בבא קמא דף סח

מי איכא נשתרש? אלא לאחר יאוש. ואי סלקא דעתך יאוש קני, אמאי משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה? שלו הוא טובח, שלו הוא מוכר!

is it possible to say that there is any entrenchment in sin? The sale does not take effect, as it occurred before the owner despaired, which means that the thief did not in fact deepen his sin by selling the animal. Rather, it must be that the sale occurred after the owner’s despair. And if it enters your mind that the owner’s despair causes the thief to acquire the animal, why does he pay the fourfold or fivefold payment? Since the animal belongs to him after the owner’s despair, in effect he slaughters his own animal or sells his own animal.

אמרי, כדאמר רבא: מפני ששנה בחטא; הכא נמי, מפני ששנה בחטא.

The Sages say: It is possible to explain the term: Entrenched in sin, in accordance with what Rava said: The thief is liable because he repeated his sin, i.e., he sinned a second time by going through the motions of the sale, regardless of the fact the sale was not legally binding. Here too, one can say that the thief is liable because he repeated his sin.

תא שמע: ״וטבחו או מכרו״; מה טביחה – שאינה חוזרת, אף מכירה – שאינה חוזרת.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: It is written: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep, and slaughter it or sell it” (Exodus 21:37). Just as slaughter is an act that cannot be undone, so too the selling referred to here is an act that cannot be undone.

אימת? אילימא לפני יאוש, אמאי אינה חוזרת? אלא לאחר יאוש. ואי סלקא דעתך קנייה, אמאי משלם ארבעה וחמשה? שלו הוא טובח, שלו הוא מוכר!

The Gemara analyzes the baraita: Now, when is a sale irreversible? If we say this sale occurred before the owner’s despair of recovering his stolen animal, why can it not be undone? Since the thief’s sale of the animal before the owner’s despair is ineffective, the sale is easily undone. Rather, the baraita must be speaking about a case where the thief sold the animal after the owner’s despair. And if it enters your mind that a thief acquires a stolen item after the owner’s despair, why does he pay the fourfold or fivefold payment for slaughtering or selling the animal at this point? He slaughters his own animal or he sells his own animal. Apparently, a thief does not acquire the stolen item after the owner’s despair.

כדאמר רב נחמן: פרט לשהקנה לשלשים יום, הכא נמי, פרט לשהקנה לשלשים יום.

The Gemara rejects this proof: The explanation for this baraita is as Rav Naḥman said in reference to a different baraita. Rav Naḥman said that when that baraita speaks of a sale that cannot be undone, this excludes one who transferred ownership of the animal to another in a temporary manner, e.g., for thirty days. Here too, one can answer in the same way, that it excludes one who transferred ownership of the animal for thirty days. Accordingly, if one sold the animal permanently, even if the sale was performed before the owner despaired and is therefore not legally binding, he is nevertheless required to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

מיתיבי: גנב ובא אחר וגנבו – הראשון משלם תשלומי כפל, והשני אינו משלם אלא קרן בלבד.

The Gemara raises an objection from another baraita: If one stole an animal, and another person subsequently came and stole it from him, the first thief pays double payment to the owner, and the second thief pays only the principal to the first thief. This is because one who steals from a thief does not pay the double payment, as the mishna teaches.

גנב ומכר, ובא אחר וגנבו – הראשון משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה, והשני משלם תשלומי כפל. גנב וטבח, ובא אחר וגנבו – הראשון משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה,

If one stole an animal and sold it, and another individual came and stole it from the purchaser, the first thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment to the owner, and the second thief pays the double payment to the purchaser, who has become the new owner of the animal. If one stole an animal and slaughtered it, and another person came and stole the slaughtered animal, the first thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment to the owner, and the second thief does not pay the double payment but only the principal, in accordance with the halakha that one who steals from a thief does not pay the double payment.

והשני אינו משלם תשלומי כפל, אלא קרן בלבד.

קתני מיהא מציעתא: גנב ומכר, ובא אחר וגנבו – הראשון משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה, והשני משלם תשלומי כפל.

The Gemara analyzes this baraita: In any event, the baraita teaches in the middle clause: If one stole an animal and sold it, and another came and stole it from the purchaser, the first thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment to the owner, and the second thief pays the double payment to the purchaser.

אימת? אילימא לפני יאוש, שני אמאי משלם תשלומי כפל? שינוי רשות בלא יאוש מי איכא למאן דאמר דקני?

When did this sale occur? If we say it happened before the owner’s despair, why does the second thief pay the double payment to the purchaser? Is there anyone who says that a change in possession of a stolen item, i.e., when it leaves the possession of the thief and enters the possession of another, without the additional factor of the owner’s despair, causes the one who has it to acquire the item? There is no such opinion. Therefore, the so-called purchaser of the animal does not become its owner, as the sale is invalid. This should be considered as a case of one who steals from a thief, and consequently there should be no double payment.

אלא פשיטא לאחר יאוש. ואי סלקא דעתך יאוש קונה, אמאי משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה? דידיה הוא דזבין!

Rather, it is obvious that the sale occurred after the owner’s despair. And if it enters your mind that a thief acquires a stolen item after the owner’s despair, why should the first thief pay the fourfold or fivefold payment? After all, it is his own animal that he sold, having acquired it immediately upon the owner’s despair.

ותו, דקתני רישא: גנב, ובא אחר וגנבו – ראשון משלם תשלומי כפל, והשני אין משלם אלא קרן.

And furthermore, consider that which the baraita teaches in the first clause: If one stole an animal, and another subsequently came and stole it from him, the first thief pays the double payment to the owner, and the second thief pays only the principal to the first thief.

מכדי לאחר יאוש קיימינן; ואי סלקא דעתך יאוש קונה, שני אמאי אינו משלם אלא קרן? אלא לאו שמע מינה יאוש לא קני, וקשיא לרב?

Now, in this baraita we are dealing with a situation after the owner’s despair, as the Gemara just established. And if it enters your mind that the owner’s despair causes the thief to acquire the item, why does the second thief pay only the principal? After the owner has despaired of recovering his item, the thief becomes the owner of the item, and the second thief should have to pay him double payment for stealing his property. Rather, must one not conclude from the baraita that the owner’s despair does not cause the thief to acquire the item? And this presents a difficulty to the opinion of Rav.

אמר רבא: ותסברא הא מתרצתא היא?! אלא דקתני סיפא: גנב וטבח, ובא אחר וגנבו – ראשון משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה, ושני אינו משלם אלא קרן; ומי איכא

Rava said: And can you understand that the text of this baraita is accurate? But consider that which it teaches in the last clause: If one stole an animal and slaughtered it, and another came and stole the slaughtered animal, the first thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment to the owner, and the second thief pays only the principal to the first thief. And is there anyone who says that a physical change brought about by an action does not cause the thief to acquire the item? There is no such opinion; the thief certainly becomes the owner of the animal after slaughtering it. Consequently, the second thief should have to pay the double payment to the thief for stealing his slaughtered animal. It must therefore be concluded that the text of the baraita has been corrupted and must be reformulated.

למאן דאמר שינוי מעשה לא קני?

אלא לעולם כולה לפני יאוש, ואיפוך סיפא למציעתא ומציעתא לסיפא, ואימא הכי: גנב ומכר, ובא אחר וגנבו – הראשון משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה,

Rather, actually the entire baraita is referring to the stage before the owner’s despair. And you must reverse the halakha stated in the last clause with that stated in the middle clause, and reverse the halakha stated in the middle clause with that stated in the last clause, and say like this: If one stole an animal and sold it, and another came and stole it from the purchaser, the first thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment to the owner, and the second thief pays only the principal to the purchaser, as a change in possession without the additional factor of owner’s despair does not cause one to acquire the item.

והשני אינו משלם אלא קרן – דשינוי רשות בלא יאוש לא קני.

גנב וטבח, ובא אחר וגנבו – הראשון משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה, והשני משלם תשלומי כפל; דקנייה בשינוי מעשה.

If one stole an animal and slaughtered it, and another came and stole the slaughtered animal, the first thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment to the owner, and the second thief pays the double payment to the first thief, as the first thief acquired it through the physical change brought about by an action, i.e., slaughter.

רב פפא אמר: לעולם לא תיפוך; סיפא בית שמאי היא, דאמרי: שינוי במקומו עומד.

Rav Pappa said: Actually, do not reverse the middle and last clauses of the baraita. With regard to the difficult last clause, it is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say: Even if an item has undergone a physical change, it remains in its place, i.e., a stolen item remains the property of the owner. A thief never attains ownership of it, even if it undergoes a physical change.

אי הכי, קשיא רישא ומציעתא לרב!

The Gemara asks: If so, if the baraita is not reversed, and if it is referring to the stage after the owner’s despair, then the first clause and the middle clause of the baraita present a difficulty to the opinion of Rav, who maintains that after the owner’s despair the item belongs entirely to the thief.

אמר רב זביד: לעולם כולה לפני יאוש, והכא במאי עסקינן – שנתייאשו הבעלים בלוקח ולא נתייאשו בגנב, דהוה ליה יאוש ושינוי רשות.

Rav Zevid said: Actually, the entire baraita is dealing with the stage before the owner’s despair. And with what are we dealing here, in the middle clause of the baraita? We are dealing with a case where the owners despaired of recovering the item when it was already in the possession of the purchaser, but they had not yet despaired when the item was in the possession of the thief. The purchaser is considered the owner because after the despair occurred, there were two factors in play, both the owner’s despair and a change in possession. The combination of these two factors effects acquisition of the item on behalf of the purchaser.

ולא תימא משום דבעינן יאוש ושינוי רשות, אלא אפילו ביאוש לחודיה נמי קני גבי גנב;

Rav Zevid continues: And do not say that in the middle clause the reason the owner’s item is acquired by another is only because we require two factors, i.e., the owner’s despair and change of possession. Rather, even in a case of the owner’s despair by itself, the item is acquired by the thief, in accordance with Rav’s opinion that despair alone effects acquisition on behalf of the thief.

אלא דלא משכחת דמשלמי תרוייהו גנב ראשון וגנב שני, אלא בהכי.

Nevertheless, the baraita chose a case in which both of these factors are present because you will not find a case in which both of them, the first thief and the second thief, pay a penalty except in such a case. The first thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment, and the second thief pays the double payment. Had the owner despaired before the sale, the first thief would have been considered the owner and would therefore be exempt from the additional payment.

איתמר: המוכר לפני יאוש – רב נחמן אמר: חייב, רב ששת אמר: פטור.

§ It was stated: With regard to a thief who sells a stolen animal before the owner’s despair, Rav Naḥman says: He is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, despite the fact that the sale is invalid. Rav Sheshet says: He is exempt from this payment.

רב נחמן אמר חייב – ״ומכרו״ אמר רחמנא, והא זבין; לא שנא לפני יאוש, לא שנא לאחר יאוש. רב ששת אמר פטור – חיוביה לאחר יאוש הוא,

The two amora’im explain the reasons for their respective rulings. Rav Naḥman says: He is liable, because the Merciful One states with regard to the fourfold or fivefold payment: “And slaughter it or sell it” (Exodus 21:37), and he has sold it. There is no difference if the sale occurs before despair, and there is no difference if it takes place after despair. Rav Sheshet says: He is exempt, as his liability is in effect only if he sells the animal after the owner’s despair, when his action, i.e., the sale, is effective. But if he sells it before the owner’s despair, when his action is not effective, he is not liable, as we require that the sale be similar to the slaughter, as they are mentioned together, and when he slaughters the animal his action is effective.

דאהנו מעשיו; אבל לפני יאוש דלא אהנו מעשיו – לא מיחייב; דומיא דטביחה בעינן, דאהנו מעשיו.

אמר רב ששת: מנא אמינא לה? דתניא, אמר רבי עקיבא: מפני מה אמרה תורה טבח ומכר משלם ארבעה וחמשה? מפני שנשתרש בחטא.

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say he is exempt? As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva said: For what reason did the Torah say that a thief who slaughtered or sold a stolen animal pays the fourfold or fivefold payment? It is because he has become entrenched in sin by slaughtering or selling the animal he stole.

אימת? אילימא לפני יאוש, מי איכא נשתרש? אלא לאו לאחר יאוש הוא? אמר רבא: מפני ששנה בחטא.

Rav Sheshet analyzes the baraita: When did this sale, referred to by Rabbi Akiva, occur? If we say that it happened before the owner’s despair, is it possible that there is any entrenchment in sin here? A sale before the owner’s despair is invalid, which means there is no deepening of his earlier sin. Rather, is it not the case that this is referring to a sale after the owner’s despair? Rava said: This is not a proof, as one can explain that the thief is entrenched in sin because he repeated his sin, i.e. sinned a second time, by his act of sale, regardless of the fact that the sale is invalid.

תא שמע: ״וטבחו ומכרו״; מה טביחה – שאינה חוזרת, אף מכירה – שאינה חוזרת. אימת? אילימא לפני יאוש, אמאי אינה חוזרת? אלא לאחר יאוש – ושמע מינה חיובא

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for the opinion of Rav Sheshet from a different baraita: It is written: “And slaughter it or sell it” (Exodus 21:37). Just as slaughter is an act that cannot be undone, so too the selling referred to here is an act that cannot be undone. The Gemara analyzes this baraita: When did this sale take place? If we say that it happened before the owner’s despair of recovering his stolen item, why can it not be undone? The thief’s sale of the animal is invalid before the owner’s despair, and therefore the sale is easily undone. Rather, it must be referring to a sale that took place after the owner’s despair. And one can conclude from the baraita that there is liability to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment only if the animal is sold after the owner’s despair. Rav Naḥman rejected this proof, as he interpreted that baraita as serving to exclude one who transferred ownership of the animal temporarily, e.g., for thirty days.

לאחר יאוש הוא! תרגמה רב נחמן: פרט לשהקנה לו לשלשים יום.

ואף רבי אלעזר סבר חיוביה לאחר יאוש הוא, דאמר רבי אלעזר:

The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Elazar also holds that the liability of a thief to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment applies if he sells it after the owner’s despair of recovering his stolen animal, as Rabbi Elazar says:

תדע שסתם גניבה יאוש בעלים הוא –

Know that an ordinary case of theft is assumed to result in the owner’s despair of recovering the stolen item. In other words, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one may assume that the victim of theft has despaired of recovering his item.

שהרי אמרה תורה: טבח ומכר – משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה. ודלמא לא אייאש! אלא לאו משום דאמרינן: סתם גניבה – יאוש בעלים היא.

The reason is that the Torah stated that if a thief slaughtered or sold the animal he had stolen, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. But why is this so? Perhaps the owner did not yet despair at the time the thief sold the animal, in which case the sale is invalid, and there should be no fourfold or fivefold payment. Rather, is it not because we say that an ordinary case of theft is assumed to result in the owner’s despair of recovering the stolen item? This concludes the statement of Rabbi Elazar, which clearly indicates that there is no fourfold or fivefold payment if the animal is sold before the owner’s despair.

ודלמא אף על גב דלא אייאש!

The Gemara asks a question with regard to Rabbi Elazar’s assumption: But perhaps the Torah obligates the thief to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment even if the owner has not yet despaired at the time of the sale, despite the fact that the sale is invalid, as Rav Naḥman stated.

אמרי: לא סלקא דעתך; דומיא דטביחה – מה טביחה דאהנו מעשיו, אף מכירה דאהנו מעשיו. ואי לפני יאוש, מאי אהנו?

In response to this question the Sages say: This cannot enter your mind, as Rabbi Elazar maintains that the juxtaposition of slaughtering and selling in the verse that states: “And slaughter it or sell it,” teaches that the thief’s sale of the animal is similar to his slaughter of it. Just as slaughter is a matter in which his action was effective, so too, the case of selling the animal is one in which his action was effective, i.e., the sale is valid. And if the sale occurred before the owner’s despair, in what sense were his actions effective?

ודלמא דשמעיניה דאייאש! אמרי: לא סלקא דעתך; דומיא דטביחה – מה טביחה לאלתר, אף מכירה לאלתר.

The Gemara asks another question with regard to Rabbi Elazar’s reasoning: But perhaps the Torah requires the fourfold or fivefold payment only in the specific case where the animal is sold after we heard that the owner despaired of its recovery. The Sages respond to this and say: This cannot enter your mind, since, as explained above, the thief’s sale of the animal must be similar to his slaughter of it. Therefore, just as the thief is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment for slaughtering the animal even if he does so immediately, so too, the halakha that he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment for selling it applies even if he does so immediately, before it is known that the owner has despaired of recovering the animal.

אמר לו רבי יוחנן: גניבה בנפש תוכיח – שאין יאוש בעלים, וחייב! מכלל דסבר רבי יוחנן: לפני יאוש חייב.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Elazar: The case of stealing a human being, i.e., kidnapping, proves that your reasoning is incorrect. The Torah states: “And he who steals a man and sells him or if he is found in his hand, he shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:16). In this case there is no owner’s despair, as no one ever despairs of his own freedom. Consequently, the thief’s sale of the person he kidnapped is invalid, and yet the Torah states that he is liable to receive the death penalty for selling him. One can learn by inference from this question that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that if the thief sells the stolen animal before the owner’s despair he is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

לאחר יאוש מאי? רבי יוחנן אמר: חייב, וריש לקיש אמר: פטור.

§ The Gemara asks: If the thief sells the animal after the owner’s despair, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable. And Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.

רבי יוחנן אמר חייב – חיוביה בין לפני יאוש, בין לאחר יאוש. ריש לקיש אמר פטור – חיוביה לפני יאוש הוא, אבל לאחר יאוש – קנה,

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable, as the thief’s liability applies whether the animal is sold before the owner’s despair or after his despair. Reish Lakish says: He is exempt, as the thief’s liability is in effect only if he sells the animal before the owner’s despair, but after the owner’s despair there is no liability, because the thief has acquired the animal by virtue of the owner’s despair, and therefore it is his own animal that he slaughters or his own animal that he sells.

ושלו הוא טובח ושלו הוא מוכר.

איתיביה רבי יוחנן לריש לקיש: גנב והקדיש, ואחר כך טבח – משלם תשלומי כפל, ואינו משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita: If one stole an animal and consecrated it, and subsequently slaughtered it, he pays the double payment to the owner of the animal, but he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. The Torah states: “The one whom the judges convict shall pay double to his neighbor” (Exodus 22:8). The word “neighbor” excludes the case of one who steals a consecrated item from the Temple treasury. Since there is no double payment to the Temple treasury there can be no fourfold or fivefold payment either, as the fourfold or fivefold payment is considered an addition to, not a replacement of, the double payment (see 75a). Therefore, a thief does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment to the Temple treasury for slaughtering one of its animals.

אימת? אלימא לפני יאוש, מי קדוש?! ״איש כי יקדש את ביתו קדש״ אמר רחמנא – מה ביתו שלו, אף כל שלו!

The Gemara analyzes the baraita: When did the events described in the baraita occur? If we say they happened before the owner’s despair, is the animal consecrated at all? A thief cannot consecrate a stolen item before the owner despairs of recovering it, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And when a man shall sanctify his house to be holy unto the Lord” (Leviticus 27:14), from which it is derived: Just as one’s house belongs to him, so too, anything that one consecrates must belong to him, and therefore a thief cannot consecrate a stolen item.

אלא פשיטא לאחר יאוש; וטעמא דהקדיש הוא דאינו משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה, דכי קא טבח – דהקדש קא טבח, אבל לא הקדיש – טבח משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה.

Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is dealing with events that occurred after the owner’s despair. And yet the only reason that he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment is that he consecrated the animal, on the grounds that when he slaughtered it he slaughtered consecrated property. But if he did not consecrate the animal before he slaughtered it he would pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. And if it enters your mind that the owner’s despair serves to acquire the animal for the thief, why would he have to pay? At that point it is his own animal that he slaughters or his own animal that he sells.

ואי סלקא דעתך יאוש קונה, אמאי משלם? שלו הוא טובח, שלו הוא מוכר!

אמר ליה: הכא במאי עסקינן – כגון שהקדישוהו בעלים ביד גנב.

Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: With what are we dealing here? The baraita is referring to a case that occurred before the owner’s despair, and it is not the thief who consecrated the animal, as he cannot do so. Rather, we are dealing with a case where the owner consecrated the animal while it was in the thief’s possession.

ומי קדוש?! והאמר רבי יוחנן: גזל ולא נתייאשו הבעלים – שניהן אינן יכולין להקדיש, זה לפי שאינו שלו, וזה לפי שאינו ברשותו! אמרי: הוא דאמר – כצנועין,

The Gemara asks: And is the animal consecrated in this situation? But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: If one stole an item and the owner has not yet despaired of recovering it, neither of them is able to consecrate it. This one, the thief, cannot consecrate the item, because it does not belong to him; and that one, the owner, cannot consecrate it, because it is not in his possession. The Sages state an answer on behalf of Reish Lakish: He stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of the pious ones [tzenuin], who acted not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

דתנן: הצנועין מניחין את המעות, ואומרים: כל הנלקט מזה, יהא מחולל על המעות האלו.

As we learned in a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 5:1): The pious ones would set aside some coins and say: Anything that was picked from this vine by passersby shall be desacralized onto these coins. This mishna is referring to a grapevine in its fourth year after planting. The grapes on this vine must be either eaten in Jerusalem or redeemed with money that is then taken to Jerusalem and spent on food. The fruit may not be eaten outside Jerusalem without being redeemed. The pious ones were concerned that a passerby might help himself to some of their grapes, thereby transgressing a prohibition. Therefore, they would redeem any of their grapes that might be picked and eaten by passersby. Evidently, these pious ones were of the opinion that the owner of a stolen item can redeem it despite the fact that it is no longer in his possession. Likewise, they would say, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, that an owner of a stolen item can consecrate it even though it is no longer in his possession.

והרי חזרה קרן לבעלים!

The Gemara asks a question with regard to Reish Lakish’s explanation of the baraita, that it is discussing a case where the owner of the animal consecrated it after it was stolen: But the principal amount, i.e., the stolen animal itself, has returned to the owner. By consecrating the animal, the owner has exercised his ownership of it, and it is therefore considered to have been returned to him at that point. The thief should therefore not be required to pay the double payment, as a thief is liable for double payment only when the stolen item is in his possession at the time of the trial, as it states: “The theft shall be found in his hand” (Exodus 22:3).

כשעמד בדין.

The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where the thief stood in judgment and was found guilty of theft before the owner consecrated the animal. Consequently, the liability to pay the double payment preceded the owner’s consecration of his property.

היכי דמי? אי דאמרי ״צא תן לו״ – מאי איריא הקדיש? אפילו לא הקדיש נמי לא ליחייביה!

The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this answer: What are the circumstances of this trial of the thief? If it refers to a situation where the members of the court say to him: Go out and give the animal back to its owner, why does the baraita say that the thief is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment specifically because the owner consecrated the animal before it was slaughtered? Even if he did not consecrate it the thief should also not be liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

דאמר רבא: ״צא תן לו״, טבח ומכר – פטור. מאי טעמא?

The Gemara elaborates. As Rava says: If the court tells a thief: Go out and give the stolen animal back to the owner and instead the thief slaughtered or sold it, he is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment. What is the reason for this?

כיון דפסקוה למילתיה וטבח ומכר – הוה ליה גזלן, וגזלן אינו משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה.

Since the court has issued a definitive ruling in this matter, and he later slaughtered or sold the animal, he is considered a robber, and a robber does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. The difference between a thief, concerning whom the Torah prescribes the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold payment, and a robber, who does not incur these obligations, is that a thief acts stealthily, whereas a robber brazenly uses force to take an item from its owner. Once a court has obligated a thief to make restitution and he has defied this sentence, he is considered a robber, and therefore the fourfold or fivefold payment and its atonement are not applicable to him.