בבא קמא דף לא

סליקוסתא!

residue from dates?

בשלמא רב אדא בר אהבה – כשמעתיה. אלא רב הונא, לימא הדר ביה?

The Gemara comments: Granted, Rav Adda bar Ahava acted in accordance with his halakhic opinion that this is the halakha, and a public ruling is issued to that effect. But with regard to Rav Huna, shall we say that he retracted his prior opinion?

הנהו – מותרין הוו.

The Gemara answers: Those owners of the barley were forewarned to remove the barley from the public domain, and they did not comply. Therefore, they were penalized by Rav Huna declaring publicly that their barley was ownerless.

מתני׳ שני קדרין שהיו מהלכין זה אחר זה, ונתקל הראשון ונפל, ונתקל השני בראשון – הראשון חייב בנזקי שני.

MISHNA: In the case of two potters carrying pots who were walking one after the other in the public domain, and the first stumbled on a bump and fell, and the second stumbled over the first and fell too, the first is liable to pay for the damage incurred by the second.

גמ׳ אמר רבי יוחנן: לא תימא מתניתין רבי מאיר היא, דאמר: נתקל פושע הוא – וחייב; אלא אפילו לרבנן, דאמרי אנוס הוא,

GEMARA: Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Do not say that the mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that one who stumbles is considered negligent and therefore liable. Rather, even according to the Rabbis, who say that one who stumbles is generally a victim of circumstances beyond his control and is consequently exempt, here, in the case in the mishna, he is liable, since after falling he had the opportunity to stand up, and he did not stand up.

ופטור – הכא חייב; שהיה לו לעמוד, ולא עמד.

רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר: אפילו תימא לא היה לו לעמוד; היה לו להזהיר, ולא הזהיר.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Even if you say that he did not have the opportunity to stand up, he had the opportunity to warn the person behind him, and he did not warn him.

ורבי יוחנן אמר: כיון דלא היה לו לעמוד – לא היה לו להזהיר; דטריד.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said in response that since he did not have the opportunity to stand up, he did not have the opportunity to warn the other person either, as he was busy trying to stand up. Therefore, the mishna, which holds him liable, must be referring to a case where he could have stood up.

תנן: היה בעל קורה ראשון ובעל חבית אחרון, נשברה חבית בקורה – פטור, ואם עמד בעל קורה – חייב.

The Gemara attempts to prove that the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak is correct. We learned in the next mishna (31b): If the owner of a cross beam was walking in the public domain carrying his beam first, and the owner of a barrel was walking with his barrel last, i.e., behind him, and the barrel was broken by the cross beam, the one who carried the cross beam is exempt. But if the owner of the cross beam stopped, he is liable, since the accident was caused by his stopping.

מאי, לאו שעמד לכתף – דאורחיה הוא, וקתני חייב, דהוה ליה להזהיר?

The Gemara asks: What, is it not referring to a situation where the one carrying the cross beam stopped in order to adjust the load on his shoulder, which is the normative behavior of one carrying a beam, and is not considered negligence? And nevertheless the tanna teaches that he is liable, as, although he had the opportunity to warn the person behind him that he was about to stop, he did not warn him. This supports the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak.

לא, כשעמד לפוש.

The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to a situation where he stopped to rest, which could not have been anticipated by the person walking behind him. Consequently, he is liable.

אבל עמד לכתף מאי, פטור? אדתני סיפא: ואם אמר לו לבעל חבית ״עמוד״ – פטור, לפלוג וליתני בדידה: במה דברים אמורים – כשעמד לפוש,

The Gemara asks: But according to this interpretation, if he stopped to adjust the load on his shoulder, what is the halakha? Is he exempt? If so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of that mishna: But if he said to the owner of the barrel: Stop, he is exempt, let the tanna distinguish and teach within the former case itself, as follows: In what case is this statement, that he is liable, said? In a case when he stopped to rest. But in a case where he stopped to adjust the load on his shoulder, he is exempt.

אבל עמד לכתף – פטור!

הא קא משמע לן – דאף על גב דעמד לפוש, כי קאמר לו לבעל חבית: ״עמוד״ – פטור.

The Gemara answers: The mishna is presented in this manner because it teaches us this novelty, that even if he stopped to rest, in a case when he says to the owner of the barrel: Stop, he is exempt.

תא שמע: הקדרין והזגגין שהיו מהלכין זה אחר זה; נתקל הראשון ונפל, ונתקל השני בראשון, והשלישי בשני – ראשון חייב בנזקי שני, ושני חייב בנזקי שלישי.

Come and hear an alternative proof from what is taught in a baraita: With regard to potters and glaziers who were walking one after the other, and the first stumbled and fell, and the second stumbled over the first, sustaining damage, and the third stumbled over the second, also falling and sustaining damage, in this case, the first person is liable to pay for the damage of the second, and the second is liable to pay for the damage of the third. But if they all fell because of the first, the first is liable to pay for the damage of them all. And if they warned each other, i.e., each one warned the next, they are all exempt. The Gemara concludes: What, is it not a case where they did not have the opportunity to stand up, and they are nevertheless liable to pay for not warning the people behind them, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak?

ואם מחמת ראשון נפלו – ראשון חייב בנזקי כולם. ואם הזהירו זה את זה – פטורין. מאי, לאו שלא היה להן לעמוד?

לא, שהיה להן לעמוד.

The Gemara answers: No, it is a case where they had the opportunity to stand up and they did not do so.

אבל לא היה להם לעמוד מאי, פטור? אי הכי, אדתני סיפא: אם הזהירו זה את זה – פטור; לפלוג וליתני בדידה: במה דברים אמורים – שהיה להן לעמוד,

The Gemara asks: But according to this interpretation, if they did not have the opportunity to stand up, what would be the halakha? Would they be exempt? If so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the baraita: If they warned one another, they are exempt, let the tanna distinguish and teach within the former case itself, as follows: In what case is this statement, that they are liable, said? It is a case where they had the opportunity to stand up, but if they did not have the opportunity to stand up, they are exempt.

אבל לא היה להן לעמוד – פטורין!

הא קא משמע לן – דאף על גב דהיה להן לעמוד, כי הזהירו זה את זה – פטורין.

The Gemara answers: The baraita is presented in this manner because it teaches us this novelty, that even if they had the opportunity to stand up, in a case when they warned each other they are exempt.

אמר רבא: ראשון חייב בנזקי שני – בין בנזקי גופו, בין בנזקי ממונו. שני חייב בנזקי שלישי – בנזקי גופו, אבל לא בנזקי ממונו.

§ With regard to this halakha, Rava said: The first one who stumbled is liable to pay for the damage of the second, both for damage caused to the second person by his body and for damage caused to him by his property. By contrast, the second is liable to pay for the damage of the third only with regard to damage caused by his body as result of the fall, and not with regard to damage caused by his property.

ממה נפשך? אי נתקל פושע הוא – שני נמי ליחייב! אי נתקל לאו פושע הוא – אפילו ראשון נמי ליפטר!

The Gemara questions Rava’s statement: Whichever way you look at it, this is difficult to understand. If Rava maintains that one who stumbles is considered negligent, the second person should also be liable to pay for all forms of damage caused by his negligence. And if Rava maintains that one who stumbles is not considered negligent, even the first should be exempt from liability for the damage incurred by the second.

ראשון – ודאי פושע הוא. שני – אגופו מחייב, דהיה לו לעמוד ולא עמד. אממונו פטור, דאמר ליה: האי בירא – לאו אנא כריתיה.

The Gemara explains: The first is certainly considered negligent, and is therefore liable to pay for damage caused by both his body and his property. The second is deemed liable to pay for damage caused by his body, as he had the opportunity to stand up and he did not stand up. For damage caused by his property that was lying there and that caused the third person to stumble and fall, he is exempt, as he can say to him: I did not dig this pit, i.e., I did not cause this obstacle. Since it was the first person who stumbled and brought about the situation where the items of the second were lying on the ground, the second is not deemed liable.

מיתיבי: כולן חייבין על נזקי גופן, ופטורין על נזקי ממונן. מאי, לאו אפילו ראשון?

The Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s statement from a baraita that comments on this case: All of them are liable to pay for damage caused by their bodies and exempt from paying restitution for damage caused by their property. What, does this not refer even to the first, indicating that even he is exempt from damage caused by his property?

לא, לבר מראשון. והא ״כולם״ קתני! אמר רב אדא בר אהבה: ״כולן״ – הניזקין.

The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to all of them except for the first. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the baraita teach the term all of them, indicating that the first is also included? Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The term all of them refers only to those who incurred damage, and excludes the first one, who only caused damage to others.

האי מאי? אי אמרת בשלמא אפילו ראשון – היינו דקתני ״כולן״; אלא אי אמרת לבר מראשון, מאי ״כולן״? ליתני ״הניזקין״!

The Gemara questions this answer: What is this interpretation? Granted, if you say that the term includes even the first, this explanation is consistent with that which is taught: All of them. But if you say that it is referring to all of them except for the first, what is the reason that the misleading term: All of them is used? Let the baraita teach more accurately that those who incurred damage are liable in turn for the damage caused by their bodies, but are exempt from paying restitution for damage caused by their property.

אלא אמר רבא: ראשון חייב – בין בנזקי גופו דשני, בין בנזקי ממונו דשני; ושני חייב בנזקי שלישי – בנזקי גופו, אבל לא בנזקי ממונו. מאי טעמא?

Rather, this entire explanation of Rava’s statement should be rejected, and it should be explained as follows: Rava said that the first is liable both for injury caused to the body of the second and for damage caused to the property of the second, and the second is liable to pay for damage incurred by the third with regard to injury to his body but not with regard to damage to his property. What is the reason for the exemption in the last case? It is because after his fall, the body of the second person is effectively a pit, and we do not find that in the category of Pit one is liable to pay restitution for damage caused to vessels.

דהוה ליה בור, ולא מצינו בור שחייב בו את הכלים.

הניחא לשמואל, דאמר: כל תקלה – בור הוא; אלא לרב, דאמר: אי אפקריה אין, אי לא לא; מאי איכא למימר?

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to Shmuel, who says that any obstacle that was placed in the public domain constitutes a pit, i.e., the halakhot of a pit apply to it. But according to Rav, who says that if the one who placed it there renounces ownership of the hazardous object it is considered a pit, but if he does not renounce ownership of it then it is not considered a pit, what is there to say? The second one who fell obviously did not renounce ownership of his body, so why is he exempt from damage he caused to vessels as though he were a pit?

לעולם – כדאמר מעיקרא, ודקשיא לך ״כולן חייבין״ – תרגמה רב אדא בר מניומי קמיה דרבינא: שהוזקו כלים בכלים.

The Gemara answers: Actually, Rava’s statement should be explained as he was understood to have said initially, i.e., that he distinguishes between damage caused by another’s body and damage caused by his property. And as for your difficulty from the statement in the baraita that all of them are liable to pay for the damage caused by their bodies but exempt from paying restitution for the damage caused by their property, apparently including even the first one, contrary to Rava’s opinion, Rav Adda bar Minyumi interpreted it before Ravina as referring to a case where vessels were damaged by vessels. In other words, it is not the body, but the vessels of the second that were damaged by the property of the first, and since the broken vessels of the first have the status of a pit, the owner is exempt from liability for damage caused to the vessels of others.

אמר מר: אם מחמת ראשון נפלו – ראשון חייב בנזקי כולם. מחמת ראשון היכי נפיל? רב פפא אמר: דפסקה לאורחיה כשלדא. רב זביד אמר: כחוטרא דסמיותא.

The Master said above: If they all fell because of the first, the first is liable to pay for the damage of them all. The Gemara asks: How did they all fall because of the first? Rav Pappa said: It is a case where he blocked the road like a skeleton [keshilda], filling the entire width of the road and causing the rest to stumble over different parts of his body. Rav Zevid said: He fell diagonally like a blind man’s cane, and they all stumbled over him.

מתני׳ זה בא בחביתו וזה בא בקורתו, נשברה כדו של זה בקורתו של זה – פטור; שלזה רשות להלך, ולזה רשות להלך.

MISHNA: If this person came in the public domain with his barrel, and that person came from the opposite direction with his cross beam, and this one’s jug was broken by that one’s cross beam, the one carrying the cross beam is exempt, because this one had permission to walk in the public domain, and that one also had permission to walk there.

היה בעל הקורה ראשון ובעל חבית אחרון; נשברה חבית בקורה – פטור בעל הקורה.

If they were walking in the same direction, so that the owner of the cross beam was walking first, in front, and the owner of a barrel last, behind him, and the barrel was broken by the cross beam, the owner of the cross beam is exempt, since the owner of the barrel saw him in front of him and should have been more careful.