בבא קמא דף נד

״או״, מיבעי ליה לחלק. ורבי יהודה – לחלק מ״ונפל״ נפקא. ורבנן – ״ונפל״, טובא משמע.

The word “or” is necessary to separate the cases of the ox and donkey. This indicates that if either falls in individually, the owner of the pit is liable. And how does Rabbi Yehuda derive the halakha to separate the cases in the verse? He derives it from the use of the singular form of the verb: “And an ox or donkey fall [venafal],” indicating that he is liable if even one animal falls. And the Rabbis maintain that the term and fall can also indicate many animals, as the use of the singular form of a verb does not prove that the subject is necessarily singular.

אימא ״ונפל״ – כלל, ״שור וחמור״ – פרט; כלל ופרט – אין בכלל אלא מה שבפרט; שור וחמור – אין, מידי אחרינא – לא!

The Gemara now challenges both opinions: Say that the term “and fall” is a generalization, whereas the phrase “an ox or a donkey” is a detail. According to the principles of halakhic exegesis, when the Torah presents a generalization and a detail, the generalization includes only what is contained in the detail. Therefore, an ox and a donkey are indeed included, but anything else is not included.

אמרי: ״בעל הבור ישלם״ – חזר וכלל. כלל ופרט וכלל – אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט; מה הפרט מפורש – בעלי חיים, אף כל בעלי חיים.

The Sages said in response: The following verse: “The owner of the pit shall pay” (Exodus 21:34), means that it then generalized again. The verses are structured according to the principle of halakhic exegesis of: A generalization, and a detail, and a generalization. According to this principle, you may deduce that the verses are referring only to items that are similar to the detail. In this case, just as the explicit detail is referring to animals, so too, all items included in the generalization must be animals.

אי, מה הפרט מפורש, דבר שנבלתו מטמאה במגע ובמשא – אף כל דבר שנבלתו מטמאה במגע ובמשא, אבל עופות לא!

The Gemara now challenges this answer: If so, just as the explicit detail, i.e., the ox and donkey, is referring to items whose carcass renders a person ritually impure by contact or by carrying, so too, all items, i.e., all animals, whose carcass renders a person ritually impure through contact or by carrying, should be included in the halakhot of damage classified as Pit. But birds, whose carcasses do not render a person impure through contact or by carrying, would not be included.

אם כן, נכתוב רחמנא חד פרטא! הי נכתוב? אי כתב ״שור״, הוה אמינא: קרב לגבי מזבח – אין, שאינו קרב לגבי מזבח – לא.

The Gemara answers: If so, let the Merciful One write only one detail, from which the exclusion of birds could be derived. The Gemara asks: Which detail should the Torah write? If it writes only an ox, I would say that an item that is sacrificed on the altar, such as an ox, indeed renders the owner of the pit liable, whereas an item that is not sacrificed on the altar does not render him liable. And if the Merciful One writes only a donkey, I would say: Those animals whose firstborn is sanctified, such as a donkey, as described in the Torah (Exodus 13:13), do indeed render their owners liable, but animals whose firstborn is not sanctified do not render them liable. Therefore, the Torah states both an ox and a donkey.

ואי כתב רחמנא ״חמור״, הוה אמינא: קדוש בבכורה – אין, שאין קדוש בבכורה – לא!

אלא אמר קרא: ״והמת יהיה לו״ – כל דבר מיתה.

The original difficulty therefore resurfaces: Why is the verse not expounded as a generalization, a detail, and a generalization, thereby excluding birds? Rather, the previous method of deriving liability for a pit must be rejected, and instead it should be derived as follows: The verse states: “And the carcass shall be for him” (Exodus 21:34), from which it may be inferred that anything subject to death is included.

בין לרבנן דקא ממעטי להו לכלים, ובין לרבי יהודה דקא מרבי להו לכלים – כלים בני מיתה נינהו?! אמרי: שבירתן זו היא מיתתן.

The Gemara asks: If this is the basis for liability for a pit, then both according to the Rabbis, who exclude vessels from liability based on another verse, and according to Rabbi Yehuda, who has amplified the halakha to include vessels, one could ask: Are vessels subject to death? Clearly, vessels cannot be subject to death. Why, then, is a separate source necessary to derive their halakhic status? The Sages said in reply: Vessels may also be considered subject to death in the sense that their shattering is tantamount to their death.

ולרב דאמר: בור שחייבה עליו תורה – להבלו ולא לחבטו; בין לרבנן בין לרבי יהודה – כלים בני הבלא נינהו?! אמרי: בחדתי, דמיפקעי מהבלא.

The Gemara continues to challenge this explanation: But according to Rav, who says: With regard to Pit, for which the Torah deems a person liable, it is only for damage caused by its lethal fumes, but not for damage caused by the impact of the fall, the following question may be raised both according to the Rabbis and according to Rabbi Yehuda: Are vessels capable of being broken by the lethal fumes, such that a verse is necessary to exclude them? The Sages said in reply: There is such a case concerning new vessels, which crack from the fumes.

האי ״והמת יהיה לו״ מבעי ליה לכדרבא, דאמר רבא: שור פסולי המוקדשין שנפל לבור – פטור, שנאמר: ״והמת יהיה לו״ – במי שהמת שלו,

The Gemara asks further: But isn’t this verse: “And the carcass shall be for him,” necessary for that which Rava ruled, as Rava says: With regard to a disqualified consecrated ox that fell into a pit, the owner of the pit is exempt, as it is stated: “And the carcass shall be for him.” It is referring to a person to whom the carcass belongs, thereby excluding this person, to whom the carcass does not belong. Once a halakha has already been derived from this verse, it cannot be used as the basis for deriving a second halakha.

יצא זה שאין המת שלו.

אלא אמר קרא: ״כסף ישיב לבעליו״ – לרבות כל דאית ליה בעלים. אי הכי, אפילו כלים ואדם נמי!

Rather, the halakhot of liability for Pit must be derived from another source. The verse states concerning Pit: “He shall recompense money to its owners” (Exodus 21:34), thereby including any item that has an owner within the scope of liability. The Gemara challenges this answer: If so, then even vessels and people should be included as well, which presents a difficulty for all opinions.

אמר קרא: ״שור״ – ולא אדם, ״חמור״ – ולא כלים. ולרבי יהודה דקא מרבי להו לכלים, בשלמא ״שור״ – ממעט ביה אדם, אלא ״חמור״ מאי ממעט ביה?

The Gemara answers: This is why the verse states: “An ox,” but not a person; “a donkey,” but not vessels. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who amplifies the scope of liability to include vessels, granted that the term “an ox” is necessary, as he excludes people based on it, for which he is not liable. But with regard to the term “a donkey,” what does he exclude based on it?

אלא אמר רבא: ״חמור״ דבור לרבי יהודה, ו״שה״ דאבידה לדברי הכל – קשיא.

Rather, Rava said: The term “donkey” stated with regard to Pit, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the term “sheep” (Deuteronomy 22:1), stated with regard to a lost item, according to the opinion of everyone (see Bava Metzia 27a) are difficult. There is no explanation for why they are stated.

נפל לתוכו שור חרש שוטה וקטן – חייב. מאי ״שור חרש שוטה וקטן״? אילימא שור של חרש, שור של שוטה,

§ The mishna teaches: If a ḥeresh ox or a shoteh ox or a katan ox fell into the pit, the owner of the pit is liable. The Gemara clarifies: What is meant by the phrase: A ḥeresh ox or a shoteh ox or a katan ox? If we say that it means: An ox belonging to a deaf-mute [ḥeresh], an ox belonging to an imbecile [shoteh], or an ox belonging to a minor [katan], then it can be inferred that if it was an ox belonging to a halakhically competent adult, the owner of the pit would be exempt. What would be the reason for this exemption?

שור של קטן – הא שור של פקח פטור?!

אמר רבי יוחנן: שור שהוא חרש, שור שהוא שוטה, שור שהוא קטן.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Instead, it should be interpreted as: An ox that is impaired by being deaf, or an ox that is an imbecile, or an ox that is very young.

הא שור שהוא פקח – פטור?

The Gemara asks: But can it be inferred that if an ox that is of standard intelligence fell into a pit, the owner of the pit would be exempt?

אמר רבי ירמיה: לא מיבעיא קאמר; לא מבעיא שור שהוא פקח – דחייב; אבל שור חרש שוטה וקטן, אימא חרשותו גרמה לו, קטנותו גרמה לו,

Rabbi Yirmeya said: The mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, and should be understood as follows: It is not necessary to state that if an ox that is of standard intelligence fell into a pit, that the pit’s owner is liable. But with regard to an ox that is deaf, an imbecile, or very young, say that it was not due to the pit alone that it fell in, but its deafness caused it to fall in or its young age caused it to fall in, and the owner of the pit should be exempt. Therefore, it teaches us that he is liable in these cases as well.

וליפטר; קא משמע לן.

אמר ליה רב אחא לרבינא, והתניא: נפל לתוכו בר דעת – פטור. מאי, לאו שור בר דעת? אמר ליה: לא, אדם. אלא מעתה, אדם בן דעת הוא דפטור,

Rav Aḥa said to Ravina: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If a living being that is mentally competent fell into a pit, the owner is exempt. What, is it not referring to an ox that is mentally competent? Ravina said to him: No, it is referring to a person. Rav Aḥa challenges this response: If that is so, you should then infer that it is only for the injuries of a person who is mentally competent that he is exempt, but if one is not mentally competent, is the halakha that he would be liable? But the term “an ox” is written in the Torah as causing liability, and not a person.

הא לאו בן דעת הוא – דחייב? ״שור״ – ולא אדם כתיב!

אלא מאי ״בן דעת״ – מין בן דעת. אמר ליה, והתניא: נפל לתוכו שור בן דעת – פטור!

Rava responded to Rav Aḥa: Rather, what does the term mentally competent mean? It is referring to a species that is mentally competent, and thereby includes all humans in the exemption from liability. Rav Aḥa said to him: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If an ox that was mentally competent fell inside it, he is exempt.

אלא אמר רבא: שור והוא חרש, שור והוא שוטה, שור והוא קטן – דוקא; אבל שור והוא פקח – פטור. מאי טעמא? דבעי ליה עיוני ומיזל.

Rather, Rava said that Rabbi Yirmeya’s explanation should be rejected, and the mishna is referring specifically to an ox that is deaf, an ox that is an imbecile, and an ox that is very young, for which he is liable; but for an ox that is of standard intelligence, he is exempt. What is the reason? The reason is that the ox should have looked carefully while walking. If it did not, it is responsible for its own injury. The Gemara notes: That idea is also taught in a baraita: With regard to an ox that is deaf, an imbecile, or very young, blind, or that is walking at night and unable to see, if it fell into a pit, the pit’s owner is liable. But if the ox is of standard intelligence and is walking during the day, the pit’s owner is exempt, since normal behavior for oxen is that, ordinarily, they watch where they are going and avoid pits.

תניא נמי הכי: נפל לתוכו שור חרש, שוטה, וקטן, וסומא, ומהלך בלילה – חייב. פקח ומהלך ביום – פטור.

מתני׳ אחד שור ואחד כל בהמה – לנפילת הבור, ולהפרשת הר סיני, ולתשלומי כפל, ולהשבת אבידה, לפריקה, לחסימה, לכלאים, ולשבת.

MISHNA: The halakha is the same whether concerning an ox or whether concerning any other animal with regard to liability for falling into a pit, and with regard to keeping its distance from Mount Sinai at the time of the receiving of the Torah, when it was forbidden for any animal to ascend the mountain, and with regard to the payment of double the principal by a thief, and with regard to the mitzva of returning a lost item, and with regard to unloading its burden, and with regard to the prohibition of muzzling it while threshing, and with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, and with regard to the prohibition against its working on Shabbat.

וכן חיה ועוף כיוצא בהן. אם כן, למה נאמר ״שור או חמור״? אלא שדבר הכתוב בהווה.

And similarly, undomesticated animals and birds are subject to the same halakhot as domesticated animals. If so, why are all of the above halakhot stated in the Torah only in reference to an ox or a donkey? Rather, the reason is that the verse speaks of a common scenario, from which the other cases may be derived.

גמ׳ לנפילת הבור – ״כסף ישיב לבעליו״ כתיב – כל דאית ליה בעלים, כדאמרן. להפרשת הר סיני – ״אם בהמה אם איש לא יחיה״,

GEMARA: The Gemara explains the sources for all of the halakhot enumerated in the mishna that apply to all animals. With regard to falling into a pit, it is written: “He shall recompense money to its owners” (Exodus 21:34), which means that any animal that has owners is included, as we mentioned (see 54a). With regard to the requirement that animals keep their distance from Mount Sinai before the giving of the Torah, this is derived from the verse: “Whether it be animal or person, it shall not live” (Exodus 19:13), and an undomesticated animal [ḥayya] is also included in the term animal [behema]. In addition, the word “whether” serves to include birds.

וחיה בכלל בהמה הויא; ״אם״ – לרבות את העופות.

לתשלומי כפל – כדאמרינן: ״על כל דבר פשע״ – כלל כל דבר פשיעה. להשבת אבידה – ״לכל אבדת אחיך״. לפריקה – יליף ״חמור״–״חמור״ משבת.

With regard to the double payment of a thief, it is as we say in a halakhic exegesis of the verse: “For any matter of trespass” (Exodus 22:8), that it is a general statement which includes any matter of negligence. With regard to the mitzva of returning a lost item, the verse states comprehensively: “For every lost thing of your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:3). With regard to the halakha of unloading a burden, derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word donkey is employed in the context of unloading a burden (see Exodus 23:5), and the word donkey is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

לחסימה – יליף ״שור״–״שור״ משבת.

With regard to the prohibition against muzzling an animal, mentioned in the verse: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing” (Deuteronomy 25:4), derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word “ox” is employed in the context of muzzling, and the word “ox” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

לכלאים – אי כלאים דחרישה, יליף ״שור״–״שור״ משבת;

With regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, if it is referring to the prohibition against using diverse kinds for plowing, due to which it is forbidden to plow with an ox and a donkey together (see Deuteronomy 22:10), derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word “ox” is employed in the context of plowing with diverse kinds, and the word “ox” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

אי כלאים דהרבעה, יליף ״בהמתך״–״בהמתך״ משבת.

If it is referring to the prohibition of diverse kinds for crossbreeding, derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the term “your cattle” is employed in the context of crossbreeding animals (see Leviticus 19:19), and the term “your cattle” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Exodus 20:10), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

וגבי שבת מנלן? דתניא: רבי יוסי אומר משום רבי ישמעאל, בדברות הראשונות נאמר: ״עבדך ואמתך ובהמתך״, ובדברות האחרונות נאמר: ״ושורך וחמרך וכל בהמתך״.

The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive concerning Shabbat itself that the words “ox” and “donkey” are referring to all types of animals? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: In the first version of the Ten Commandments it is stated: “Your manservant, your maidservant, nor your cattle” (Exodus 20:10), whereas in the second version of the Ten Commandments it is stated: “Nor your ox, nor your donkey, nor any of your cattle” (Deuteronomy 5:14). Now, aren’t an ox and a donkey already included in the category of: All animals, which are included in the term “cattle”? Why, then, were they specified? To teach you that just as with regard to the terms ox and donkey that are stated here, undomesticated animals and birds have the same halakha as them, so too, everywhere that an ox and donkey are mentioned, all types of undomesticated animals and birds have the same halakha as them.

והלא שור וחמור בכלל כל בהמה היו, ולמה יצאו? לומר לך: מה שור וחמור האמור כאן – חיה ועוף כיוצא בהן, אף כל חיה ועוף כיוצא בהן.

אימא: ״בהמה״ דדברות הראשונות – כלל, ״שורך וחמרך״ דדברות האחרונות – פרט; כלל ופרט – אין בכלל אלא מה שבפרט; שור וחמור – אין, מידי אחרינא – לא!

The Gemara asks: But why not say that the verses be expounded as follows: The term “cattle” used in the first version of the Ten Commandments is a generalization, and the phrase “your ox and your donkey” used in the latter version of the Ten Commandments is a detail. In the case of a generalization and a detail, the principles of halakhic exegesis dictate that the generalization includes only what is specified in the detail. Therefore, with regard to this subject, an ox and a donkey should indeed be included, but anything else should not be included.

אמרי: ״וכל בהמתך״ דדברות האחרונות – חזר וכלל. כלל ופרט וכלל – אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט; מה הפרט מפורש – בעלי חיים, אף כל בעלי חיים.

The Sages said in reply: In the phrase “nor any of your cattle” stated in the latter version of the Ten Commandments following the phrase “your ox and your donkey,” it then generalized again. Therefore, the verse is structured as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization. According to the principles of halakhic exegesis, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Consequently, just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as animals, so too, all items included in the general term must be animals.

ואימא: מה הפרט מפורש – דבר שנבלתו מטמא[ה] במגע ובמשא, אף כל דבר שנבלתו מטמא[ה] במגע ובמשא; אבל עופות – לא!

The Gemara challenges the answer: But say instead that just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as an item, i.e., an animal, whose carcass renders a person ritually impure through contact or through carrying, so too, all items whose carcass renders a person ritually impure through contact or through carrying should be included. But birds, whose carcasses do not render one impure through contact or through carrying, should not be included.

אמרי: אם כן, נכתוב רחמנא חד פרטא! הי נכתוב רחמנא? אי כתב רחמנא ״שור״, הוה אמינא: קרב לגבי מזבח – אין,

The Sages said in reply: If so, let the Merciful One write only one detail from which this could be derived. The Gemara asks: Which detail should the Merciful One write? If the Merciful One writes only an ox, I would say: An animal that is sacrificed on the altar, such as an ox, indeed renders the owner of the pit liable, whereas an animal that is not sacrificed on the altar does not render him liable. And if the Merciful One writes only a donkey, I would say: An animal whose firstborn is sanctified, such as a donkey, as described in the Torah (Exodus 13:13), does indeed render him liable, but an animal whose firstborn is not sanctified does not render him liable. Therefore, the Merciful One writes both an ox and a donkey.

שאינו קרב לגבי מזבח – לא; כתב רחמנא ״חמור״. ואי כתב רחמנא ״חמור״, הוה אמינא: קדוש בבכורה – אין, שאין קדוש בבכורה – לא; כתב רחמנא ״שור״.

אלא ״וכל בהמתך״ – ריבויא הוא.

Consequently, there is no redundancy, and each detail is required for correctly deriving other halakhot. If so, the previous question resurfaces: Why are the verses not expounded such that the prohibition does not include birds? Rather, the term: “Nor any [vekhol] of your cattle,” should be understood as an amplification, encompassing any item that is even partially similar to the detail.

וכל היכא דכתב רחמנא ״כל״ – ריבויא הוא?! והא גבי מעשר דכתיב ״כל״, וקא דרשינן ליה בכלל ופרט!

The Gemara asks: But is it the case that anywhere that the Merciful One states the word “any [kol]” it is intended as an amplification? But concerning tithes, where it is written “any [kol],” and yet we expound the verses with the method of a generalization and a detail, rather than using the method of amplification and restriction.

דתניא: ״ונתתה הכסף בכל אשר תאוה נפשך״ – כלל, ״בבקר ובצאן וביין ובשכר״ – פרט, ״ובכל אשר תשאלך נפשך״ – חזר וכלל;

This is as it is taught in a baraita concerning second-tithe money brought to Jerusalem: The verse states: “And you shall give the money for anything [bekhol] your soul desires” (Deuteronomy 14:26), which is a generalization, followed by: “For oxen, or for sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink,” which is a detail, and concludes with: “Or for anything [uvkhol] your soul asks of you,” where it then generalized again.

כלל ופרט וכלל – אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט, מה הפרט מפורש – פרי מפרי וגידולי קרקע, אף כל פרי מפרי וגידולי קרקע!

Therefore, the verse is structured as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization. According to the principles of halakhic exegesis, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Consequently, just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as produce of produce, i.e., they grow from a parent organism, such as agricultural produce or animals, and they are grown from the ground, i.e., their sustenance comes from the ground, so too, it includes all things that are the produce of produce and are grown from the ground. It is evident from here that the method of a generalization and a detail is used in connection with the term “kol,” as opposed to interpreting it as an amplification.

אמרי: ״בכל״ – כללא, ״כל״ – ריבויא. איבעית אימא: ״כל״ נמי כללא הוא, מיהו האי ״כל״ דהכא – ריבויא הוא; מדהוה ליה למכתב: ״ובהמתך״ כדכתיב בדברות הראשונות, וכתב:

The Sages said in response: A distinction may be drawn between the term: “For anything [bekhol],” which is a generalization, and the term “any [kol],” as in: “Any of your cattle,” which is an amplification. And if you wish, say instead that the word “any [kol]” is a generalization as well, in addition to “for anything [bekhol].” But this word “any,” written here, is an amplification. This is the case since it could have written: And your cattle, as it is written in the first version of the Ten Commandments, and instead it writes: “Nor any of your cattle.” Learn from this that it is an amplification and encompasses other animals as well.

״וכל בהמתך״ – שמע מינה ריבויא.

השתא דאמרת: ״כל״ – ריבויא הוא; ״בהמתך״ דדברות הראשונות, ו״שור וחמור״ דדברות האחרונות – למה לי?

The Gemara continues to analyze this matter: Now that you have said that the term “any [kol]” is an amplification, why do I need the words “your cattle,” stated in the first version of the Ten Commandments, and the terms “an ox or a donkey,” stated in the latter version of the Ten Commandments? The phrase “and any of your cattle” already includes any animal.

אמרי: ״שור״ – לאגמורי ״שור״–״שור״ לחסימה,

The Sages said in response: Each of these terms is required. The term “ox” can be used to derive the halakha with regard to the prohibition against muzzling, as the word “ox” is employed in the context of muzzling, and the word “ox” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat.

״חמור״ – לאגמורי ״חמור״–״חמור״ לפריקה,

The term “donkey” can be used to derive the halakha with regard to the halakha of unloading a burden, as the word “donkey” is employed in the context of unloading a burden (see Exodus 23:5), and the word “donkey” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14).

״בהמתך״ – לאגמורי ״בהמתך״–״בהמתך״ לכלאים.

The term “your cattle” can be used to derive the halakha with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, as the term “your cattle” is employed in the context of crossbreeding animals (see Leviticus 19:19), and the term “your cattle” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Exodus 20:10).

אי הכי, אפילו אדם ליתסר! אלמה תנן: אדם מותר עם כולן לחרוש ולמשוך?

The Gemara asks: If so, that this redundancy is the source for extending the prohibition of diverse kinds, then it should be prohibited even for a person to plow together with an ox or another animal. Why, then, did we learn in a mishna (Kilayim 8:6): It is permitted for a person to plow and pull with any of them, indicating that the prohibition relates only to animals?

אמר רב פפא: פפונאי ידעי טעמא דהא מילתא – ומנו? רב אחא בר יעקב; אמר קרא: ״למען ינוח עבדך ואמתך כמוך״ – להנחה הקשתיו, ולא לדבר אחר.

Rav Pappa said: The Sages of Paphunya know the reason for this matter, and who are these Sages? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who resided in Paphunya. The reason is that the verse states: “You shall not perform any labor, neither you, your son, your daughter, your slave, your maidservant, your ox, your donkey, any of your animals, or the stranger residing within your city gates, that your manservant and your maidservant may rest as well as you” (Deuteronomy 5:14), as if to say: I have equated people with animals only concerning resting on Shabbat, but not with regard to another matter.

שאל רבי חנינא בן עגיל את רבי חייא בר אבא: מפני מה בדברות הראשונות לא נאמר בהם ״טוב״, ובדברות האחרונות

Having discussed some differences between the two versions of the Ten Commandments, the Gemara now discusses a related matter: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Agil asked Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: For what reason is the word good not stated in the first version of the Ten Commandments, whereas in the latter version of the Ten Commandments,