסי מבריה קא אתי; הכא נמי, לאברוחינהו לנכסי מאחוה אתי.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Is this to say that a son inherits from a father, but a father does not inherit from a son? There is no difference between their rights to inherit from one another. Rather, even if the mishna taught a halakha concerning a son transferring his property to his father, the son’s reason for doing so could have been that he comes to hide his property from his own son and wants his father to inherit from him instead. Here too, when a father transfers his property to his son, he comes to hide his property from the son’s brothers, as the father has other sons but does not want them to inherit from him. Therefore, the mishna’s choice of case cannot serve as a basis for inference.

אלא מאי ״אינה דומה למשנתנו״? משום תקנת אושא. דאמר רבי יוסי בר חנינא: באושא התקינו, האשה שמכרה בנכסי מלוג בחיי בעלה, ומתה – הבעל מוציא מיד הלקוחות.

Abaye continues: Rather, what was Shmuel’s reason for saying that the right of a husband to the property that his wife sold before she died is not similar to our mishna that states that a father does not have rights to property sold by his son? The difference is due to the rabbinic ordinance of Usha, an ordinance instituted with regard to a husband’s rights to his wife’s property. As Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: In the town of Usha the Sages instituted that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property in her husband’s lifetime and then died, the husband repossesses it from the purchasers. This ordinance was instituted only for the benefit of a husband, but not for the benefit of a father or son.

אמר רב אידי בר אבין, אף אנן נמי תנינא: ״מעידים אנו באיש פלוני שגירש את אשתו, ונתן כתובתה״,

Rav Idi bar Avin said: We too learn of the ordinance of Usha in the baraita: If witnesses said: We testify about so-and-so that he divorced his wife and gave her the full value of the obligations recorded in her marriage contract,