בבא קמא דף עט

גנב והקדיש; גנב והקיף; גנב והחליף; גנב ונתן במתנה; גנב ופרע חובו; גנב ופרע בהקיפו; גנב ושלח סבלונות בבית חמיו – משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה.

The baraita continues: If he stole an animal and consecrated it, or if he stole an animal and sold it on credit, i.e., without receiving any money for it at the time, or if he stole an animal and exchanged it for another item, or if he stole an animal and gave it to another as a gift, or if he stole an animal and used it to repay his debt, or if he stole an animal and used it to pay for an item he purchased on credit, or if he stole an animal and sent it in the form of presents to his betrothed in his father-in-law’s house, in all of these cases he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment, as these acts are all considered forms of selling. This concludes the baraita.

מאי קא משמע לן? אשמעינן רישא גנב ונתן לאחר וטבח – דיש שליח לדבר עבירה. אף על גב דבכל התורה כולה אין שליח לדבר עבירה,

The Gemara asks: What is this baraita teaching us? All of the halakhot it states are obvious. The Gemara answers: The first clause teaches us, through the case of one who stole an animal and gave it to another and that person slaughtered or sold it on his behalf, that in this case there is agency for transgression. Even though in the entire Torah there is a principle that there is no agency for transgression, here there is agency for transgression. The Torah’s principle is that a transgression committed by an agent who was appointed by another person is not considered the act of the one who appointed the agent, but the independent act of the agent himself. The case discussed by this baraita is an exception to the rule, as here, the agent’s slaughter or sale of the animal is legally considered the action of the thief.

הכא יש שליח לדבר עבירה.

מאי טעמא? ״וטבחו״ ו״מכרו״; מה מכירה – דלא אפשר דלאו על ידי אחר, אף טביחה על ידי אחר – מחייב.

What is the reason that this case is an exception to the principle? It is because the verse states: “And slaughters it or sells it” (Exodus 21:37), which juxtaposes the two acts of slaughtering and selling. This teaches that just as one becomes liable for selling, which by definition is impossible without another party, i.e., the buyer, so too one becomes liable for slaughtering even when it is by means of another party, i.e., when the thief instructs another person to slaughter the animal on his behalf.

ואשמעינן סיפא גנב והקדיש – מה לי מכרו להדיוט, מה לי מכרו לשמים.

And the latter clause of the baraita teaches us a novelty in the case of one who stole an animal and consecrated it. The novelty is that this is considered a sale despite the fact that there is no purchaser. This is due to the following argument: What difference is it to me if he sold the animal to an ordinary person, and what difference is it to me if he sold it to Heaven by consecrating it? If the animal changes ownership, it is considered a sale, and it does not matter if the new owner is an ordinary person or the Temple treasury.

מתני׳ גנב ברשות הבעלים, וטבח ומכר חוץ מרשותם; או שגנב חוץ מרשותם, וטבח ומכר ברשותם; או שגנב וטבח ומכר חוץ מרשותם – משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה.

MISHNA: If one stole an animal in its owner’s domain, i.e., he took hold of it or established control over it but had not yet removed it from the owner’s premises, and then he slaughtered it or sold it outside of the owner’s domain; or if he stole an animal outside of the owner’s domain and slaughtered it or sold it in the owner’s domain; or if he stole an animal and slaughtered it or sold it, and all of this occurred outside the owner’s domain, in all of these cases, he must pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. But if he stole it and slaughtered or sold it, and all of this occurred in the owner’s domain, he is exempt from any of the fines for theft, as it is not considered theft until the stolen object is actually removed from the owner’s premises.

אבל גנב וטבח ומכר ברשותם – פטור.

היה מושכו ויוצא, ומת ברשות הבעלים – פטור. הגביהו או הוציאו מרשות בעלים, ומת – חייב.

If the thief was in the process of leading the animal and leaving the owner’s premises, and it died while it was still in the owner’s domain, the thief is exempt from all fines. If he lifted it up or led it out of the owner’s domain and then the animal died, he is liable for his theft. For an act to be considered theft, the thief must acquire the item by pulling it or moving it, which are ineffective forms of acquisition on the owner’s premises; or by lifting it up, which is effective even when performed in the owner’s domain.

נתנו לבכורות בנו או לבעל חוב, לשומר חנם, לשואל, לנושא שכר ולשוכר; והיה מושכו, ומת ברשות הבעלים – פטור. הגביהו או שהוציאו מרשות הבעלים, ומת – חייב.

If the thief gave the animal as payment for the redemption of his firstborn son, or as payment to a creditor, or conveyed it for safeguarding to an unpaid bailee, or lent it to a borrower, or conveyed it for safeguarding to a paid bailee, or leased it to a renter, and he was leading out the animal and it died in the owner’s domain, the thief is exempt from all fines. If that individual, following the thief’s instructions, lifted up the animal or led it out of the owner’s domain, and it subsequently died, the thief is liable for the theft. The thief is liable for instructing another to remove the animal for the purposes of payment of a debt, safekeeping, borrowing, or rental, as this is tantamount to the thief taking it with his own hands.

גמ׳ בעי אמימר: תיקנו משיכה בשומרים, או לא?

GEMARA: Ameimar raises a dilemma: Did the Sages institute the requirement of pulling or leading an animal with regard to bailees, or not? When an animal or other item is purchased, the parties to the sale are not bound by the deal until the purchaser performs an act of acquisition, one of which is pulling the animal or leading it along. Did the Sages institute an ordinance that the same applies to bailees? In other words, does the bailee’s obligation to safeguard the animal or item begin as soon as he consents to watch it, or only after he has taken the animal and moved it even minimally?

אמר רב יימר, תא שמע: נתנו לבכורות בנו או לבעל חובו, לשומר חנם ולשואל, לנושא שכר ולשוכר; היה מושכו ויוצא, ומת ברשות הבעלים – פטור. מאי,

Rav Yeimar said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If the thief gave the animal as payment for the redemption of his firstborn son, or as payment to a creditor, or conveyed it for safeguarding to an unpaid bailee, or lent it to a borrower, or conveyed it for safeguarding to a paid bailee, or rented it to a renter, and he was leading out the animal and it died in the owner’s domain, the thief is exempt from payment. What, is it not talking about the bailee leading out the animal, when it states that the thief is exempt? And if so, conclude from this mishna that the Sages instituted the requirement of pulling with regard to bailees. If the bailee’s obligation begins immediately upon his consent to watch over the item, it would be considered stolen by the thief at that stage, even before the bailee moves it.

לאו שומר – ושמע מינה תיקנו משיכה בשומרין?

אמר ליה: לא, גנב.

Ameimar said to Rav Yeimar: No, this is not necessarily the correct interpretation of the mishna. The mishna may mean that the owner gave the animal to his creditor or to a bailee, and subsequently a thief came to steal it from the house of the creditor or the bailee, and it was the thief who was leading the animal out of those premises when it died.

הא תנא ליה רישא! תנא גנב שגנב מבית הבעלים, ותנא גנב שגנב מבית שומר.

Rav Yeimar asked: How can that clause of the mishna refer to an animal that died as the thief was leading it out? The mishna already taught this halakha in the first clause. Ameimar answered: Nevertheless, it is possible that the mishna taught this halakha concerning a thief who stole an animal from its owner’s house, and then taught it again with regard to a thief who stole an animal from a bailee’s house.

אמר ליה רב אשי: לא תדחייה; מה לי גנב שגנב מבית שומר, מה לי גנב שגנב מבית בעלים?

Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: Do not reject Rav Yeimar’s argument by means of this alternative interpretation of the mishna. It is not reasonable to assert that the mishna taught this halakha twice, as what difference is it to me if the thief stole it from the bailee’s house and what difference is it to me if the thief stole it from the owner’s house? There is no halakhic distinction between these two cases. Therefore, the mishna would not have discussed both of them.

אלא לאו שומר – ושמע מינה תיקנו משיכה בשומרין? שמע מינה. איתמר נמי, אמר רבי אלעזר: כדרך שתיקנו משיכה בלקוחות, כך תיקנו משיכה בשומרין.

Rather, is it not more reasonable to say that the mishna should be interpreted as meaning that the bailee was leading the animal out of the owner’s house at the behest of the thief, as Rav Yeimar claimed? And therefore, one should conclude from the mishna that the Sages instituted the requirement of pulling with regard to bailees. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that they did. It was also stated explicitly that Rabbi Elazar says: Just as the Sages instituted the requirement of pulling with regard to purchasers, so too they instituted the requirement of pulling with regard to bailees.

תניא נמי הכי: כדרך שתיקנו משיכה בלקוחות, כך תיקנו משיכה בשומרין. וכשם שהקרקע נקנית בכסף, בשטר ובחזקה, כך שכירות נקנית בכסף, בשטר ובחזקה.

This is also taught in a baraita: Just as the Sages instituted the requirement of pulling with regard to purchasers, so too they instituted the requirement of pulling with regard to bailees. And just as land is acquired by the payment of money, by the writing of a deed of sale, or by the purchaser taking possession of the land through working it, so too a rental deal is finalized by the payment of money, by the writing of a deed of rent, or by the renter taking possession of the land. This concludes the baraita.

שכירות דמאי? אילימא

The Gemara asks: When the baraita speaks of rental, it is referring to rental of what kind of property? If we say

שכירות דמטלטלין, מטלטלי בני שטרא נינהו?! אמר רב חסדא: שכירות דקרקע.

it is speaking of the rental of movable property, is movable property subject to the writing of a deed? Rather, Rav Ḥisda said: It is referring to the rental of land.

אמר רבי אלעזר: ראוהו שהטמין בחורשין וטבח ומכר – משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה. אמאי? הא לא משך! אמר רב חסדא: שהכישה במקל.

§ Rabbi Elazar says: If people saw a thief who was hiding in the woods near a herd of grazing animals, and that individual emerged and slaughtered or sold one of the animals from the herd, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. The Gemara asks: Why is the thief liable to the fourfold or fivefold payment? But he did not pull the animal. Rabbi Elazar is apparently describing a case where the thief emerged from the forest and slaughtered one of the animals without first moving it, and there is no fourfold or fivefold payment unless the thief first steals the animal. Rav Ḥisda says: This is referring to a case where he hit the animal with a stick, causing it to move.

אמרי: וכיון דראוהו, גזלן הוא! כיון דקא מטמרי מנייהו, גנב הוא.

With regard to Rabbi Elazar’s statement, the Sages say: But since people saw him doing all this, he is a robber, not a thief, and the fourfold or fivefold payment applies only to thieves. A thief is one who sneaks into a house or other private property; one who commits his act brazenly, in public, is classified as a robber. The Gemara answers: Since he was hiding from them, he is considered a thief, despite the fact that they saw him.

ואלא גזלן היכי דמי? אמר רבי אבהו: כגון בניהו בן יהוידע, שנאמר: ״ויגזל את החנית מיד המצרי, ויהרגהו בחניתו״.

The Gemara asks: But if so, what are the circumstances of a robber? Rabbi Abbahu said: Robbers are like the case of Benaiah ben Jehoiada, as it is stated concerning him: “He slew an Egyptian, a goodly man; and the Egyptian had a spear in his hand; but he went down to him with a staff, and he robbed the spear out of the Egyptian’s hand, and slew him with his own spear” (II Samuel 23:21).

רבי יוחנן אמר: כגון בעלי שכם, שנאמר: ״וישימו לו בעלי שכם מארבים על ראשי ההרים, ויגזלו [את] כל אשר יעבר עליהם בדרך״.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A different example of a robber is a case like that of the men of Shechem, as it is stated: “And the men of Shechem set ambushers for him on the tops of the mountains, and they robbed all that came along that way by them” (Judges 9:25).

ורבי אבהו – מאי טעמא לא אמר מהאי? אמר לך: כיון דמטמרי איטמורי, לא גזלני נינהו. ורבי יוחנן – הא דקא מטמרי, דלא ניחזינהו אינשי וניערקו מנייהו.

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Rabbi Abbahu did not say the example from this verse, which discusses the men of Shechem? He could have said to you: Since the men of Shechem were hiding in ambush, they are not considered robbers but thieves. And how would Rabbi Yoḥanan respond to this claim? This fact that they were hiding was not because they were hesitant to steal in view of the public. Rather, they acted in this manner so that the travelers should not see them in advance and flee from them.

שאלו תלמידיו את רבן יוחנן בן זכאי: מפני מה החמירה תורה בגנב יותר מגזלן? אמר להן: זה – השוה כבוד עבד לכבוד קונו,

§ The Gemara concludes its discussion of theft with several aggadic statements. His students asked Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai: For what reason was the Torah stricter with a thief than with a robber? Only a thief is required to pay the double, fourfold, or fivefold payment, not a robber. Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said to them in response: This one, the robber, equated the honor of the servant to the honor of his Master, and that one, the thief, did not equate the honor of the servant to the honor of his Master. The robber fears neither God nor people, as he is not afraid to rob in public. The thief does not fear God but he does fear other people, which demonstrates that he is more concerned about humans than God.

וזה – לא השוה כבוד עבד לכבוד קונו.

כביכול עשה עין של מטה כאילו אינה רואה, ואוזן של מטה כאילו אינה שומעת, שנאמר: ״הוי המעמיקים מה׳ לסתר עצה, והיה במחשך מעשיהם וגו׳״; וכתיב:

As it were, the thief establishes the eye below, i.e., God’s eye, as though it does not see, and the ear below, i.e., God’s ear, as though it does not hear. The Gemara cites verses that describe people who imagine that God does not see their actions, as it is stated: “Woe to them who seek deeply to hide their counsel from the Lord, and their works are in the dark, and they say: Who sees us, and who knows us?” (Isaiah 29:15). And it is written: “And they say: The Lord will not see, neither will the God of Jacob give heed” (Psalms 94:7). And it is written: “For they say: The Lord has forsaken the land, and the Lord does not see” (Ezekiel 9:9).

״ויאמרו לא יראה יה ולא יבין אלהי יעקב״; וכתיב: ״כי [אמרו] עזב ה׳ את הארץ, ואין ה׳ ראה״.

תניא, אמר רבי מאיר: משלו משל משום רבן גמליאל, למה הדבר דומה? לשני בני אדם שהיו בעיר ועשו משתה, אחד זימן את בני העיר ולא זימן

It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir said: To illustrate the severity of a thief over a robber, as per Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai’s explanation, they stated a parable in the name of Rabban Gamliel. To what is this matter comparable? To two people who were living in the same city, and both of them prepared a feast. One of them invited the people of the city to his feast but he did not invite the king’s sons. And the other did not invite the people of the city and also did not invite the king’s sons. Which of them deserves a greater punishment? You must say that it is this one who invited the people of the city but did not invite the king’s sons. Likewise, both the thief and the robber show disdain for God, but the robber does not display more respect for people.

את בני המלך, ואחד לא זימן את בני העיר ולא זימן את בני המלך. איזה מהן עונשו מרובה? הוי אומר: זה שזימן את בני העיר ולא זימן

את בני המלך.

אמר רבי מאיר: בא וראה כמה גדול כח של מלאכה: שור, שביטלו ממלאכתו – חמשה; שה, שלא ביטלו ממלאכתו – ארבעה.

The Gemara discusses why there is a fourfold payment for a sheep but a fivefold payment for an ox. Rabbi Meir said: Come and see how great the power of labor is. The theft of an ox, which was forced by the thief to cease its labor, leads to a fivefold payment; whereas the theft of a sheep, which was not forced by the thief to cease its labor, as a sheep performs no labor, leads to only a fourfold payment.

אמר רבן יוחנן בן זכאי, בא וראה כמה גדול כבוד הבריות: שור, שהלך ברגליו – חמשה; שה, שהרכיבו על כתיפו – ארבעה.

Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said: Come and see how great human dignity is. The theft of an ox, which walked on its own legs as the thief stole it, leads to a fivefold payment, whereas the theft of a sheep, which the thief carried on his shoulder as he walked, thereby causing himself embarrassment, leads to only a fourfold payment.

מתני׳ אין מגדלין בהמה דקה בארץ ישראל; אבל מגדלין בסוריא, ובמדברות של ארץ ישראל.

MISHNA: One may not raise small domesticated animals, i.e., sheep and goats, in settled areas of Eretz Yisrael, as they graze on people’s crops. But one may raise them in Syria, despite the fact that with regard to many other halakhot Syria is treated like Eretz Yisrael, and in the wilderness of Eretz Yisrael.

אין מגדלין תרנגולין בירושלים, מפני הקדשים; ולא כהנים בארץ ישראל, מפני הטהרות.

One may not raise chickens in Jerusalem, due to the sacrificial meat that is common there. There is a concern that chickens will pick up garbage that imparts ritual impurity and bring it into contact with sacrificial meat, thereby rendering it ritually impure. And priests may not raise chickens anywhere in Eretz Yisrael, because of the many foods in a priest’s possession that must be kept ritually pure, e.g., teruma.

אין מגדלין חזירין – בכל מקום. לא יגדל אדם את הכלב, אלא אם כן היה קשור בשלשלת. אין פורסין נישובים ליונים,

Furthermore, one may not raise pigs anywhere, and a person may not raise a dog unless it is tied with chains. One may spread out traps [nishovim] for pigeons only if this was performed at a distance of at least thirty ris, which is 8,000 cubits, from any settled area, to ensure that privately owned pigeons are not caught in the traps.

אלא אם כן היה רחוק מן הישוב שלשים ריס.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן: אין מגדלין בהמה דקה בארץ ישראל, אבל מגדלין בחורשין של ארץ ישראל. בסוריא – אפילו בישוב, ואין צריך לומר בחוצה לארץ.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: One may not raise small domesticated animals, i.e., sheep and goats, in settled areas of Eretz Yisrael. But one may raise them in the forests of Eretz Yisrael. In Syria, it is permitted to do so even in a settled area. And, needless to say, it is permitted to do so outside of Eretz Yisrael.

תניא אידך: אין מגדלין בהמה דקה בארץ ישראל; אבל מגדלין במדבר שביהודה, ובמדבר שבספר עכו. ואף על פי שאמרו אין מגדלין בהמה דקה,

It is taught in another baraita: One may not raise small domesticated animals in settled areas of Eretz Yisrael. But one may raise them in the wilderness that is in Judea and in the wilderness that is on the border near Akko. And even though the Sages said that one may not raise small domesticated animals, nevertheless, one may raise large, domesticated animals, i.e., cattle, because the Sages issue a decree upon the public only if a majority of the public is able to abide by it.

אבל מגדלין בהמה גסה; לפי שאין גוזרין גזרה על הצבור אלא אם כן רוב צבור יכולין לעמוד בה.

בהמה דקה אפשר להביא מחוצה לארץ, בהמה גסה אי אפשר להביא מחוצה לארץ.

This difference is that it is possible for someone to bring small domesticated animals from outside of Eretz Yisrael in the event that they are needed. But it is not possible for someone to bring large, domesticated animals from outside of Eretz Yisrael whenever he needs one, since there is a constant need for them as beasts of burden. Therefore, the Sages did not issue a decree with regard to these types of animals.

ואף על פי שאמרו אין מגדלין בהמה דקה – אבל משהה הוא קודם לרגל שלשים יום, וקודם משתה בנו שלשים יום. ובלבד שלא ישהה את האחרונה שלשים יום.

The baraita continues: And even though they said that one may not raise small domesticated animals, however, one may keep these animals on his premises for thirty days before a pilgrimage Festival, and thirty days before the wedding feast of one’s son, when many animals are needed for food, provided that he does not leave the last one, i.e., the animal which he purchased immediately before the Festival, for thirty days.

דסלקא דעתך אמינא דאי נפק ליה רגל, ומכי זבנה עד השתא אכתי לא מלו ליה תלתין יומין; לא נימא תלתין משרא שרי ליה לשהויי,

The Gemara clarifies the final line of the baraita: The baraita needs to state this ruling as it might enter your mind to say that if the pilgrimage Festival has passed and thirty days have not yet elapsed from the time when he bought the animal until now, he may keep the animal until thirty days have elapsed. To counter this, the baraita teaches that we do not say: It is permitted to keep it for a total of thirty days. Rather, once the pilgrimage Festival has passed, he should not keep it any longer.

אלא כיון דנפק ליה רגל – לא מבעי ליה לשהויי.